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Preface 
”The Nordic Pearls” – a network consisting of Fondet for dansk-norsk 
samarbeid (Lysebu and Schæffergården), Hanaholmen, Nordens folkhög-
skola Biskops-Arnö and Voksenåsen  – have together with Nordens Hus in 
Reykjavík addressed different aspects of past and present Nordic-
Russian relations in a conference series during 2015 and 2016. The aim 
was to create a better understanding of the contemporary and historical 
aspects of the relations between Russia and our countries.
The conference on “State, Religion, and Society in Russia and the Nordic 
Countries” at Schæffergården 3 - 4 November 2016 was a part of this se-
ries. It attempted to widen our understanding of this subject by focusing 
on significant differences in notions of religion-state relations as well as 
differences when it comes to the role played by religion in our societies. 
It is in our common interest to know and hopefully to understand the 
differences in order to create a basis for continuing mutual relations.  
At the conference, a number of specialists offered their views on Russia’s 
“special path” as a basis of interpretation and discussion. Their contribu-
tions are presented here. 
The conference was arranged by Fondet for dansk-norsk samarbeid, and 
has been generously supported by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. 
The program has been planned by Dr Christian Gottlieb.
Terje Nygaard
General secretary
Fondet for dansk-norsk samarbeid
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Until a few years ago we in the West had already got 
used to the idea that Russia, after the collapse of the 
Soviet experiment, was now finally on its way to be-
coming a “normal” country” with democracy, freedom, 
a market economy and all the other trappings of a mod-
ern liberal society. 
But with the rise of the current Russian president, 
Vladimir Putin, these expectations have gradually been 
disappointed. Particularly since the Ukrainian crisis, cul-
minating with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, 
the policies of Mr. Putin have been the cause of much 
controversy and a polarization of the debate on Russia 
and its relation to other parts of the world, particularly 
the West. Suddenly the “normality” that we had come 
to expect seemed to evaporate only to give way to a 
more sinister form of traditional Russian authoritarian-
ism.
To many politicians and opinion makers in the West 
this change seemed to come as something of a sur-
prise; and a very unpleasant one, at that. Many reac-
tions to the change seem to indicate that there is not a 
great deal of understanding that while some factors in 
Russian society do indeed support a development of 
Western “normality”, several other factors weigh heavily 
in another direction. For many complex reasons Rus-
sian society remains characterized by a series of factors 
that impede or prevent its development according to 
western standards of “normality”.
The aim of this conference is an attempt to identify 
some of these factors and to consider them from the 
perspective of the Nordic countries that are among 
Russia’s closest neighbors.
In order to identify these factors the conference will 
focus particularly on the relationship between state, 
religion and society in both Russia and the Nordic coun-
tries. This is done in a belief that this theme is where 
some of the most hotly contested issues are to be 
found. It is also believed that precisely a comparative 
analysis will help to promote a mutual understanding 
of the issues.
Conference themes
The conference theme is based on the proposition that 
three important historical factors have contributed par-
ticularly to the formation of Russian society. These are:
• The role and functioning of theocracy.
• The idea and practice of Russia as an Orthodox 
Christian empire.
• Russia/Orthodoxy as an (imagined) independent 
civilization.
All have deep roots in Russian/Orthodox history and, 
although dormant for most of the 20th century they 
are all now back as objects of public discussion. All of 
them are connected with each other but also need to 
be considered individually in their own right. Most of 
the following lectures will be devoted to an examina-
tion and discussion of these factors while the last two 
will attempt to consider them in the light of the parallel 
historical experience of the Nordic countries.
So much for the introduction to the conference theme.
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Before we proceed with lectures and discussions, there 
is one more issue that I think it important to address 
right from the beginning in light of the current situa-
tion in Ukraine and Syria. Considering the fact that the 
Russian government has recently been accused of war 
crimes, even by the foreign minister of this country, it 
hardly needs saying that some of the issues to be dealt 
with here are potentially or actually controversial; sub-
jects of heated debate, if not even actual fighting.
On this basis it is important to stress that this confer-
ence is not intended as an exercise in “Putinverste-
hung” as they say derisively in Germany of attempts 
to “understand” or defend Putin, whether naively or 
perhaps for more sinister reasons. This conference is 
not intended as an apology for the views and policies of 
Vladimir Putin and the current Russian government.
Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Moscow Marmorkirken_Copenhagen.jpg
The conference is however, intended as an attempt at 
“Russlandsverstehung”, understanding of Russia. It has 
been planned on the basis of a conviction that whatever 
may be thought about Mr. Putin and his government, 
which are, after all, transitory phenomena, there is 
a more deep-seated Russian historical experience, a 
special mentality and more enduring Russian points of 
view that deserve a hearing even if Mr. Putin is indeed 
a scoundrel. Whatever Mr. Putin’s intentions he may in 
fact still be a representative of beliefs, views and inter-
ests sincerely held by many Russians. Things that we 
as Russia’s neighbors need to know something about 
under all circumstances.
In conclusion, it should also be mentioned that the 
views expressed in the following lectures are those of 
the speaker in question.
On theocracy
Theocracy literally means rule by God. While this obvi-
ously implies that theocracy presupposes an assump-
tion of God, it also makes it a rather difficult term.
Thus, even if God is assumed, theocracy in its strictest 
sense – direct rule by God – is hardly applicable as a 
descriptive term to any concrete human society or state. 
If everything that happens is assumed to be actively 
willed by God, every human society would then in 
some sense be theocratic, and it would be impossible to 
distinguish any specific society as particularly theocrat-
ic. If we assume only some things to be willed by God, 
it remains difficult to determine which things and hence 
to understand why some communities of believers may 
be considered theocracies while others may not.
In other words: even the most ardent believer in the 
possibility of theocratic government will have to admit 
that any given society that considers itself theocratic 
can only ever be an approximation to an ideal. Even if 
the entire organization and practice of such a society or 
state are believed to be an expression of Divine will, it 
will always inevitably have to be somehow mediated by 
mortal and sinful men prone to all manner of mistakes 
and limitations. Theocracy in this yet unredeemed world 
remains a utopia.
To some this may seem a somewhat trivial observation 
but, given the unfamiliarity with the concept of theoc-
racy in today’s world, it may still be useful as an intro-
duction to the concept. In practice “rule by God” has 
always meant rule by priests and/or by rulers “appoint-
ed by God” in accordance with laws and rules derived 
from or inspired by sacred texts.
In a consideration of theocracy in Russia, this is very 
obviously the case.
The Byzantine origins of Russian theocracy
The roots of theocracy in Russia are much older than 
Russia itself and reach back to the origin of the Byzan-
tine or East Roman Empire in the early 4th century. The 
theocratic tradition begins with the emperor Constan-
tine, the first Roman emperor to embrace Christianity 
and establish it as the privileged religion of the Roman 
Empire. One of the most decisive turns in the history 
of Christianity and of Europe and even of the world at 
large.
The Constantinian turn implied that the emperor was 
now no longer to be seen as a god himself, one among 
many, but rather as the particular favorite of the one 
omnipotent God. As the chosen instrument of Divine 
will on earth.
For the Christian Church the turn entailed a sudden 
and totally unexpected promotion from the status of a 
suppressed underground movement on the periphery 
of society to that of a protagonist at the highest level of 
power and prestige in the Roman Empire. Within a few 
generations, Christianity achieved monopoly status in 
the empire, which was now perceived as the Christian 
empire that was to be the vehicle of the missionary zeal 
of Christianity and the tool of its spread to all mankind 
in all corners of the world. The universalist aspirations 
of Christianity had provided the Roman Empire with 
what it had hitherto been missing: a grand universal 
purpose; a universal idea suitable to the actual status of 
the empire as ruler of almost all the known world.
The history and theology of Russian theocracy
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Centered in the new imperial capital of Constantino-
ple – Constantine’s city – the universal Christian empire 
was now perceived as an image or reflection of the rule 
of God in heaven. As there is only one God in heaven, 
there can be only one emperor in this world and only 
one universal empire as a premonition of the true 
Kingdom of God that is to come on the latter day. Based 
on this idea the universal Christian Empire wielded a 
combination of secular and spiritual power on a scale 
never before seen in this part of the world.
In more practical terms, the idea of the Christian Empire 
translated into the formal arrangement of Byzantine 
government; i.e. of the formal relationship between 
the worldly rule of the emperor and the spiritual rule of 
the supreme bishop, known as the patriarch. Or, as we 
would say today, of the relationship between Church 
and State.
The first to formulate the nature of this relationship 
was the emperor Justinian. In 535, he announced the 
concept that was to become the basic principle of the 
Church/State relationship in the Orthodox world: The 
symphonia, or symphony, that ought to prevail between 
emperor and patriarch. Describing the ideal of a har-
monious collaboration between the two, the symphony 
assumes that both are engaged in the same project: the 
protection and spread of the Christian Church and its 
message of salvation for all mankind.
The idea of the symphony was further developed in the 
880s by patriarch Photius. In his Epanagoge, he ex-
pressly drew the logical conclusion seemingly implicit 
in the symphonia principle: That emperor and patriarch 
are not merely collaborators but equal partners. None 
of them takes precedence over the other and both of 
them need each other. Although this assertion by the 
patriarch did not in practice prevent later emperors 
from demonstrating their power over the church, Photi-
us’ assertion has remained a central aspect of the ideal 
of Orthodox symphonic government.
As ideally perceived, Orthodox theocracy does not 
imply the total identification of Church and State. 
There still remains an important distinction between 
them. But while Church and State retain their distinct 
identities, they are always in fundamental agreement 
because both are engaged in the same overall project, 
which is, of course, fundamentally religious. Like two 
sides of the same coin, Church and State are seen as in-
separably united, of equal value, but each representing 
their distinct face to the world. To put it in the terminolo-
gy of Western Christianity, the ideal Orthodox theocracy 
is neither “caesaro-papist”, nor “papo-caesarist”. The 
emperor is not head of the Church, nor is the patriarch 
head of State. But both are harmoniously united in a re-
lationship of mutual respect and collaboration on God’s 
plan with the world.
Obviously, this construction does not allow the possi-
bility that the emperor might profess any other religion 
than Orthodox Christianity. Neither could he be a-reli-
gious, even anti-religious, nor merely assume a position 
of religious “neutrality”. Theocracy, in other words, is 
by definition fundamentally incompatible with the idea 
of secularization. The idea expressed already by Christ 
himself that there should be a distinction between what 
belongs to the emperor and what belongs to God – 
which may indeed be the first ever distinction between 
a secular and a spiritual sphere – seems quite difficult 
to realize in a construction like the Byzantine theocra-
cy. Indeed, it may cause us to wonder counterfactually 
what Christ would have answered, if the coin famously 
presented to him, had indeed carried not only the por-
trait of the emperor on the one side but also that of the 
patriarch on the other.
So much for the theory of Orthodox theocracy. Although 
the theory was often quite far from actual practice in 
the Byzantine Empire, it has remained the basic ideal of 
church/state relations in the Orthodox Church. 
As such, it was also inherited by the Russian Orthodox 
Church, though it could hardly be realized in the initial 
stages after the Christianization of Kievan Russia in the 
late 10th century. In any case, an independent church/
state relationship could obviously not be practiced in 
the well over 200 years of the Mongol hegemony in the 
13th-15th centuries. However, in the course of the 15th 
century when the Russians, under the leadership of the 
Moscow princes, managed finally to defeat the Mongols 
and to reestablish a unified and independent Russian 
state, the ideas of the Byzantine theocracy also began to 
surface in the Russian context.
Theocracy applied to Russia
In 1448, the Russian church achieved autocephaly, i.e. 
ecclesiastical independence from Constantinople. The 
importance of this move was confirmed a few years 
later in 1453 when the fall of Constantinople to the 
Turks marked the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire 
and the end of more than a thousand years of contin-
uous theocratic government. The historic centre of the 
Orthodox Church was now no longer master of its own 
home. This major event was decisive not least for the 
Russians who also happened to find themselves in a pe-
riod of transition. As they liberated themselves from the 
Mongols, they were now in a position to form their own 
independent Russian state and to define its relationship 
to their own independent Russian church. The fall of 
Constantinople further entailed that Russia was now 
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not only the largest but also the only Orthodox coun-
try left with political independence; the only country 
in the world where Orthodoxy was free to develop on 
its own terms. This situation was to remain the state of 
affairs for the subsequent almost 400 years, i.e. until the 
Balkan Orthodox nations managed to achieve indepen-
dence in the 19th century.
Although it is debatable whether the fall of Constan-
tinople and the contemporaneous rise of Russia ever 
entailed a concrete “transfer of empire” (translatio 
imperii), contemporary Russians evidently chose to 
understand it this way: After the fall of Byzantium, Mus-
covite Russia took over the purpose, ideals and symbols 
of the Christian Empire. The most famous, classical 
formulation of this idea is found in the letter of 1524 by 
the monk Filofei (Philotheus) asserting that, after the 
fall of both Rome and Constantinople, the Russian ruler 
is now the only Orthodox emperor (tsar) in the entire 
Christian world and Moscow the only hallowed seat 
of the holy, universal, apostolic church. And so it shall 
remain forever after. As Filofei memorably put it:
Two Romes have fallen, but the third one stands and a 
fourth there shall never be.
The idea of Moscow as the “third Rome” has been in-
terpreted differently, in both apocalyptic and imperialist 
terms, either as a strict admonition piously to observe 
Orthodoxy in the awareness of judgment day, or as an 
outburst of self-aggrandizing imperial ambition. In any 
case, whether a cause of humility or pride, the idea pre-
supposes a theocratic mode of thinking. It was a mode 
of thinking that had previously been expressly inculcat-
ed by the Byzantine establishment itself, as in the letter 
of about 1394 by patriarch Antony of Constantinople to 
Grand Prince Basil I of Vladimir:
It is not possible for the Christians to have a Church 
without an Emperor, for the imperial sovereignty and 
the Church form a single unity and they cannot be 
separated from each other. […] Hear what the prince 
of the Apostles, Peter, says in his first epistle: “Fear 
God, honour the Emperor”. He did not say “the Emper-
ors” for he was not referring to the so-called “emper-
ors” of various different countries, but he said “the 
Emperor” in order to emphasize that there was only 
one Emperor in the world. […] the single Emperor 
whose laws, ordinances and decrees hold throughout 
the world, who alone, with none other, is revered by 
all Christians”.
If the Russians were to take such thinking seriously, 
they would now – with the Byzantine Emperor gone 
– have to establish their own emperor and, by implica-
tion, their own empire. Otherwise, their church could 
not continue to exist.
In practical terms, it was to take some time before the 
formal set-up of theocratic government was estab-
lished. Although the grand princes of Moscow began to 
be referred to as “tsars” (Russian for Caesar) already in 
the early 16th century (as in Filofei’s letter), the tsardom 
was only officially established in 1547 with the corona-
tion of Ivan IV, later known as “the Terrible”. In 1589 the 
autocephaly of the Russian church was definitively con-
firmed when Moscow was recognized by Constantino-
ple as a patriarchy in its own right. The formal basis of 
symphonic, theocratic government by tsar and patriarch 
in the Byzantine tradition had thus been re-established 
in the “Third Rome”.
In this form, the construction was to last for the sub-
sequent 111 years, i.e. until the arrival on the scene of 
Tsar Peter I, known as “the Great”. During this period, 
the symphonic relationship was put to the test by the 
policies of patriarch Nikon, whose liturgical reform 
of the Russian Church in 1652 triggered the so-called 
Old-believers schism, which divided the church and has 
endured to this day. His assertion of the preeminence of 
the patriarch over the tsar was obviously also a chal-
lenge to the latter and can be seen as a breach of the 
ideal symphony; in any case, it became a cause of his 
own eventual downfall. His stance was carried on by 
several of his successors on the patriarchal throne and 
was to provide a perfect justification or pretext for Peter 
the Great to do something about the role of the church.
Tsar Peter I, known as “the Great”. Portrait by Jean-Marc Nattier, 1717
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Theocracy dismantled or transformed
Peter’s solution was radical. When the current patriarch 
Adrian died in 1700, Peter – who had achieved single 
rule as tsar in 1696 – decided to postpone appointment 
of a new patriarch and left the seat vacant for the time 
being. In 1721, Peter’s Church reform definitively abol-
ished the patriarchy and replaced it with a new govern-
ment body known as the Most Holy Ruling Synod. As a 
department of Peter’s newly reformed state administra-
tion, the Synod was formed as one among several state 
institutions whose ultimate head was the tsar himself. 
The Church reform, in other words, deprived the church 
of independent leadership and effectively turned the 
Orthodox Church into the official state church of the 
Russian Empire.
After Peter, his policies were continued and confirmed 
above all by Catherine the Great who in 1764 secular-
ized all property belonging to the church whose econo-
my was entirely overtaken by the state; thus depriving 
the church not only of administrative but also of materi-
al independence. In 1797 Catherine’s son and successor, 
Paul I, for the first time officially declared the tsar “head 
of the Church”.
It is important here to note that the idea of monarchical 
church government was not Peter’s own invention, nor 
was it known from some alternative version of Ortho-
doxy. Rather the idea came to him expressly from Prot-
estantism, which had until then had no consequences in 
Russia. On his extensive travels in Western Europe Peter 
had visited several Protestant states including England 
and the Danish-Norwegian kingdom (with whom he 
was allied in the Great Northern War against Sweden) 
where he had observed that the king was the head of 
the church. Inspired by this, he later entrusted the con-
crete formulation of his church reform to a theologian, 
Feofan Prokopovich, who, although Orthodox, was also 
heavily influenced by Lutheranism. Thus, the obvious 
Protestant tendencies in Peter’s church reform were no 
coincidence but fully intentional.
Not because Peter had any intention of converting to 
Protestantism or of introducing an actual reformation 
in Russia, but because this Protestant practice seemed 
to him more conducive to the efficiency of modern 
rational government. More conducive to the “common 
good” that all government should promote according to 
the Enlightenment spirit that he had adopted from the 
West. As such, the church reform was just one among 
many reforming measures undertaken by Peter with the 
intention of turning Russia into a “European” country. 
The numerous western ideas, practices, institutions, 
things, tendencies introduced by Peter in the early 
1700s all intended to make Russia an important player 
on the European scene, where it had until then played 
only a very minor role. Peter’s sense that Russia was 
lacking behind contemporary Western European states 
inspired the launch of his grand project of westerniza-
tion – and modernization. In contemporary west Euro-
pean fashion Russia was now organized on the basis of 
enlightened absolutism and monarchical church govern-
ment, much like, for instance, the Lutheran kingdom of 
Denmark and Norway in the age of absolutism.
It is also important to be aware that Peter’s westerni-
zation project, and specifically his church reform, was 
not welcomed by the Orthodox church leadership. On 
the contrary, from the perspective of the Church, Peter’s 
state church construction constituted a coercive imposi-
tion of principles that were not merely alien but directly 
opposed to the principles of Orthodox church govern-
ment. A layperson at the head of the church – even if he 
were the tsar – is not permissible in Orthodox cannon 
law. Furthermore, the submission of the church under 
the state implied a breach of the symphonia principle 
of equality between tsar and patriarch. Although the 
churchmen of Peter’s day were not in a position to 
prevent his reforms, their view has persisted and is still 
echoed today by Orthodox church historians.
Thus, in the eyes of such historians, Peter’s church re-
form constituted an undesirable and illegitimate chal-
lenge to the principle of theocratic government. While 
Orthodox theocracy is seen as a promotion of church 
independence of the state, Western absolutism entails 
subjection of the church under the state and is thus 
anti-theocratic and a step on the way to secularization. 
Some Russian church historians are even inclined to see 
Peter’s state church construction as more or less “totali-
tarian”. So from this point of view theocracy and total-
itarianism are opposites. In the eyes of most western 
historians, it is usually the other way round.
Thus, it remains questionable to what extent the Petrine 
state church construction can still be described as a 
theocracy. From a Western point of view, it may seem to 
have retained a strong theocratic element from the past, 
but from an Orthodox point of view, it was no longer 
an authentic full-fledged theocracy. It can be described 
as a hybrid of Orthodoxy and Protestantism, perhaps a 
post-theocracy, or as a theocracy partially dismantled. 
However this may be, it is notable that, even if theocra-
cy was challenged, the theocratic ideal lived on in the 
minds of Orthodox believers conscious of the basically 
illegitimate nature of the Petrine construction.
The relationship between the Russian state and the Or-
thodox Church during the reigns of the Petrine Empire, 
i.e. until its demise in 1917, is characterized by a recur-
ring and growing ambiguity regarding the administra-
tion of Peter’s heritage. To what extent his westerniza-
tion project should take precedence over the pre-Petrine 
tradition represented not least by the Orthodox Church. 
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The tsars never managed to solve this problem, which 
became one of the basic causes of the revolution of 
1917.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that 1917 
was a highly ambiguous year for the Russian church. 
On the one hand, it was a relief. The fall of the tsar also 
brought an effective end to the rule of the Synod, and 
it is characteristic that one of the first things the Church 
did after the fall was to convene a general council in 
order to re-establish the patriarchy. Consequently, the 
new patriarch was installed just five days after the 
Bolshevik October coup. Considering the role of the Em-
peror in Orthodox tradition it is ironic that it took the fall 
of the tsar to re-establish a self-reliant position for the 
Orthodox Church.
On the other hand, 1917 also saw the beginning of the 
Bolshevik regime that was soon to introduce the most 
vehement, violent and systematic attempt to eradicate 
any trace of religion from public space. According to 
the regime’s ideology, this was done in order to build a 
communist society totally cleansed of any reactionary 
and repressive influences such as notions of a religious 
or spiritual dimension of life. A society characterized 
not merely by total separation of Church and State, 
but even an unrelenting war by the State against the 
Church. A policy that might be seen as the substitution 
of theocracy with its polar opposite.
The result was a disaster of monstrous proportions, not 
only for the Church but for all of society under Soviet 
rule. To what extent the struggle against religion was 
a cause of this disaster may be debated but that there 
was a connection is not in doubt. The fact remains that 
the grand attempt to rid society of God also managed 
to rid it of enormous numbers of human beings. The to-
tally godless society also proved to be one of the most 
totalitarian societies ever seen.
The question today is: What comes after totalitarian-
ism? What will replace militant secularization? What are 
we to make of the explicit and repeated references to 
the symphonia principle that are now being voiced by 
representatives of the Orthodox Church? Do they really 
mean it, and if they do, what are the implications?
These are some of the basic questions that this confer-
ence will address.
The “Symphony” in Contemporary Russia
Per-Arne Bodin
 
Stockholm University, pab@slav.su.se
One very difficult question to answer, in my view, is the 
character of the relation between the Russian Ortho-
dox Church and Russian statehood both historically 
and at the present time. This is a crucial question for 
understanding both Russian history and the Russia of 
today. I will try to contribute to the answer pertaining 
to the situation today by using and discussing the term 
symphony.  The term has a somewhat loose meaning 
which aptly describes the ambiguity between legality 
and practice, which seems to characterize this relation. 
On one hand contemporary Russia, like imperial Russia 
or the Soviet Union, is a multi-ethnic and multi-confes-
sional state; on the other the Orthodox Church plays an 
important or at times a decisive role in the formation of 
its ideology. 
Much has already been written and said on this issue, 
especially on the practical implications of this fact, but 
I will approach the question from a somewhat different 
angle and undertake a discourse analysis of the most 
authoritative statements from both the church and the 
state and also turn to the field of event studies to try to 
cope with this question. 
Constitution and Law
In the first Russian constitution of 1906 it was clear that 
the Orthodox Church had the role of state ideology: 
Article 62. The established and ruling faith of the 
Russian Empire is the Christian, Orthodox Catholic, 
Eastern faith.1
In the Soviet constitution of 1936 and 1977 the Commu-
nist party took the role which the Church had had in the 
1906 text. In the famous paragraph six in the Brezhnev 
constitution concerning the leading role of the Commu-
nist party it was formulated in the following way:
Article 6. The leading and guiding force of Soviet soci-
ety and the nucleus of its political system, of all state 
organisations and public organisations, is the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for 
the people and serves the people.2
In the Yeltsin constitution of 1993 it was of primary im-
portance not to designate any such specific ideological 
foundation to the state: 
Article 14.  
1. The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No 
religion may be established as the State religion or as 
obligatory.
2. Religious associations shall be separate from the 
State and shall be equal before the law.3 
There is no mention of God in the present Russian 
Constitution in contrast to, for example the German 
fundamental law (‘Im Bewußtsein seiner Verantwortung 
vor Gott und den Menschen’). 
This divine legitimation is stronger and is overtly 
expressed in the current national anthem, with the text 
written originally by Sergei Mikhalkov in 1942. The men-
tion of Stalin in the original version is now replaced by 
that of God:
You are unique in the world, one of a kind – 
Native land protected by God! 
Russia is preserved by God, but no reference to any 
particular confession is made. This use of rather general 
use of a divine legitimation for the state is a parallel 
to the ‘In God we trust’ in the USA, for example on 
banknotes, decided on as late as in 1956. 
In the law on religion from 1997 not only God, but 
more precisely Orthodoxy is given a special role, not 
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only from a historical point of view, but also in the 
establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality 
and culture. The whole ambiguity in the church–state 
relation is expressed here in one sentence. The state is 
secular, yet Orthodoxy plays a special role and at the 
end of the sentence other religious denominations are 
also assigned a place, albeit secondary:
Basing itself on the fact that the Russian Federation is 
a secular state; Recognizing the special contribution 
of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the es-
tablishment and development of Russia’s spirituality 
and culture; Respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, 
Judaism and other religions which constitute an 
inseparable part of the historical heritage of Russia’s 
peoples.4 
These are the defining official documents of the state in 
its relation to the Church and other confessions.
Symphony
In a lengthy text from the year 2000, ‘Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church’, the 
Church defines its view of its relation to the State. This 
text functions as its fundamental document, sketching 
the role of the Church in society in the new situation 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. The word used to 
describe the ideal relation between church and state is 
‘symphony’, [simfoniia].
In their totality these principles were described as 
symphony between church and state. It is essentially 
co-operation, mutual support and mutual responsi-
bility without one side intruding into the exclusive 
domain of the other. The bishop obeys the govern-
ment as a subject, not because his episcopal power 
comes from a government official. Similarly, a gov-
ernment official obeys his bishop as a member of the 
Church seeking salvation and not because his power 
comes from the power of the bishop. The state in such 
symphonic relationships with the Church seeks her 
spiritual support, prayer for itself and blessing for 
its work of achieving the goal of its citizens’ welfare, 
while the Church enjoys support from the state in cre-
ating conditions favourable for preaching and for the 
spiritual care of her children who are at the same time 
citizens of the state.5
The term symphony – coined in Byzantium by the 
emperor Justinian (6th century) in his sixth Novella – is 
thus the key word used in this document to define the 
ideal relation between Church and State as below. These 
Novellae are considered by historians to be precisely 
a way of strengthening legitimacy and, in this case, 
Justinian’s rule.6 The sixth Novella expresses the rela-
tion between church and state as below. The text is also 
partially quoted in the ‘Bases of the Social Concept’. The 
exact wording of the novella runs as follows:
The greatest blessings granted to human beings by 
God’s ultimate grace are priesthood and kingdom, the 
former taking care of divine affairs, while the latter 
guiding and taking care of human affairs, and both 
come from the same source, embellishing human life.
Therefore, nothing lies so heavy on the hearts of 
kings as the honour of priests, who on their part serve 
them, praying continuously for them to God. And if 
the priesthood is well ordered in everything and is 
pleasing to God, then there will be full symphony 
(συμφωνία τις ἀγαθή) between them in everything that 
serves the good and benefit of the human race. 7
This special term from Byzantine jurisprudence is thus 
a key word today in the self-image of the Orthodox 
Church in mapping its relation to the State. 
The frequent use of the word ‘symphony’ by the new 
patriarch, Kirill, shows a development in the relation 
between church and state. It was used more historically 
in the social document of 2000, but since then it has 
been seen more or less as a fact, the current or future 
relationship between church and state. I would argue 
that this term has been internalized in the discourse on 
the relation between church and state: earlier schol-
ars of church history used it only rarely. The word is 
absent from extensive handbooks on the Byzantine 
Empire from earlier times as well as from Kazdan’s 
new three-volume encyclopaedia of Byzantium.8 It was 
however used in some cases by Church historians, 
such as Anton Kartashev in his History of the Rus-
sian Church from the 1930s, but most other books on 
Byzantium and the Orthodox Church do not mention it 
at all. The term existed and has its origin in Justinian, 
but has been revived for use in the special context of 
post-Soviet Russia. It is used as if it has always been 
the common notion to depict an ideal relation between 
Church and State. It is a word found in the archive of 
historical Church terms to be used and loaded with new 
meanings in a very different context from that in which 
it was originally used. Nowadays it can even be seen in 
a newspaper headline, as in this rather witty example 
from Izvestiia in 2009 about the president’s reception for 
the new patriarch, playing on the two meanings of the 
word: ‘Dmitrii Medvedev and Patriarch Kirill performed 
a symphony’.9 
The Holy Synod and Beyond
Before the time of Peter the Great, the patriarchate was 
an independent organisation. From Peter up to 1917, 
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a governmental organ – the Holy Synod – ruled the 
church as it is declared in the constitution of 1906:
Article 65. In the administration of the Church the 
autocratic power acts through the Holy Directorial 
Synod, which it has created.10
In late Soviet times, contact with the Church was main-
tained through the odious Council for Religious Affairs. 
Today there is no such organisation. This is a token of 
the independence of the church in its relation to the 
state. The Holy Synod is now as in Soviet times the 
name of the decision-making body of the church itself 
without any secular participation. The lack of a church 
ministry is one more real and symbolic fact demon-
strating the symphony between church and state, in the 
meaning of non-intervention in each other’s affairs. The 
election and enthronement of a new patriarch without 
any intrusions is an even more important statement of 
an independent church.  
The Enthronement
The function of the symphony can be studied in the cer-
emony of the enthronement of the new Patriarch Kirill 
as patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’ on 1 February 2009. 
The existence of a ruling patriarch is the most important 
token of an independent church in relation to the state. 
From the time of Peter the Great up to 1917 and from 
1925 up to 1943 the state bluntly denied the church that 
right.  
The ceremony took place in the Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour in the presence of the then President Dimitrii 
Medvedev and the then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. 
The president and the prime minister were positioned 
in the most prestigious place of honour for a layman – 
in the right kliros, that is on the right hand side at the 
front of the church. 
During the enthronement the president and prime 
minister were both invited to the altar room, but not the 
female guests of honour, because traditionally women 
are not allowed to enter the holiest part of the church.
At the enthronement of Kirill, the president and the 
prime minister thus had the same access to the altar 
room which the Byzantine emperor and the Russian tsar 
once had.11 The position of president and prime minister 
inside the altar room however was completely peripher-
al; in principle, as far from the throne of the patriarch as 
was possible. In principle, it is permissible for all men, 
to enter the altar room. Still, the invitation to enter the 
altar room was something very special. 
In Old Russia, the tsar together with one metropolitan 
(archbishop) performed the enthronement ceremony 
in practice, that is they placed the elected patriarch on 
the throne. Now it was done by two senior metropoli-
tans. Moreover, the commentator in the TV broadcast 
did not mention the president and prime minister’s 
presence until far into the broadcast and the cameras 
focused on them rarely. A clip of the president and the 
prime minister was always followed by a clip of ordi-
nary believers. One can see this at once important and 
insignificant role of the civil power allocated from two 
perspectives. On the one hand, it was a semiotic marker 
of the relationship between church and state and, on the 
other, the loyal and independent position of the church 
in relation to the civil power. This broadcast seemed to 
show symphony in practice in the new way. It differs in 
relation to Byzantine time, to late imperial time and to 
the Soviet era. 
The assigned role of the secular power is due to the 
Constitution: the Russian state is secular, while the Or-
thodox church has a special historical role, as evidenced 
by the preamble to the Constitution, as we have noted. 
It is this complexity of church–state relationship that 
is portrayed in the complex relationships between the 
president and prime minister on the one hand and the 
patriarch on the other. 
The Reception Given for the Patriarch. The Speech of 
President Medvedev and of the Patriarch
One main point stressed by the president during a 
reception given in honour of the new patriarch after 
the enthronement was the importance of the Church in 
creating the Russian statehood. It is something more 
added to the history, spirituality and culture mentioned 
in the law on religion. This is the most precise way of 
using the church for the legitimation of the existence of 
Russia in its contemporary form. The president and the prime minister in the altar room
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I am pleased to once again congratulate you, Your 
Holiness, – said Dmitii Medvedev, taking his seat at 
the table. – In the new Russia relations of church and 
state are based on non-interference of state bodies 
in the activities of religious organizations and at the 
same time recognizing the enormous contribution of 
the church in the establishment of statehood. 12
The patriarch stressed in his speech the importance of 
‘symphony’, thus again focusing on the church-state 
relation. This term has made a journey from the books 
of church history into the language used in a speech to 
the president of the Russian Federation. 
In Byzantium the word ‘symphony’ was used to 
describe the relation [between state and church]. That 
is a harmonious combination of accountability and 
responsibility. We need to recognize that the spirit of 
symphony ought to direct our thoughts and deeds. 13
The Inauguration of the President
My next example is the inauguration of President Putin 
on May 7, 2012. The patriarch, was placed in the front 
row during the ceremony, but did not participate in any 
way. During the inauguration of president Boris Yeltsin, 
the patriarch even stood in the front together with the 
president during the ceremony. 
During a divine service the same day but after the inau-
guration in the Annunciation Cathedral in the Kremlin, 
the patriarch blessed the president, reading a prayer in 
Church Slavonic for him. The president was thus includ-
ed in the sacral sphere through the use of a prayer in 
Church Slavonic pertaining to his official capacity.
Look down also now on our fervent prayer and bless 
the good intention of the President of our country 
Vladimir. Strengthen and guide him to accomplish 
this great task without hindrance. Give him under-
standing and wisdom, in peace and without sorrow 
protect the Russian people.  Guide his subordinates 
on the path of truth and righteousness in governance, 
and protect them from partiality and corruption.14 
Some of the words were identical to those in the prayer 
read at the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II on 14 May 
1896. At the same time, the church stressed that the 
ceremony was the usual one for ‘beginning any good 
action’. Furthermore, the president is never mentioned 
in the litanies of the church, in the same way as in the 
Putin and the patriarch in the Annunciation cathedral after the inauguration
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Soviet period only the word ‘powers’ was used in the 
prayers for the secular leaders of the country. Before 
1917 the Tsar as well as other members of the imperial 
family were frequently mentioned in the litanies of the 
church. 
Pussy Riot
And then to the government’s reaction to the action of 
the punk group Pussy Riot. In the view of the church, 
the deeply insulting action profaned one of the most 
important churches in Russia, the Cathedral of Christ 
the Savior in Moscow. The text of the punk song deals 
with precisely the close relationship between church 
and state in contemporary Russia:
The patriarch believes in Putin. 
Better believe in God, you vermin!
The government’s decision to indict the group can be 
seen as a practical manifestation of symphony, a term 
that was mentioned in the press debate on the demon-
stration.
Athos, the president and the patriarch
My third example of the use of the term symphony in 
today´s Russia is the joint visit of the patriarch and the 
president in May 2016 to Athos, the holy mountain, as 
part of the millenial celebration of Russian (or more 
correctly East Slavic) monasticism on the peninsula. The 
word ”symphony” was widely used in press comments 
on the event, as, for example, in the following newspa-
per heading: ”The Athos Symphony of Patriarch Kirill 
and Vladimir Putin.”
 Athos is a conservative stronghold well suited as a 
symbolic space in today’s official Russian politics.   
Putin underscored in a speech the importance of the 
site as a source of the moral foundation of society, and 
he also highlighted the financial support the Russian 
government had provided for the restoration of the 
Russian Panteleimon Monastery . As in the case of the 
meeting between the pope and the Russian patriarch 
earlier this year, Kirill wants to be a key representative 
of Christianity. The Russian participation in the war in 
Syria is widely seen in Russia as a defense of Christian-
ity against militant Islam. On this and other issues the 
church and state share a common agenda. Many of the 
photographs taken at the event illustrate and can be 
considered a showcase of symphony. At the same time, 
the president’s statements were rather vague. As in 
President Putin at Athos, May 2016
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earlier cases he must consider the fact that a large part 
of the population do not defacto adhere to Orthodox 
beliefs or practices.
Conclusion
Thus the relation between church and state illustrated 
in these three cases is utterly ambivalent and can only 
be so. There is opposition between the Constitution, 
the law on religion and the practice which is impossible 
to resolve, but possible to describe using the abstruse 
term of symphony. This ambivalence also permeates all 
practical relations between church and state on issues 
such as the Principles of Orthodox Culture lessons for 
schools, icons at military units, and permission to use a 
blue light on the patriarch’s limousine. At the same time, 
the situation differs not only from that of the Soviet 
era, but also that of pre-1917 Russia and also from the 
Byzantine time, although seen by the church as an ideal. 
There is in every case a reservation showing the secu-
larity of the state, and this reservation is in every case 
overruled. This is one important part in understanding 
the relation between Church and state in today’s Russia.
Why is the church needed when only a few per cent 
come to divine services? Why these often very elabo-
rately staged events modelling the relation between 
state and church? Let us acknowledge that some or 
many of the people in power are sincere in their return 
to Orthodoxy. Still, there is a strong wish on the part 
of the politicians to create historical continuity and 
legitimation through the use of Orthodoxy as we have 
already observed. Yet there is also the problem of guilt 
from the secular power. Many of its representatives still 
have their origin in the old regime and have themselves 
in their youth talked derisively about the church and 
religion. Thus both a personal and collective guilt is a 
reason for this benevolent treatment of the Orthodox 
Church. One further factor is the longing for an ideology 
after communism ceased to be the state ideology. The 
situation is not at all as unique as it seems: we have the 
same discussions here in Sweden, where the relation 
between the Swedish church and the state is also rather 
ambiguous. Still the Orthodox faith and what I would 
call a living traditional religion insisting on a strong 
transcendental and mystical element is quite a compli-
cated component in modern state-building. 
For the state the church is needed to create legitimacy 
in a situation where the state is new and its legitimacy 
is rather shaky. The church stands, as we have noted, 
for a cultural, historical continuity and as a basis for 
Russia’s statehood. Both the church and the state still 
talk with two tongues on this question, and it can not be 
otherwise. 
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Introduction 
Let me first express my gratitude to the organizers of 
the highly topical conference. In this dramatic geopo-
litical situation, what appears to mark the beginning of 
the Second Cold war era, the chance to discuss within 
a Nordic-Russian expert network the collaboration be-
tween State, Religion and Society actors gives us some 
hope for future.  
In this presentation my purpose is to shed light on the 
question of State Church Collaboration in contemporary 
situation, from the perspective of a cultural scholar spe-
cialized in Russian studies, especially Orthodox culture 
in past and present. Having now lived in Russia more 
than four years I have had the opportunity to make 
observations on how the societal climate has changed 
during this period, what kind of transformations have 
taken place in the relations between secular and reli-
gious authorities. 
“Civil religion”
I am likely to argue that when discussing the state-
church relations in post-Soviet Russia, it is perhaps 
appropriate to speak of a special phenomenon of “civil 
religion”. To my mind, Russian version of civil religion 
sui generis can be shortly described in the following:  
it is linked with de-secularisation of societal climate 
and manifests itself through the symbolic language 
of cultural Orthodoxy, comprehensible to all citizens 
living in civilizational sphere of Russian Federation and 
more widely, in the russki mir, i.e. Russian citizens and/
or Russian speakers around the world. It is important 
to note that Russian version of civil religion does not 
require participation in rituals or individual faith. It re-
quires, in contrast, commitment to venerate the sacred 
common values in the name of national coherence and 
identity building. Today, the conservative curve and 
moral values are strongly based on “civil religion” man-
ifestations in the public sphere of life.  
This “civil religion” –  that is, not necessarily requiring 
personal belief in God, merely veneration of shared 
values – is mostly evident in cultural sphere, “Cultural 
Orthodoxy”. Not coincidentally, there are textbooks in 
schools labeled “Bases of the Cultural Orthodoxy”. In 
this frame “Cultural Orthodoxy” denotes public sphere 
national idea embedded in symbols, manifesting itself 
in memory politics and cultural production. “Civil reli-
gion” dressed in the uniform of Cultural Orthodoxt is in 
constant flux, secular-sacral transformations take place 
and the project lies at the core of Russian political agen-
da. It is an important component in identity building in 
today´s situation, and is also used as pretext for encour-
aging citizens to individual and collective sacrifices. 
Examples of this we see in state sponsored broadcasts 
and other media on a daily basis.
“Civil religion” appears as the core channel in com-
municating national symbols, traditions and feasts. 
Because citizens are well aware of the core symbols 
and heroes, the symbol language can easily be used to 
rewrite, to reinvent and to reinterpret national history, 
myths, heroes and feasts. Civil religion is everywhere. 
It is not possible to tell, where the “Church” or the 
religious authority starts and the secular ends, or vice 
versa. 
As for the concept “civil religion”, I have borrowed 
it from the American sociologist Robert Bellah, who 
invented it to describe the national civil religion in the 
United States, based on Protestant tradition and spe-
cific history of founding myths and cataclysms of the 
nation (Bellah 1967).  
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Orthodox tradition
In Russia, however, the core tradition is not in Prot-
estantism, but in Orthodoxy in the widest, “civiliza-
tional” meaning. Orthodox tradition lies at the core of 
the national founding myth famously coined by monk 
Philotheos in his mythical thesis of  translatio imperii; 
and coining Moscow as successor of Rome and Con-
stantinople as the leader of Christianity. As my illustra-
tion indicates, symphony – close collaboration between 
religious and secular authority – are at the core of 
Orthodoxy as civil religion.  
To compare, in the East we face the phenomenon 
of continuation of undivided collaboration between 
secular and sacred (sometimes called cesaropapism) 
vs. in the West we have gradual division of secular 
and religious authority (Renaissance I, Reformation II, 
Enlightenment III.)
In Russia, it is important to realize that “civil religion” 
addresses non-Orthodox population and other denom-
inations as well. Russian leaders are nominally Ortho-
dox, but they simultaneously emphasize that Russia is 
multi-confessional.  
Recycling of symbols
Important is that embodiment of “civil religion” is con-
stantly in flux, new versions of founding myths are cre-
ated and restored while simultaneously replacing some 
old one; in symphony between secular and religious 
actors .  Jeanne Kormina (2015) , has suggested the 
term recycling. She argues that the return of religious 
objects to the Church, and process of de-secularisation 
in the post-Soviet context was carried out by non-reli-
gious cultural workers. Orthodox churches, icons, sacral 
objects were saved and cherished by non-believers, due 
to their acknowledgement of their beauty and part of 
national identity. ”This is our truly Russianness, there 
is no way out of it”, is the motto. Shooting of the film 
Andrei Rublev (by Andrei Tarkovsky, 1966) as another 
example in the sphere of cultural production was the 
result of this attitude: imperative calling to save the 
ancient, own beauty.
Examples of reinvented tradition
Next, let us take some topical examples from today´s 
state-church collaboration and recycling of symbols. 
Today  -  on the eve of fourth of November - it is time-
ly to notice, that in 2005 the State duma reinvented 
the old tsarist feast day of expelling Polish occupation 
forces from Moscow in November 1612, and more 
generally the end of the Time of Troubles, when Russia 
was without a tsar and in historiography described as 
a period of deep misery. The day was celebrated in the 
Russian Empire until 1917, when it was replaced with a 
commemoration of the Russian Revolution. In new Rus-
sia, the commemoration of Bolshevik victory has lost 
its accuracy, consequently, it was replaced by the day of 
national unity celebration on 4 of November.
Not coincidentally , the day is also the feast day of 
the Russian Orthodox icon of Our Lady of Kazan. This 
Representations of Ideal Symphony [between secular and religious authority] 
in the Byzantium (left) and 19th century Russia (right), 
Tsar Nicholas II in the altar
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concurrence between secular and sacred is the sine qua 
non factor of Russian civil religion. The Russian state 
ideology lies at this harmony and symphony. 
According to the myth related to the events of 1612, 
invocation of the intercession by Virgin Mary through 
the icon of Kazan helped the commanders Minin and 
Pozharsky to repel the Polish invasion of 1612, and later, 
the Swedish invasion of 1709, and Napoleon’s invasion 
of 1812. In general, the Kazan icon of Virgin Mary is 
credited wonderworking. When the original icon was 
stolen in Kazan in 1904, it was interpreted as a sign of 
upcoming tragedies. Similar interpretations are crucial 
part of endurance and flexibility of national-religious 
myths. 
According to one of the myths, after the Revolution of 
1917 there was speculation that the original icon was 
in fact preserved in St. Petersburg. Reportedly, an icon 
of Our Lady of Kazan was used in processions around 
Leningrad fortifications during the Siege of Leningrad.
Let us take another example; of reinventing old tradi-
tion. In 2013, as part of celebrations of 300 years anni-
versary of Romanov House in Russia, in St. Petersburg 
Orthodox processions were restored for the first time 
in 100 years. Although controversial, while monarchism 
is not unanimously supported by majority, the first 
processions were very popular and closed traffic along 
Nevsky Prospekt to the Lavra of Alexander Nevsky, 
named according to a saintly prince, for a while.
Function and  performance
In organizing these public events outside the church 
building and domain, the Russian Orthodox Church 
collaborates with secular power and acts in the sphere 
of secular performances, as has been theorized by Peter 
Beyer (1994, 86-88, 2006, 62-116; based on Niklas Luh-
mann.) As Luhmann wrote, function is the pure, ‘sacred’ 
communication involving the transcendent and the 
aspect that religious institutions claim for themselves: 
the basis of their autonomy in modern society.  Reli-
gious performance, by contrast, occurs when religion 
is “applied” to problems generated in other systems 
but not solved there or simply not addressed elsewhere 
(cf. Luhmann, 1977, 54ff; 1982:238-242) - via Peter Beyer 
1994, 86-88.
In contemporary Russia, many topics are not addressed 
in institutions but left to the sphere of performance. 
Therefore, topics not addressed in institutions are dan-
gerous – they become in sociological terms negative sa-
cred. The Pussy Riot case and judicial verdict strikes as 
an example par excellence of this problem: it is a taboo 
to criticize the supreme leader without punishment. 
Obscurantism
The Economist  (Oct22 2016) wrote recently in a special 
report on Russia, that “aggressive obscurantism is im-
posed by both state and church. This takes many forms, 
from banning modern-art shows to organizing anti-gay 
campaigns, promoting anti-Darwinism and attempting 
to stop abortions. “ (Tell me about Joan of Arc, econo-
mist.com/news/special-report/21708882).
This typical notion of “obscurantism” in relation to the 
Russian Orthodox Church to my mind is a bit mislead-
ing. It undermines the holistic nature of Orthodox cul-
ture as the fundamental legacy in society, its manifesta-
tions as the visible side of civil religion, long history of 
symphony and cesaropapism.  One would like to argue, 
that on the contrary, the very history of Orthodoxy itself 
in Russia is the history witnessing the battle against 
corruption. Take Metropolitan Philip and Tsar Ivan IV as 
an example. 
What we need to analyze Orthodoxy in the public sec-
ular sphere is double vision: we need an insider expert 
vision to be aware of inherent myths, feasts, heroes, 
symbols. To be able to recycle requires familiarity and 
recognition. To produce is to consume, and vice versa. 
Second, we need an outsider expert vision to be able to 
compare.
The president and the patriarch
One more important point is the relationship between 
the head of the state and head of the church. Here, it is 
accurate to bring into mind what Professor Bodin (2016) 
wrote about the donkey, tsar and patriarch.  We can 
over and again come back to the very same question – 
is it the monarch walking the donkey while the patriarch 
is sitting on it? Or is the monarch sitting on the donkey 
and patriarch walking? What is the key issue in the 
“Day of National Unity 4 November”. Photo 2015 . Patriarch Kirill of Moscow 
greets the leaders of traditional religions of the Russian Federation
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balance between secular and religious authority? As the 
author argues, the answer is unambiguous: the secular 
keeps the upper hand. 
Today, we often see the two, president and patriarch, 
together in public performances. But has anyone seen 
the president asking for a blessing from the patriarch 
in public? For an outsider this might strike as obscu-
rantism. For the Russian civil society it about symbolic 
language that citizens are able to interpret. And it is 
about the bond between trusted institutions – secular 
and sacred - that not only keeps the performance going 
on, but denotes stability in society. 
Military and civil defence performances. 
Before I finish, I would like to shortly mention the 
desecularisation in the sphere of military and civil de-
fence performances. 
This brings us back to the figure of saintly prince Alex-
ander Nevsky. Through his image, the warrior prince, 
the audience can venerate and emulate his example. 
The figure also alludes at what is at stake today - sim-
ulation of the battle of 1240 – “against the west with 
swords, and against the east by act of humiliation”, that 
is, by negotiation.  The point is to emulate today the 
example of past experience. Orders of St. Alexander 
Nevsky, of St. George the Victorious, or Andrey the 
First-Called are examples of restored imperial orders, 
which can be given as recognition of military e.g. ex-
ploits.
Some words of the public relationship between the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the army. The patriarch 
blesses missiles, and he has inaugurated a first mili-
tary bishop in new Russia. The duties include blessing 
soldiers to operations, as well as commemorating those 
killed in action or collateral damage.
I quote Patriarch Kirill: The readiness of the Northern 
Fleet, which keeps the peace in Russia and abroad, 
depends largely on the spiritual strength and faith of its 
sailors; spiritual support of our forces is one of the key 
tasks of the Church. Those who take the military oath 
especially need spiritual help; we all believe that the 
sailors of the Northern Fleet will show full combat read-
iness if they have strong faith and strong spirit.Alexander Nevski 1220 - 1264. Righteous Prince. 
Prince-soldier and defender of Russia
Holy warrior Admiral Fyodor Ushakov. Most illustrious naval commander 
and admiral of the 18th century; glorified a also as local saint and patron of 
the Russian Navy in 2001, and of nuclear-armed strategic bombers. «Do not 
despair, these terrible storms will turn to Russian glory».
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Addressing the staff of the Northern Fleet after his arriv-
al in Severomorsk, Vladyka Kirill emphasised: 
“As we’re a nuclear power, spiritual healthiness in 
our personnel is key to maintaining the peace, both 
domestically and globally; it guarantees that they can 
carry out their duties, with all that such brings to the 
life of the Motherland. Maybe, one day, there may 
come a time that the outcome of a battle or a success-
ful endeavour will depend precisely on the spiritual 
state of our soldiers.” (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/
print/4586753.html)
In turn, Vice-Admiral N.A. Yevmenov, Commander of the 
Northern Fleet, told the patriarch:‬‬
´For all Orthodox, a word from our pastor and the 
Word of God mean a lot. Let’s take some examples… 
Admirals Ushakov and Nakhimov are holy names for 
every one of the Orthodox warriors under the flag 
of St Andrew the Apostle. Our grandfathers fought 
under this flag… under this flag, we go out to sea and 
carry out our service. The words, “All those who go to 
sea pray to God”… these aren’t empty words for us. 
´(18 August 2016. Aleksei Mikheyev , http://ria.ru/reli-
gion/20160818/1474695054.html; )
St Petersburg is a city of memory. Secular and religious 
go hand in hand. One lights candles in the churches and 
at the squares. One commemorates the victims every 
day. When you go to a supermarket you see a notice - 
veterans of international operations and of the defense 
of Leningrad are served beyond the queue. The ques-
tion of guilt and punishment is addressed at a lower 
level of authority, beyond it, is the taboo. Regicide is a 
taboo. There is no way to penetrate the secret bond be-
tween the tsar and the church; all you can do is to study 
history and the present, and quote Patriarch Tikhon, The 
balm accords with the relics.
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It is a privilege to talk about the last Russian Emperor 
in the city where his mother Maria Fedorovna, Princess 
Dangmar of Denmark was born (1847) and died (1928). 
In 2006 her remains were transferred from Roskilde 
Cathedral in Denmark to St Peter and Paul Cathedral in 
St Petersburg,  
My hero today will not be the Russian Tsar Nikolas II 
in his earthly life, which was difficult and even tragic. 
Instead, I’ll be talking about his posthumous life as an 
Orthodox saint. 
Who are the saints in Orthodox (and Catholic) Chris-
tianity? The cult of saints appeared already in Roman 
Empire. They are special dead people who are com-
memorated not only by their relatives, but also by 
a larger community of co-believers. The community 
builds special ties with these dead people, the ties of 
spiritual kinship which involves reciprocity and mutual 
responsibility. 
What does the Church need saints for? The theological 
answer to this question was given by St. Augustine the 
Blessed in the end of 4th c. He argued with a Manichean 
who contended that Christians “change the idols into 
martyrs, to whom you pray as they do to their idols.” 
St. Augustine responded, “It is true that Christians pay 
religious honor to the memory of the martyrs, both to 
excite us to imitate them and to obtain a share in their 
merits, and the assistance of their prayers”. In other 
words, for a Christian believer saints are role models 
and helpers. 
There are different categories of saints in contempo-
rary Orthodoxy. There are holy fools and enlighteners, 
wonder-workers and passion-bearers, and martyrs of 
course. As the social life changed, the Church (or the 
believers) needed new up-to-date saints as their helpers 
and role models. In these saints’, images and ideas of 
sanctity are reconstituted, and the continuing grace-
fulness of the church and actuality of ancient dogmatic 
and moral truths are proven. To fulfill this function the 
profile of a new saint should be up-to-date, it must 
Ipatiev House, Ekaterinburg, were the Romanovs were killed in 1918.
Destroyed in 1977
Church on Blood. Built on the place of the Ipatiev house 2000-2003
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be possible to understand the main idea of his or her 
Christian mission and to imitate the saint’s religious 
deeds in the current social circumstances, or there must 
be maximal recognizability of his or her social posi-
tion and life experience. The former meaning creates a 
perfect role model, the latter one represents the portrait 
of an ideal helper – a saint patron for everyone who 
hopes that the saint will understand the nature of his or 
her problem. This is why new categories of saints have 
been elaborated and new saints have been canonized 
(that is officially recognized as such). 
The most ancient category of saints, so to say saints per 
se, are the martyrs. They are the heroes of Christians, 
the saints who were persecuted for their Christian faith 
by the hostile state authorities of the Empire where 
those Christians happened to live, originally by the 
pagan Emperors of Roman Empire. The Neo-Martyrs are 
those who suffered from the hands of Turks (Muslims) 
in the Ottoman Empire after the fall of Constantinople 
in 1453 and through the 19th c. (relevant for Greece, 
Georgia). There are also those new Neo-Martyrs who 
were killed by the Soviet atheistic state (in Russia; in 
Romania).
From the late 1980s through the 1990s the Russian 
Orthodox Church – like the rest of Russian society – was 
enthusiastically involved in the process of rewriting 
Soviet history. The Church reproached the Soviet state 
for its militant atheism and especially for the murder 
of priests and devoted believers during the civil war 
of 1918-1920 and Great Terror of 1937-8. Like many 
post-Soviets, Orthodox historians started doing re-
search in the newly opened archives in order to write 
the tragic story of state–church relations during Soviet 
times and to rehabilitate those brothers in faith who 
were killed or who died in Soviet prisons and camps.
The result of this “archival” period for Orthodox people 
was the mass canonization of so-called “New Martyrs 
and Confessors” of Russia. 
The first martyr of the Soviet regime was canonized 
by the Russian Orthodox Church already in 1989 (Pa-
triarch Tikhon); it had canonized twelve more by 2000 
when the Jubilee Bishops’ Council decided to canonize 
all martyrs and confessors of the twentieth century 
known by name (there were 1,071 at that time), as 
well as those who were still unknown. All in all, by the 
beginning of 2011 the list contained the names of 1,774 
saints. A commemoration day for the new saints was 
established (Feb 8) and a special icon, The New Martyrs 
and Confessors of Russia Known and Unknown, was 
created. The icon depicts crowds of people, some with 
written names, others without, concentrated around a 
central group of royal saints - Russian Tsar Nicholas II 
and his wife and five children, killed in Yekaterinburg by 
Bolsheviks in July 1918.
Yet, though the royal family exemplifies all New mar-
tyrs, it was not canonized as martyrs in Russia. The 
Romanovs were canonized by the Russian Orthodox 
Church as passion-bearers, to great dissatisfaction of 
prominent minority of pro-monarchist believers. In 
Church tradition, passion-bearers are saints (they are 
rare) who were tortured by fellow believers and compa-
triots rather than by those who persecuted Christians as 
martyrs. The debate about caterogy of sainthood went 
alongside with the painful process of rewriting Soviet 
history. The crucial queston was wom to blame for this 
crime. 
In 1993 Patriarch Alexei II called upon the Russian 
people to repent the collective sin of regicide. In this 
way, as Kathy Rousselet (2011: 150) notes: “a new moral 
judgment was to be made on Soviet history. The under-
standing of the spiritual dimension of the Soviet trage-
dy and the subsequent repentance were considered to 
be grounds for reconciliation of all Russian people.” (I 
have to add here that the canonization itself was also a 
political act as it was one of the prerequisits for recon-
ciliation of the ROC and ROCA which happened in 2007. 
For ROCA Romanovs are the matryrs, of course). 
Icon of Holy Neo-Martyrs and Confessors of Russia, known and unknown
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However, a decade later the call for collective repen-
tance disappeared from the political agenda of the offi-
cial Church, to be maintained only by groups of right-
wing monarchist Orthodox dissidents. These people 
insist that Nikolay Romanov be canonized as a martyr. 
But they go further: for them Nikolay is the “Redeemer” 
(iskupitel’), who by his death expiated the sins of the 
Russian people in the same way as Jesus Christ did for 
the whole of mankind. 
Although the Church denounced this way of venerat-
ing new saints as a heresy of tsarebozhie (veneration 
of Tsar as God), it failed to stop the activities of these 
Orthodox dissidents. Icons and other images of the 
emperor depicted as a redeemer and a martyr can be 
found in many parts of the country. One “underground” 
icon known as “Zealous sacrifice” depicts the head of 
Nicholas II in a Eucharist vessel or on a plate. These 
“zealots” sugget their own variant of the Soviet his-
tory, they use rhetorics of the concpiracy theory. For 
example, they insist that this crime was a ritual murder 
committed by the inner enemies of the nation (like Jews 
and masons). This position helps them to reconciliate 
with the Soviet past.
Martyrs are heros and political symbols more then 
helpers. To become the objects of popular veneration, 
that is to become media connecting the living with the 
heavenly world, these special dead have to reveal po-
tenciality of making miracles. To be venerated as saints 
by common believers, the special dead in Orthodox 
tradition need to have their material representations 
– first of all, the remains and the place where they are 
burried (a grave, a tomb, a casket or a chapel where the 
remains are kept). These material representations serve 
as means of communication between the believers and 
God, as embodiment of the sacred. No body – no saint. 
(The same logic applies to modern secular states that 
preserve the bodies of political leaders whom they have 
“canonized” as their creators). 
New martyrs (the majority of them) are the saints with-
out bodies. They were burried in massgraves some-
where in the forests or in the swamp, and this circum-
stance, together with some other reasons, brilliantly 
analysed by Karin Vibeke Hyldal Christensen in her 
recent PhD thesis «The Making of New Martyrs of Rus-
sia. Soviet Repression in Orthodox Memory» defended 
in the University of Copenhagen this year, prevent the 
believes from making new martyrs their personal role 
models or heavenly helpers.
Royal passion-beares. Canonized in 1981 by ROCA (as martyrs) 
in 2000 by  ROC 
Nikolas II as a Redeemer , fresco Pskov oblast
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The Romanovs’ remains are also in question, as the 
ROC does not recognize authenticity of the remains 
found near Yekaterinburg. “The royal remains” were 
first found by a group of enthusiasts and local history 
amature students in 1979 in the course of the “black 
archeology” illegal excavations. Frightened with possi-
ble concequances of their findings and having no odea 
what to do with them, these people reburied the sculps 
and bones to reveal the case only ten years later, when 
the proper time came. The remains were officially found 
by the same group of people, with support of the local 
authorities in 1991. The remains, however, have not 
been solemnly burried right after finding, as one could 
suppose. It seems nobody knew what to do with these 
treasures. As the governor of Yekaterinburg explained 
later (in 1997), he did not allow to move the remains 
to Moscow for examination, as he was afraid that they 
could be just «sold out». In that period this politician 
(Eduard Rossel’) was developing a federalist (or sepa-
ratist if you wish) political project of building the Ural 
republic with Yekaterinburg as its capital, and maybe 
he was thinking of these treasures as potentially use-
ful in building regional identity. Anyway, only in 1993 
(two years after the finding) a special «Governmental 
comission for investigation of the matters concerning 
examination and reburial of the remains of the Russian 
Emperor Nicholas II and his family» was created and the 
police was allowed to commence criminal investigation 
into the «unknown persons» death. 
In 1998 the case was closed, the bones identyfied as 
Romanov’s, and the remains burried solemnly in St 
Petersburg in Peter and Paul Cathedral where Russian 
Emperors have been entombed since the eighteenth 
century. The church hesitated. 
In 2007 new important discovery was made by the 
team of Yekaterunburg volunteers. They found missing 
remains of Romanovs, the bones of Prince Alexy and 
Princess Maria. These two bodies were burried – or 
rather hidden - in a small distance from the main burial 
spot. These remains went through the genetic tests 
again, and were identified as Romanovs’ bodies. 
The local enthusiasts not only have been doing ar-
cheological excavations with no state support, they 
also organized a memorial at the burial place. They 
organize excursions to this spot and keep it clean and 
do other things for memorialization of Romanovs in 
Yekaterinburg. In their activities which they themselves 
understand as a “work for the future”, the searchers 
do important ethical work of translating the historical 
narrative of crime and terror into a story of love and 
responsibility. They convert political murder into cul-
tural heritage. They depolitisize the image of the Roma-
novs, moving the accents from parents to children, and 
from much discussed political causes of the killing or 
the people who committed it to their own duties and 
responsibilities as citizens and human beings. For them, 
the main character in the tragedy is neither Nikolas II 
nor his wife, but their children. When the remains of 
Alexy and Maria were found, somebody from the circle 
of the searchers wrote a poem. 
The poem  started “Your majesties! Your kids have been 
found!” and promised that the meeting of the whole 
family will happen in the near future: “What a happi-
ness! The precious remains will join the parents and sis-
ters and share the same grave”. It hasn’t happened yet. 
Why haven’t the Church recognized the Romanov’s 
remains until now? It seems that this way it exercises 
the right of veto in the sphere of historical heritage it 
Burial ceremoni, St Petersburg, 1998. Officers carrying the coffin with the 
remains of Nikolas II
The group of local enthusiasts (amateur historians and military archeology 
club members) who found the remains of Prince Alexy 
and Princess Maria in 2007
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managed to obtain within last decade or so. By means 
of Romanovs’ unrest bodies ROC reminds to the society 
about Russian uncertain past and the Church’s role in 
defining the picture of this past.   
Conclusion
American anthropologist Catherine Verdery in her won-
derful book “The political lives of dead bodies: Reburial 
and Postsocialist change” (1999) tells about such highly 
symbolic activities as moving the bodies (remains and 
statues) of national political leaders and cultural heroes 
around the territories of states in Eastern Europe after 
1989. Some bodies were ‘invited’ after long period of 
‘exile’ to be reburied in their native land, whereas other 
where removed from the central locations to peripher-
ies (Memento Park in Budapest) or publicly destroyed 
and vandalized, that is have been symbolically pun-
ished or killed – like many statues of Lenin in the new 
independent states. As Verdery convincingly explained 
this, the “reburials narrow and bond the community of 
mourners” and they also establish blame and involve 
“creating certain kinds of social actors. (…) Which kind 
of social being can be effectively blamed and held ac-
countable? The state? The former regime? An ethnic or 
national group? Single individuals?”  
The reburials of cultural heroes in Eastern Europe 
marked the moment of “turning the page” in history of 
the countries, the boundary between before and after, 
between Socialism and something which “came next”. 
In post-Soviet Russia the main dead bodies are still in 
transition waiting for their “true burials” and proper 
yearly (that is eternal) commemoration ceremonies. 
Lenin’s body is still in Mausoleum in Moscow (Yurchak 
2015), and Romanovs’ remains are still waiting for their 
authenticity certificate and the status of “truly dead”. 
Before that, they remain ghosts, the spirits, which cause 
troubles in the community of their descendants and 
prospective mourners. “The page” has definitely not 
been turned.
Portrait of Nicholas II by Misha Brusilovsky. 2016.Yekaterinburg
“Your Majesties, the children have been found!”. Poem from web site of the 
history club in Yekaterinburg
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Centuries of expansion
For some 600 years – between around mid-1300 and 
1945 – the Russian state constantly expanded its terri-
tory. In the beginning one might say that this process 
represented a gathering of Russian lands under the 
political authority of Moscow, who managed to eclipse 
all the other Russian principalities and emerged as the 
power center of a strong Russian state. However, from 
around the times of Ivan the Terrible, Russian state 
began to expand also into territories that were not 
primarily inhabited by Russians or other Eastern Slavs. 
Specifically, we can date this change to the conquest of 
Kazan’, the capital of the northernmost Tatar Khanate, in 
1552. This was a watershed in Russian history by includ-
ing increasing numbers of non-Russians, non-Orthodox 
peoples in the state and thereby laying the foundations 
of the multinational Russian Empire.
Already the grandfather of Ivan the fourth had begun to 
use the title “czar”, which of course is a Russian version 
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of “Caesar”, and thereby indicated that he did not see 
his status as a mere “king”, but belong to a more select 
group of “emperors”. In the early 18th century Peter the 
Great – the greatest reformer on the throne in Russia 
changed the official nomenclature of the Russian state, 
and began to refer to himself as “Imperator” and his 
state as the “Russian Empire”, “Rossiiskaia imperiia”. 
This remained the official name of the Russian state 
until the 1917 revolution when the czar was toppled 
and the new communist leaders began to refer to 
their state as the “Union of Socialist Soviet republics”. 
They would emphatically deny that their state was an 
empire of any kind, and indeed, the non-Russians got 
more formal rights than they had ever achieved before, 
including separate “homelands” – Union republics for 
the largest once. Even so, the central power institutions 
were dominated by Russians and other Slavs, while the 
non-Russians were allowed a high degree of control 
and privilege within their respective republics. And, in 
fact, according to many political scientists a defining 
feature of imperial systems, which one may find in such 
different structures as the Ottoman Empire and the Brit-
ish colonial empire, is a high degree of indirect rule: the 
peripheral areas are controlled by local elites. So the 
fact that indigenous political elites enjoyed considerable 
leeway in how they ran their business can therefor in 
fact be seen as adding strength to the argument that 
also the Soviet Union was an empire.
 Finally, after Second World War a new, outer layer of 
dependencies was added to this Soviet empire when 
the East European countries were turned into small 
clones or satellite states: also they were run by indige-
nous, elites, after having first adopted the Soviet-style 
communist ideology. The end of the Second World War, 
by the way, also marked the end of territorial expansion 
of the USSR, when Western Ukraine – Galicia – was 
added to Soviet Ukraine. (The other annexations of new 
territory in the West had previously been part of the 
Russian Empire under the tsars, but Galicia had not.)
 After several hundred years of steady expansion, the 
Russian empire began to unravel in the 20th century. 
This happened twice, first during World War I and then 
after the end of the Cold War. In the first instance, the 
state most reassembled under the new communist 
leaders, and its dissolution could be seen as a short-
term aberration. The second dissolution in 1991 will 
in all likelihood be permanent. But are the Russians 
prepared to live at such a truncated state as they have 
now?
Nation-state versus Empire nostalgia
In terms of territory, the difference between Soviet 
Union and the Russian Federation is not very great: con-
temporary Russia makes up more than 75 percent of the 
former Soviet state. With regard to population, however, 
the situation is very different. While the total Soviet pop-
ulation in the latest census in 1989 was 285 million, the 
number of inhabitants in Russia today is only approx-
imately half of that. But while smaller, the state is also 
more ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Whereas 
ethnic Russians made up only half of the Soviet popu-
lation towards the end of the last century, their share of 
the population of Russia today has risen to more than 
80%. The overwhelming majority of the remaining 20% 
are also fluent in Russian, and for the most part well 
integrated into Russian society. In the early 1990s, the 
leading Russian social anthropologist, Valery Tishkov, 
claimed that Russian now, finally, had all the prerequi-
sites to create a nation-state. 
The leading West European states – France and England 
– have started their developments towards consolidat-
ed nation-states at the end of the Middle Ages and in 
early modern times. But this period – early moderni-
ty –was precisely when Russia took a huge step away 
from nation-state consolidation towards the building 
of a multi-ethnic empire. In this perspective, one might 
say that now, after a long- long delay, Russia had the 
chance to try out the nation-state option, to see if it 
could work for them also.
The mental adaption which this would require has 
proved to be difficult. when so many Russians today 
hate Gorbachev as much as they do, it is not only due 
to the economic hardships they have endured since per-
estroika, but even more to the fact that they blame  him 
for the breakup of the unitary Soviet state. The people 
behind the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 
1991 were not primarily motivated by a need to salvage 
the communist economic system. The main thing for 
Statue of Ivan the Terrible in the Russian city of Oryol, 
erected in October 2016
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them was to keep their great Fatherland together. And 
also in the Yeltsin period the leading Russian nationalist 
movements were what we would call imperialists. They 
wanted to restore as much possible of the defunct Sovi-
et state – and some of them also the Russian Empire. In 
1990x there’s Parliament – the Duma – passed a reso-
lution declaring that the dissolution of the USSR was 
illegal.  This resolution sent shockwaves throughout the 
outside world, even though nobody understood exactly 
what the practical political implications of it would be.
 Most famous among these so-called empire restorers 
was Vladimir Zhirinovskii, who also fantasized about 
protecting Russian power all the way down to the 
Indian Ocean. In the early and mid-1990s many alarm-
ist Western pundits predicted that Zhirinovskii might 
end up as the next Russian president Yeltsin which, as 
we know did not happen. Instead, Yeltsin’s handpicked 
successor Vladimir Putin took over, and after a short in-
terlude with his sidekick Dmitri Medvedev as a stand-in 
president 2008-2012, is now back at the helm.  
One of Putin’s most famous statements, at least one of 
the statements most remembered in Western countries, 
is that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest 
tragedy in the 20th century. This of course was an outra-
geous statement since it apparently belittled the Holo-
caust, and other tragedies in World War II, and seeming-
ly placed Putin squarely among the empire-restorers. 
However, we tend to ignore that he has also has said 
that Russians who does not deplore the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union have no heart while those who wants 
to restore it has no brains. Of course it is possible to be 
nostalgic about something which you realize cannot be 
relived, like one’s childhood for instance.  
But, you may ask: has not Putin, by annexing Crimea 
and supporting the rebels in eastern Ukraine, proven 
that he is prepared to follow up his Empire nostalgia 
with deeds, and has started the resurrection of the Em-
pire? Well, this is simply the way Russian imperialists 
see it, or hope to see it. For instance, the prolific writer 
and redoubtable imperialist, Alexander Prokhanov, 
claims that under Vladimir Putin Russia is building a 
fifth Empire, the first four were the Kyiv state, Musco-
vy, the Russian Empire in the in Petersburg period, the 
Soviet Union. For Prokhanov and people who think like 
him – and I admit that they are quite a few– Russia can 
only exist as an empire: empire is a fundamental trait of 
Russian self-understanding. in his book the Torch of No-
vorossiia One of the leading ideologues of the Donbass 
rebels – Pavel Gubarev –, claims that “we are imperial-
ists: we despise small petty, national states.” But even if 
they want to Gubarev does not speak on behalf of Putin 
and the Kremlin. He and the rebels realize that them-
selves, they understand that Putin’s Russia is not ready 
to help them win the war and annex more Ukrainian 
territory. In fact, Russian imperialists increasingly call 
Putin a traitor. 
Orthodoxy in imperial ideology
Now let us turn from political history to the history of 
ideas, from the history of the Russian Empire to the 
history of Russian imperialism, and ask: what has been 
the ideology of this imperial expansion? This is such a 
huge question that I could easily have filled the entire 
semester of lectures at my university with it, and since 
the overarching thematic so this conference is religion  
I will narrow down my question to this: what has been 
the role of religion – and in particular of orthodoxy – as 
non-ideology of this expansion? Let me begin with my 
conclusion and sets forward the claim that we should 
be extremely wary of overemphasizing this role. It is my 
contention that very many historians and commenta-
tors have made too much out of the alleged influence of 
orthodoxy on Russian policymaking. But we should be 
careful to distinguish between two possible roles which 
religion can play in politics: it can either be the driver 
of policies, or it can function as legitimation of policies 
already decided upon for very different reasons some of 
which may be so cynical that they need some more ac-
ceptable justifications. Russian orthodoxy has in certain 
periods function in this letter own but hardly ever in the 
former.
If we go back then to the beginning of the Russian 
Empire – which I dated to the capture of Kazan’ in 1552, 
we can note that what has often been interpreted as 
the ideology of Empire in czarist Russia was formulated 
even half century before that, at the very beginning of 
the 16th century . I am of course referring to the theory 
or myth of the third Rome, which probably is the most 
famous concept that springs to mind for most of you 
when we are discussing religion and Empire in Russia. 
The main elements of this myth you probably know 
way already: before the great schism in 1054 also the 
Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev
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Eastern churches recognized the Bishop of Rome – the 
Pope – as the head of Christendom, but when Cath-
olics and Orthodox parted ways Constantinople as 
the second city of the Roman Empire took over as the 
geographical center of Christianity, as a holy city with 
God’s special blessing. However, when Constantinople 
fell into the hands of the Ottomans for centuries later 
in 1453, clearly the Greek church no longer enjoyed the 
blessing of God, proving that they strayed from the 
true path. But thanks be to God, the Russians had hand 
on to true religion, in the special dispensation of God 
had moved again, this time to Moscow. Moscow was 
the third Rome, and “chetvertomu ne byt’”: which is 
normally translated as “there shall be no fourth”. Some 
people believe that this amounts not only to a program 
of triumphalism – Russia is the crowning achievement 
of God’s creation, stronger and holier than any other 
nation – but also that it is a program of Messianism. 
By that is meant that Russia and the Russians have an 
obligation to spread the truth by faith to all of mankind. 
Russia is an instrument of God in the history of salva-
tion, a collective Messiah
 We should note, however, that this myth, or theory, was 
which forward not by the metropolitan head of the Rus-
sian church for his apparatus in Moscow, but by a rather 
obscure monk in a peripheral monastery interest on 
Russian, starets Filofei. Secondly, many scholars with 
good reason interpret the sentence “there shall be no 
fourth” not as triumphalism or as a claim that Moscow 
will rule as the center of Christendom at all times until 
Jesus returns to the earth and establishes his eternal 
kingdom. No, it is more likely that it is in admonition to 
the czar: look at the two first Romans: they fell because 
they did not behave as true Christian monarchies. If 
the Russian ruler does not heed the commandments of 
God’s kingdom can be discarded with just as the two 
previous ones. In this interpretation starets Filofei is 
seen as a chastising prophet rather than as an ideolo-
gist of Empire.
Thirdly and finally, we can note that the Russian Czars 
to a very, very little degree have invoked the myth 
of the third Rome in order to underpin their imperial 
expansion. It is true that we can find that certain echo 
of this myth in the book History of Kazan’, which at the 
behest of Czar Ivan IV, the terrible, was written to justify 
the capture of the northernmost Tatar, but it also seems 
clear that even Ivan saw himself just as much, or per-
haps even more, as the legitimate inheritor of the gravel 
on the Mongols than the legitimate inheritor of the 
Byzantine legacy. And after that the myth of the third 
Rome went into decline and was more or less forgotten 
about for almost 300 years after it was resurrected by 
the second generation of Slavophiles in the late 19th 
century. We can note that even the Slavophiles where 
no messianists: they focused on the need to sanctify 
Russia and the Russians only not on saving the rest of 
the world.
It is of course true that Muscovy was a theocracy and 
the czars until Peter the Great claim to ruler with divine 
right. The only clear traces we can find in the sources of 
the third Rome idea is in critical, oppositional literature, 
in particular in the autobiography of the leader on the 
so-called Old believers, archpriest Avvakum. But Avva-
kum and his followers of traditionalist believers were 
severely persecuted by the czarist authorities, which to 
them only proved that Filofei’s warning had come true: 
the czar had strayed from the true Orthodox path, and 
Moscow, therefore, was no longer third Rome.
So if Russia was not ruled by Orthodox ideology, what 
was the ideology of the Empire then? Peter the Great, 
of course, inaugurated a secularizing, Westernizing, 
and modernizing rule in Russian history, the so-called 
St. Petersburg period. He had no patience with the 
church which he saw as a hopelessly backward-looking, 
reactionary institution. He’s ideology, if we can call it 
that was very pragmatic, it was to strive for the “com-
mon good” and for a strong state and blooded bites 
strong leader. All over Europe the 18th century was the 
age of absolutism to Russia was here only following the 
typical European trend. Peter’s successors in the 18th 
century followed up on this program. And Catherine the 
great, for instance, confiscated two thirds of the church 
property enclosed the vast majority of Russian monas-
teries. At the same time, however, she was not averse 
to using orthodoxy as a legitimation whenever it suited 
her, and she could for instance justify war against the 
Muslim Ottomans by the need to protect the Sultan’s 
Christian subjects against discrimination. This of course 
is orthodoxy as legitimation and not as a driver of 
policies. The role of the church as a prop of the tsarist 
regime increase during the 19th century, especially after 
the rise of the Russian revolutionary movement. If any 
Russian monarch after Peter the Great tried to fit the 
Vladimir Putin and patriarch Kirill in Sergieva Lavra, 2014’
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role of a true Orthodox believer it was probably Nicho-
las the second, who in certain respects atavistically tried 
to resurrect the Muscovy tradition, but, as we know, he 
was ignominiously toppled in February 1917, and soon 
the godless Bolsheviks took over.
Empire and Orthodoxy under Communism
Quite a few commentators have claimed that the Bol-
sheviks continued the czarist Russian tradition under a 
new inverted ideology. The strongest and most famous 
proponent of this idea was the Russian thinker Nikolai 
Berdiaev, who in his book the sources of Russian revo-
lution from 1932 set forth these claim. Some of Berdi-
aev’s observations are quite intriguing, and of course 
the Bolsheviks fell back on the Russian tradition of au-
thoritarian, centralized rule, after a short period of pro-
to-democracy between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. 
But sometimes his claims are so far-fetched that they 
border on the ridiculous such as when he claims that 
the Third international, which Lenin established in 1919 
as an instrument to bring communism to the rest of the 
world, it is simply a new incarnation of the idea of Rus-
sia the third Rome. This, to my mind is only a play on 
words. If anything, the idea behind Third international 
shows how little regard Lenin had for Russia as a state 
in his scheme. The Congress is of the third international 
were held in Moscow simply because his party was the 
only Communist Party in the world which had accom-
plished a successful revolution, and he looks forward to 
moving its headquarters to Paris and Berlin as soon as 
Moscow - May 7th, 2015: Young musicians in the beautiful St. George’s uniform with ribbons and drums of a military band 
go after a rehearsal of the Victory Parade
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possible. Lenin was certain respects a secular messian-
ist, but as far removed from Russian nationalist as you 
can get. Ironically, it was only when a non-Russian – the 
Georgian Joseph Stalin – moved into the Kremlin that 
Russian or more precisely Soviet patriotism became 
an important plank in seventh ideology. After the 
Second World War the Soviet ideologists claimed that 
for communists in all countries internationalism and 
support for so beginning was one and the same thing.  
Moreover, Stalin even to some degree began to use the 
church as a prop for his regime. This happened in 1943, 
when the soviets where battling for their life against 
the German invaders and Stalin had to use all avail-
able ideational resources to mobilize the population in 
the war effort. There are such arsenals allowed to elect 
a new patriarch, churches were reopened and most 
astonishing of all, the Moscow patriarchate was allowed 
to organize a huge pan- Orthodox Congress in Moscow 
in 1947, where prelates from all over the Orthodox world 
participated. Apparently, the Kremlin for a while toyed 
with the idea of using the church as an instrument to 
legitimize the sovietization of Eastern Europe; many of 
the peoples who now came under Soviet hegemony 
were traditionally Orthodox Christians, especially in the 
Balkans.  Apparently, Stalin concluded that the ideologi-
cal difference between communism and orthodoxy was 
too great for this strategy to be credible.
Russia’s imperial legacy today
Fast-forward: the last Soviet President, Gorbachev, and 
the first Russian president after the fall of communism, 
Boris Yeltsin, were secular, West-leaning leaders who 
made few efforts to woo the church.  They stopped 
the persecution of believers, but the vast majority of 
Russian Orthodox remained deeply sceptical of them 
and claimed that the new reformers in the Kremlin 
had opened the floodgates for a deluge of pernicious, 
decadent Western influences, which undermined the 
traditional Russian real life including Christian, Ortho-
dox values. Only when Vladimir Putin took over after the 
turn of the millennium have we seen a rapprochement 
between altar and throne. Already in his first major 
statement to the Russian people – the so-called millen-
nium article from December 1999 – Putin claimed that 
the Russian idea had to be based on a combination of 
universal values and traditional Russian values, in-
cluding spiritual values. By the way in which he talked 
about universal values it was clear that this was for all 
practical purposes identical with Western values, such 
as democracy, freedom of speech, human rights and 
so on. So at this stage Putin tried to be both a western-
izer Russian traditionalists at the same time. I guess 
it is worth reminding ourselves about this today even 
though now it sounds like a faint echo from bygone 
years. To be sure, Putin and his entourage still pay lip 
service to democracy, freedom of speech and human 
rights, but the content of these concepts they will 
define themselves: it has to be so-called “sovereign 
democracy” not a copy of liberal Western democra-
cy, and some human rights   such as rights of sexual 
minorities, waiting have to be circumscribed in such 
a way that they do not conflict with the sentiments of 
the majority population and their values. This message 
is enthusiastically embraced by the church which fully 
supports Putin’s policies, outwardly at least. Patriarch 
Kirill has publicly claimed that after the experience of 
the horrible 1990s, Putin’s entry into the Kremlin was 
a miracle from God. Even so, not everything is rosy in 
the relationship between church and state in Russian. 
For instance, the church has worked hard to get a new 
class called Foundations of Orthodox culture – which it 
in reality would be an Orthodox catechism class – intro-
duced as a mandatory subject in Russian schools but 
has been rebuffed. When it comes to foreign policy and 
in particular the policy towards the “near abroad”, the 
church leaders –  as virtually all Russians – exuberantly 
supported the annexation of Crimea, but in Ukraine 
the church has its own concerns which do not always 
coincide with the priorities of the Russian state. As 
much as half of the parishes of the Moscow patriarch-
Rehearsel for the military parade at Victory celebrations 9th May, in Moscow Monarchist demonstration by the statue of Ivan the Terrible in Oryol
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ate are located in Ukraine, and it is very important for 
the patriarch not to antagonize his Ukrainian faithful. In 
Ukraine there are no less than three Orthodox churches, 
so if the Ukrainian faithful conclude that the Moscow 
patriarchate is running the errands of Ukraine’s enemy, 
the Russian- supported rebels in Donbass, they can go 
to one of the two other churches. 
The Russian church, one might say, has its own variety 
of imperialism, by which it claims that the   entire space 
of the former Soviet Union is its so-called canonical 
territory. Elsewhere in the Orthodox world the general 
principle is that each nation has its own independent 
church, a so-called autocephalous church, meaning that 
it has its own “head” or autonomous leader. As long as 
the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union were in-
tact, this principle of one state--one church worked well 
also for the Moscow patriarchate, but it became deeply 
problematical when this unitary state fell apart. Logical-
ly, each Soviet successor states should now be granted 
the right to have its own church, but this, the Moscow 
patriarchate claims, would be tantamount to religious 
nationalism, for which they have a technical term, 
they call it “phyletism”. So far the Russian church has 
been able to hold onto most of his parishes not only in 
Ukraine but also in Belarus, Moldova and Central Asia, 
but my guess is that it is a losing battle. 
Neoimperialism and soft power
Russian imperialism today is by necessity what we 
might call neo-imperialism. The Empire is gone, the 
former Soviet republics are now independent states, 
the best Russia can hope for is to influence politics and 
culture in these states and other states, by various kinds 
of pressures and inducements from afar. This is per-
haps not too different from American neoimperialism 
in Latin America, which stretches back to the Monroe 
doctrine of the 19th century. In the Russian neo-impe-
rialism the Russian state has at its disposal in various 
kinds of weapons, “weapons” in quotation marks. Much 
has been talked about the energy weapon which they 
can wield against neighboring countries which depend 
upon Russian energy supplies – oil and gas. But when 
we talk about the Russian imperial tradition today, we 
must also focus upon what we might call the ideolog-
ical weapons. Or maybe “weapons” is not the most 
appropriate word, when other states behave in a similar 
way, we often use the expression “soft power” instead. 
one of Russia’s most talked about “soft power” weap-
ons in the near abroad is the so-called Russian world 
concept – Russkii mir. This is a very fuzzy concept which 
can mean many different things and for that reason is 
interpreted by some observers as very menacing by 
others as innocuous.  In a broad sense it can include 
all people who either know the Russian language and 
love Russian culture irrespective of where they live: 
in that sense I would also be a member of the Russkii 
mir. In a narrower sense it refers to ethnic Russians and 
Patriotic demonstration in Moscow
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other Russophones in the former Soviet republics who 
in Moscow’s view are susceptible to Russian cultural 
influences and propaganda. Special programs have 
therefore been designed to support Russian cultural 
centers and Russian language courses in the neigh-
bouring countries economically and otherwise. Even 
if Russian authorities insist that what they are doing is 
not so different from what Germany is doing through 
their Goethe Institute and Great Britain through British 
Council, many observers claim to detect more sinister, 
aggressive objectives behind these programs. It could 
be pointed out that the Russian church wholeheartedly 
embraces the Russkii mir concept but gives it a some-
what idiosyncratic twist, by emphasizing the spiritual 
common core of the East Slavic countries, tracing it 
back to the baptism of St. Vladimir’s, the Prince of Kiev 
in 988.
Another related concept which also conveys the notion 
of the former Soviet union as unified civilizational space 
is the so-called Eurasianism, or to be more precise, 
neo-Eurasianism. The word Eurasianism it is of course 
created by combining the name of the two continents 
Europe and Asia into one, Eurasia. For the vast majority 
of the adherents of this ism, however, the concept of 
Eurasia does not cover this entire landmass, it only it’s 
North Eastern part, specifically the territory of the Rus-
sian Empire/Soviet Union. The first Eurasianists when 
a group of Russian intellectuals had immigrated from 
Russia after the Bolshevik takeover, I tried to elaborate 
an ideology for the Russian state after the collapse of 
the Russian Empire which did not rely on either czarism 
or communism. They maintain that having lived togeth-
er for hundreds of years various peoples of Russian 
Eurasia had acquired a large number of common cul-
tural denominators, in fact, a common Eurasian civili-
zation, which spanned dozens of languages, historical 
traditions and lifestyles. This might sound like a pluralis-
tic program – a Russian variety of the American slogan 
“e pluribus unum”, one out of many. The Eurasianists , 
however, even if they acknowledged that the peoples of 
Eurasia  professed a number of different faiths and reli-
gions, they insisted that Russia, as soon as Bolshevism 
had been overthrown could only have one religion that 
was Orthodoxy. 
So Eurasianism must be written regarding this program 
for cultural imperialism, no less than “the Russian 
world” concept. Two other crucial elements in Eurasian-
ism is its skepticism towards liberal democracy and 
its rejection of the West, and of Western influence in 
Russia.
Eurasianism has large number of adherents in Russia 
today, in fact, also in several other post-Soviet states, 
in the contemporary interpretations of Eurasianism 
also numerous, indeed, so many that it is very difficult 
to pinpoint that this is Eurasianism. The most famous 
ideologue of Eurasianism is no doubt Alexander Dugin, 
a self-styled philosopher who has often been labelled 
fascist or neofascist, if not that, at least belong to the 
extreme European right. Dugin has occasionally been 
claimed to be the leading ideologue of Putinism, which 
certainly is a gross exaggeration. We can, however, note 
that when Putin decided to create what he hoped would 
become a strong and tightly knit Commonwealth of 
former Soviet republics he indicative the called it “the 
Eurasian union”. 
Eurasianism, as pointed out, is a civilizational program, 
and “civilization” is increasingly becoming a pivotal 
concept in Russian self-understanding under Putin. In 
this self-perception, Russia does not only have a unique 
culture but it is “a unique civilization”.  Precisely what 
this unique civilization consists of may be somewhat 
difficult to pinpoint. It is and is not European. While 
Alexander Dugin vehemently insists that Russia is not a 
European country, since it is a Eurasian country – Putin 
has always insisted – and continues to insist – that Rus-
sia is a European country. However, it is not European 
in the way we are used to think, with European values 
embodied in for instance the statutes of the Council 
of Europe. No, it is a defender of traditional Europe-
an values which allegedly have been betrayed by the 
majority of European leaders today, such as defence of 
religion, cultural traditions and family values, commu-
nity life and so on. It is Russia more than any other that 
stands up for true Europe against what they derisively 
call Gayropa. And as we know, this is a message which 
resonates reasonably well in parts of Europe, suggest-
ing Greece, Serbia, Hungary, but surprisingly also in 
Poland and the Czech Republic. And even further afield, 
Putin has ideological friends in Front National in France, 
in Geert Wilders’ Party for freedom, not to mention in 
homophobic countries in the third world. In this way 
we see that Putin’s soft power message of traditional 
civilizational values functions as a cultural imperialism 
also beyond Eurasia.
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Conclusion
Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia had 
been vast, multicultural multi-ethnic state which could 
well be called an empire, and indeed until the 1917 
revolution also was called an empire. But in contrast 
to the British and French empires the Russian Empire 
consisted of one consolidated landmass, with very hazy 
boundaries between core and periphery. this was the 
state which Russians have lived with and it would have 
been strange indeed if the dissolution of the state did 
not believe a strong imprint on the Russian mentality. 
The fact that many Russians today are experiencing 
what you might call territorial phantom limb pains and 
a hankering for the lost Empire is therefore probably 
less remarkable than the basically peaceful manner in 
which the state collapsed and the way in which the vast 
majority of Russians have, however grudgingly, accept-
ed this historical outcome.
Double headed eagle at Palace Square, St Petersburg
When we talk about Russian imperialism today the first 
thing that springs to mind is probably the annexation 
of Crimea, an professed Russian imperialists such as Al-
exander Prokhanov see this is the first step towards the 
reestablishment of the Russian Empire. This is certainly 
a pipe dream that would never be realized. Crimea is 
an exception, an aberration, when Russian imperial-
ism continues to exert some influence in Eurasia and 
Europe today it is in the form of soft power, perhaps not 
too different from American culture of power projection.
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Introduction:
Is there a “special path” in the relation between state 
and nation in Russia? While it would be difficult to an-
swer this question with a simple and affirmative “yes” 
or “no”, one could recognize that there is a discourse on 
the special path in Russia, and that this discourse – in 
contemporary Russia – has at least two main com-
ponents: the state (not the regime) and its ideational 
underpinning on the one hand, and a society, which is 
diversely affected by the more often than not asymmet-
ric exchange between modernity and memory, on the 
other. 
There is also a historical context, however; the fragile 
composition of the latter has always – also throughout 
history – led to a strong emphasis on the former. While 
this is not a discursive trait, it is a structural one, which 
impinges on how traditional values are read and inter-
preted, and this again has an impact on the discourse. 
To exemplify: With Putin, the state has once again risen 
as the least common denominator, or rather, the high-
est common aim, of all attempts to define Russianness. 
Notably, Russianness was here defined as distinct from 
the West, or as stated in the Millennium speech: 
“(...) Russia will not soon become, or may be not at 
all, a second edition of, let’s say, the USA or England, 
where liberal values have deep historical traditions. 
Here, the state, its institutions and structures, has 
always played an exceptionally important role in the 
life of the country and the people (v zhizni strany i 
naroda). A strong state is for the Russian (rossiyanin) 
not an anomaly, not something he would struggle 
against, but on the contrary, a guarantor of order 
(poryadok), the initiator and major driving force of all 
change” (Putin, 1999). 
What Putin frames as a fact, is indeed a paradox of his-
tory, not an ideal form of existence. As Vera Tolz stated 
about the Petrine reforms: “Russia became an Empire 
before ever contemplating becoming a nation” (Tolz, 
1998). Peter the Great also built a state on the ruins of 
Byzantine Muscovy, imposing it on his gentry, clergy 
and subordinates. Hence, the state came to be planted 
upon the citizens, and not to emerge alongside with a 
process of nation building. 
Now, one may suggest that this has changed: As Pål 
Kolstø suggested in the preface to the book The New 
Russian Nationalism (2016), “Nationalism is featuring 
increasingly in Russian society and in public discourse. 
Previously dominated by ‘imperial’ tendencies – pride 
in a large, strong and multi-ethnic state able to proj-
ect its influence abroad – Russian nationalism is now 
focusing more and more on ethnic issues” (Kolstø & 
Blakkisrud, 2016). This dovetails with James Billington’s 
approach in his Russia in Search of Itself (2004); he 
suggested that the discourse of what it means to be 
a Russian is one that takes place in “a political entity 
that – for the first time in history – has become a nation 
rather than an empire, and a democracy rather than an 
autocracy.” (Billington, 2004, p. x).
No one would today claim that Russia is a democra-
cy. But has Billington at least delivered a premise for 
understanding that discourse on the nation is a part of 
becoming one, and not solely a sign of failing nation-
hood? However, discourse on the relationship between 
state and nation cannot be seen as something, which is 
disconnected from the political context over-all. 
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Indeed, we could claim that “discourse on the nation” 
is by no means an anomaly in the Russian history of 
ideas, but that they emerged belatedly, and at a stage 
when the contextual framing of the “nation” was not 
favorable for its adoption as a principle of organizing 
Russia proper. So it was that the French concept of the 
“nation” understood as the political authority emanat-
ing from the people, and the polity being organized 
along the lines of territorialized power on behalf of 
that political principle, came into being alongside with 
the Russian intelligentsia’s embracing of revolutionary 
ideas, and in a situation when the Polish question domi-
nated in the geopolitics of Europe. 
Polish gentry advisors, not the French, prompted the 
Czar to consider constitutional reforms and liberaliza-
tions, but the French made Russia all too convinced 
about its vulnerabilities. Ideas of a nation seen as rule 
for the people and by the people polarized the Russian 
debate: the radical Radishchev wanted autocracy gone, 
whereas the Slavophile conservative, Karamzin, saw in 
the state of Russia, serfdom and economic organization, 
the only panacea for anything “national” to continue 
its existence. Furthermore, the Decembrists came to 
organize themselves in communities that reflected the 
dilemma of constitutional monarchy versus republic, 
and, in the upshot, both of these lines perished under 
the official nationalism of Nikolai 1st. 
As the 19th century saw the rise of culture and shared 
history as a markers of nationhood, Slavophiles and 
Westernizers sprung forth from the same nest – the 
discussions in the Historical society of Moscow – to 
engage in a debate no less riveting and even devas-
tating for Russia – that of the Slavophile debate. When 
the dust settled on this debate, Russia was remarkably 
changed – changed in the way that both camps had to 
admit to Russia’s relative backwardness in compari-
son with Europe, a backwardness that the Slavophiles 
embraced, and the Westernizers wanted to use as a call 
to revolution. In the late 19th century the basic features 
of the agrarian Russian peasant commune (obshchina) 
was used as a rallying and reference point for almost 
every possible political concept and idea available, with 
the exception of one: the policy of the state. The state 
set the serfs free, but the policy that made use of the 
serfs by means of transforming them to owners of the 
land did not shoot off until 1907, that is, after more than 
40 years of social unrest and terrorist attacks on the 
monarchy and the state. 
And herein lies the first strand of discourse in the cur-
rent profiling of the “Russian Idea” ala Putin: that the 
Russians have always “preferred the strong state”. They 
have not. The Russian intelligentsia – a sizable minority, 
claiming to represent the people - was fostered to de-
spise the state, and did so, with a fervor well described 
by both Dostoyevsky in The Possessed (Besy), and 
Nikolai Berdyaev in his Russian Idea and The Sources of 
Russian Communism. As the Soviets took power, how-
ever, the state was soon resuscitated, albeit in a new 
form: that of the single-party state. Hence, rather than 
see the state dissolve, as Lenin’s original work The State 
and the Revolution suggested, the Bolsheviks reformat-
ted the state, re-built it, and adopted even a policy of 
statehood-granting – the policies of the nationalities. 
Surely, what was not solved, however, was the prob-
lem of the state versus the autonomy of society, and 
vice-versa. In terms of the distribution of power, society 
has held an asymmetric position with regards to the 
more dominant positioning of the state; 19th century 
Russian society was agrarian, and shock-urbanized into 
the 20th century, and the Soviet experiment gave leeway 
to “nationhood,” but not to free society. Indeed, the “so-
ciety of nations” as it emerged in the Soviet Union was 
held together only by the volatile “nation-planning” 
of the Stalinist terror, and also, the promise of a future 
where all entities, nation, class and even state-society 
relations, would be transformed, only to dissolve and 
disappear. 
Hence, if there is one continuous scheme in Russian 
history, it is that society is not – even now – fully em-
powered in Russia. Rather on the contrary, the regime 
finds way in which to plug most political conduct into 
the question of the state’s dominance, and unsanc-
tioned right to interfere. Here again, however, a new 
conundrum arises: While the state is a sine qua non 
for Russian politicians (elites), and also, reproduced in 
speeches and talks of the political elite today as some-
what essential to the Russian character, this idea is 
sculpted more on what distinguishes Russia from the 
West than to fit the realities emerging in Russia after a 
decade of an oil-booming economy. 
So, in order to outline the questions treated in this pre-
sentation:
• How does the Putin regime format and underpin the 
idea of the state in rhetoric and speech acts?
• Does society make itself known in Russia today, and 
how do they format and conceptualize “the state”?
• What is “special” about Russia’s path, and at which 
level does that “special path” make itself manifest? 
Concepts and definitions
In order to conceptualize “continuity” in the field of the 
history of ideas, we need a) clearly definable concepts, 
b) a clear understanding of context. Can we with cer-
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tainty claim that historical development in any sensible 
way influences upon contemporary social and political 
life? Is history not solely a contextual thing, that is, 
dependent upon the outlook of the actors at that time, 
the constraints they faced, and also, the socio-political 
structure of state-society relations? 
We cannot, for certain, assume that “history repeats it-
self”. There is no cyclic model, which explains outcomes 
by means of suggesting that patterns of mid-18th cen-
tury discourse, as if by cultural default, are doomed to 
repeat themselves today. Can we, however, put these 
insights on some kind of sensible formula? Are there 
concepts that may help us sort out how to analyze 
the use of history in contemporary affairs, on the one 
hand, and how this utilization involves a repetitious 
pattern of things past? 
The Russian historian Aleksey Miller in his distinctly 
important Pro et Contra article from 2009 talked about 
the “politization of history” and the “politics of mem-
ory” as two distinct branches of interpretation, the 
former being a reactivation of scientifically generated 
problems of history in a contemporary context, and the 
latter being the politics adopted, as it were, to ”guide” 
memories and use it as a tool for building an accept-
able ”state-identity,” or, as Miller suggested: 
“to direct attention towards some single plots of his-
tory and silence and marginalize others; to pay pen-
sions to the veterans of one such plot, while declining 
payments to the veterans of the other” (Miller, 2009).
Aleksey Miller also suggests that the two options mem-
ory politics and/or politization of history are present in 
all modern states and their societies. There is, however, 
one particular quality, which preserves the balance --- 
political pluralism. “The presence of a parliamentary 
opposition,” Miller holds, 
“… and also independent social and professional or-
ganizations, that defend perceptions that are distinctly 
different from parties in power positions, will, accord-
ingly, secure pluralism in the politics of memory” 
(Miller, 2009).
In my presentation today, I shall accentuate exactly the 
“politics of memory,” and only indirectly talk about the 
“politization of history.” The two are, however, certain-
ly interlinked, also in the sense that too much of the 
former, may bring about the latter in a very articulate, 
and for Russia, recognizable way. State-guided, or re-
gime-guided, history does, indeed, seem like the exact 
version of “politization of history” that Miller indicated: 
memory politics harnesses politicized history that is, 
patterns of failed nation building, sharp social polariza-
tion, and societal passivity. My question will then be: 
how does this happen?  
Yeltsin at the balcony by The White House
FONDET FOR DANSK-NORSK SAMARBEID 35
GEIR FLIKKERUSSIA’S “SPECIAL PATH” IN THE RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND NATION
State and Nation under Yeltsin/ Putin
Concerning the sources of Putinism and the state/ 
nation nexus, we have two: we have the speeches and 
speech-acts of politicians on the topic, and we have 
the practical conduct of politics. We know, then, that 
the state-leader may define politics within a certain 
realm, an, in the Russian system, he can do so relatively 
unchallenged. We do also know, however, that where-
as the public definition of issues meets with few con-
straints, the policies conducted can meet with several, 
and it can also produce constraints. 
This summarizes the conundrum of the policy of nation-
hood under Yeltsin and under Putin. The following logic 
will be based on two primary assumptions: 
Yeltsin’s policy of “nationhood” was articulated in two 
ways, both fundamentally unsustainable: a) a rapid ap-
proximation to the West, security-wise and economical-
ly, and b) a regional policy, giving he regions “as much 
sovereignty” as they could possible swallow. In this 
mix of approaches, the “Russian” issue disappeared. 
Democrats and Yeltsinites were reluctant to make it into 
a single issue, and Yeltsin himself called a national com-
petition on delivering the “Russian Idea” for contempo-
rary Russia. 
At the deeper level, however, there was a struggle for 
the state, and nowhere was this more clearly described 
than in Yegor Gaydar’s pamphlet The State and the 
Evolution (1994), where he formulated this dilemma not 
primarily as a function of the Western or Asiatic path of 
Russia, but rather, as a consequence of what he termed 
“nomenklatura capitalism.” True, Gaydar departed from 
the theory of Asiatic despotism to formulate the prob-
lems of Russia in the 1990s, but he saw the greed of no-
menklatura capitalism in his own country as inevitably 
linked to a specific “Russian” entity and cultural context 
– that of the state. If state and property have never been 
divided, historically, and in present times, Gaydar held, 
“(…) even the most powerful state would, in reali-
ty, be weak and degenerate (trukhlyavy). The state 
servicemen, the bureaucracy (chinovniki) will eat the 
state completely, and they will not halt the hunt for 
property. Everyday corruption will soon become the 
real state of affairs. The servicemen will intuitively try 
to stabilize the situation, by converting power into 
property” (Gaydar, 1994).
Gaydar clearly linked this to the paradox of the libera-
tion from the Tatar Yoke, asserting that the dissolution 
of the Horde put Russia on a firm path towards despotic 
Asian rule, firmly expressed by Ivan Grozny. With it, 
he suggested started the thriving expansion of Russia, 
ending only in 1945. And, this is important, the steady 
expansion left Russia void of important processes of  
nation-building and it also tapped state resources; 
Russia became a “…. Civilization” (dogonyayushchaya 
tsivilizatsiya), dedicating most of its resources to “catch 
up” with its constituent other --- the West:
“Russia was captured, colonized by itself, ending up 
as a hostage of the militaristic-imperial system, which 
profiled itself in front of the kneeling people as its 
eternal benefactor and savior from external threats, as 
the guarantor of the existence of the nation” (Gaydar, 
1994, p. 46).
It seems fair to say that other issues were more im-
portant than the “soft” package of a national idea; the 
GKO crisis of 1998 and the Chechen wars 1999 – 2002 
stymied discussions of “nationhood” and gave a thor-
ough boost to demands for “statehood.” As matters of 
state-security rose to the forefront, so did the call for a 
“strongman,” capable of inducing the needed amount 
Yegor Gaydar’s pamphlet The State and the Evolution (1994)
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of respect in the polity and the elite. As Putin adopted 
his first “position papers,” to paraphrase John P. Willer-
ton, the idea of statehood towered over that of “nation-
hood” (Willerton, 2014). As a matter of fact, the “nation” 
and the “nationality question” were completely gone 
from the agenda of public policy. What surfaced was a 
mildly passionate version of an ancient theme: Russia 
is not the West, and Russia has always been, and will 
always be, a unitary state. 
Most of Putin’s subsequent reforms should be inter-
preted in this light. The state, crumbling under Yeltsin’s 
multiple bilateral agreements with the regions, the near 
financial collapse of the state, and a secessionist war 
in the South, needed a complete makeover, to use a 
phrase from an average Western TV-show. The redo was 
both swift and relentless: in the period from 2002-2004, 
the state vertical was strengthened by ousting political 
competition from the Federation Council, oligarchic 
groups, and federal autonomy was retracted with the 
introduction of the presidential representatives, and the 
direct appointment of regional heads of the executive. 
Moreover, by 2007, the dominant party, United Russia, 
had risen not only to supremacy, but to dominance, 
holding 2/3 of the votes in the State Duma. A carefully 
designed manipulation of thresholds and voting rules 
also led to the final and irreversible ousting of the last 
partisan remnants of Yeltsin’s “Westernization.” 
Indeed, the name “Edinaya Rossiya” is a telling one; 
unity was expressed in state-terms, edinstvo/edinny, 
meaning “one single entity”, as opposed to razchlenenie 
(pulverization); the metaphor, or rather, executive com-
mand of “unity” was also associated with the Russian 
“nation,” that is, Russia. 
2006-2012: The Apotheosis of Statehood
As the state grew more centralized, I argue, what rose 
was not a doctrine of the nation, but of the state. This 
sprout had been present also in the millennium speech, 
but notably not formulated explicitly as a strategy, I 
argue. One interesting example in this regard is the 
oft-cited work of presidential advisor and grey cardinal, 
Vladislav Surkov, and his speech to the dominant party 
United Russia congress in 2006. 
For some reasons, many scholars have accentuated 
what Surkov wanted them to accentuate, the terms 
“sovereignty” and “democracy.” Take Stephen White, 
for instance, who suggests that the “West” failed in 
projecting the expectations of electoral democracy 
onto Russia, and hence, logically, he came to see the 
doctrine as “a form of rule that shared general demo-
cratic principles but combined them with the ability to 
take decisions without deferring to the views of other 
powers – in other words, real rather than nominal sov-
ereignty” (White, 2010, p. 278). 
But the Surkovian point of gravity was all about the 
state: as he suggested in the speech on sovereign de-
mocracy, where he was toying with the various “paths” 
and “concepts” of the Russian separate path:
“The most romantic of all the rationales for preserv-
ing state sovereignty that the Russians (russkie), the 
Russians (rossiyane) have already for 500 years been 
a state-forming people (gosudarsvoobrazuyushchiy 
narod)—we are a nation (natsia) which has adapted 
to statehood (gosudarstvennost’). Unlike many of 
our friends from the Soviet Union and many other 
countries, we have always been the vessels of an 
idea of statehood. It is clear that some countries that 
formulate joining the EU as their national idea are 
fortunate: they do not have to think as much as we do. 
It’s all very simple for them: ‘the Muscovites (moskali) 
are bad, everything is their fault, but we will run to 
Brussels, and everything will be fine.’ We should re-
member that none of these nations (natsii) have ever 
been sovereign in history; they do not have the habits 
of statehood (navyki gosudarstvennogo sushchestvo-
vaniya)” (Surkov, 2006).
In other words, statecraft, Surkov suggested, was the 
essence of the Russian path. This vision of the “past”, 
he then flipped into an eternal future, suggesting that 
finding “concepts,” also meant to model the future. He 
modeled it in the following way:
“(…) a striving toward political wholeness through 
the centralization of power functions. Second, we 
have an idealization of the goals of political struggle. 
Third, we have a personification of political institu-
tions (…) Through the centuries, a strong central state 
gathered, consolidated, and developed an enormous 
country stretching broadly over space and time. It 
conducted all significant reforms. (…) It is not so 
important whether Russia’s model of the centralized 
state was a consequence of the ‘monocentric’ ar-
chetype in the national unconscious or whether this 
archetype itself took shape under the pressure of 
historical circumstances. In any case, today, too, the 
majority views the presence of a powerful center of 
authority as a guarantee of the preservation of Rus-
sia’s wholeness—territorial, spiritual and every other 
kind” (Surkov, 2008, p. 83).
Would it be an exaggeration to suggest that Surkov 
laid the foundation for Putinism – or that he staged the 
apotheosis of statehood as personalized power? We can 
recognize that there are divergent versions of Russia’s 
path today, and that these version, as in the 1990s, are 
gravitating towards modernization and innovation, plu-
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ralist society, economic fiscal control and elite discipline 
on the one hand, and traditional values, conservatism, 
the preponderance of state hierarchy over societal plu-
ralism, and the solid guidance of the state in all affairs, 
on the other. 
We can note that, Medvedev, (quoted in White), articu-
lated that the term “sovereign democracy” was confus-
ing, and “far from ideal,” as it “combined two entirely 
different concepts.” Rather, he preferred “genuine de-
mocracy,” or “democracy within a comprehensive state 
sovereignty” (White, 2010, p. 280). And Medvedev went 
along: “democracy can only be effective in conditions 
of full state sovereignty, and sovereignty can achieve 
results only in conditions of a democratic political re-
gime” (p. 281). 
On the other hand, we also have to note that the return 
of Putin has brought about new versions of what Luke 
March (2012) calls “official nationalism” --- this is not 
“nationalism”, March argues, but ways in which to mo-
bilize and crack down on expressions of “nationalism”. 
Hence, he suggests that it is all about regime utility, not 
ideational content: 
“I will argue that the Russian authorities’ nationalism 
(which I call ‘official nationality’) is moderate in its 
content relative to historical and contemporary forms 
of Russian nationalism. This is because its aim is not 
the expression of nationalism per se, but its control 
and utilisation for regime goals. However, the effect 
of official nationality is far less benign than its content 
because of contradictions inherent in its political util-
isation: the regime takes a profoundly administrative 
approach that is far less post- Soviet than the content 
of its nationalism, and its approach to extreme nation-
alism is ambiguous and inconsistent” (March, 2012, p. 
402).
But “regime utility” is a Damocles Sword: the powerful 
state may become the weak state, since it suppresses 
pluralism in society, real popular initiative, and finally, 
solidifies the regime at the cost of state governance. 
This brings me to the last section.
2012-2016 – The Imbalanced State:  
Restrictions and Governability 
I have argued elsewhere that following the protest 
demonstrations of the 2011–2012 electoral cycle, ten-
sions between the limited modernization efforts of Med-
vedev and what I term the resurgent authoritarianism of 
Putin have become more visible.
There are numerous evidences that suggest this: Within 
two months of Putin’s inauguration on 7 May 2012, the 
Russian prosecuting authorities held high-profiled trials 
against protesters, detained the most visible politi-
cal protest leaders, and amended the 1995/2006 Law 
on NGOs. Starting from 2012, any NGO that receives 
foreign funding must register as a “foreign agent” and 
conduct stricter, more regular reporting. Refusal to reg-
ister may entail enforced dissolution, high fines, or even 
imprisonment. This and other laws have gone down in 
history as the May decrees, disciplining the government 
to work for objectives that de facto limit and contain the 
autonomy of society. 
Let me be clear: the protest events in 2011/2012 were 
“cracks in the wall” for the doctrine of building the 
state. What emerged from this protests was the demand 
that the state should not intervene in the electoral pro-
cess, and that the state’s preponderance in public and 
economic affairs suppressed free choice and a pluralist 
society. And the issue is not about numerical strength; 
it’s about state preponderance and the inherent contra-
dictions that emerge from this. 
I shall make two points. First, even though the op-
position is weakly organized, the very tools used for 
re-instating authoritarian rule may construct a policy of 
orchestrated repression and public denial far outdoing 
what once passed as selective and measured repres-
sion. In crushing all actions connected with popular pro-
tests against electoral manipulation and ballot-stuffing, 
a hybrid regime can make fatal mistakes in repressing 
society and public political organization, undermining 
governability by erecting control instances that com-
pete for positions in the state. Moreover, excessive 
control can undermine the main criterion of regime 
stability: the organizational power of incumbency. 
Second, the long expected program for “nationhood,” 
left over from the Yeltsin period in the advent of eco-
nomic growth and governance stability, has emerged in 
a context where the question “where is the nation” has 
been acutely articulated by means of military conflict. 
It’s a dissonance of formidable magnitude that Putin, 
in a position article, printed in Nezavisimaya gazeta on 
23 January 2012, was important. Putin for the first time 
used the term “state-forming people” (gosudarstvoo-
brazuyushchiy narod) about Russian ethno-nationals 
(Putin, 2012), this at a time when Russian “nationalism” 
was taking to the streets and defying the state. More-
over, as the supplementing government policy on “na-
tionhood” was developed, the Euromaidan broke out, 
making Brubaker’s triadic nexus a fearsome reality. 
Putin at Athos
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Conclusion:
Where does all this lead us? I shall attempt a short and 
sweet recapture of the main arguments. 
If there is one single question that more than anything 
has puzzled Russian nation-builders, and that has cre-
ated fear and security measures from the state, it’s the 
issue of “nationhood”. Thus, the doctrine of the state as 
the single unifier is a product of an inherent, fundamen-
tal sense of insecurity.
The statehood doctrine does not, however, settle the is-
sue of political and societal pluralism in Russia, howev-
er, as the major fault lines are now developing around 
issues of how much power the state should have over 
nascent societal organization. This contradiction will 
only intensify with the generational shift, and a policy 
of discrimination may lead to more articulate forms of 
nationalism. 
Finally, and here I would like to recall Miller’s distinction 
between the “policy of memory” and the “politization 
of history” – a policy of streamlining society along the 
lines of exalting the principle of statehood and state 
control over that of societal autonomy may certainly be 
accompanied by a cultivation of “what to remember” 
and how. On the other hand, this may lead to the politi-
zation of history, that is, recurrent patterns of conflicts 
of interest, where the liberal segment of Russian society 
will withdraw, become more assertive, or vanish in a 
puddle of chauvinism, patriotism and social polarization. 
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Introduction
The theme of the seminar is State, religion and society 
in Russia and the Nordic countries.  My contribution 
addresses the Russian dimension. The title is inspired 
by current Russian opinions among the intelligentsia 
concerning Russia’s plight but also by the memory poli-
cy of the present regime in Russia. 
Clericalization refers to the impact of the Russian Or-
thodox Church, militarization to the image of the state 
and acquiescence to the atmosphere in political life. 
Concerning the Church, the attention is on its stance 
regarding public affairs and not on theology. The term 
Intelligentsia refers to a social category and a concept 
whose history has come full circle in Russian history. 
The trajectory starts in the Enlightenment at the time 
of Alexander Radishchev and his A Journey from St. 
Petersburg to Moscow in 1790. It continues via names 
such as Vissarion Belinskii, Peter Chaadaev and Alexan-
der Herzen, to change guise in Soviet times with dissi-
dents such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sinyavskii 
and Andrei Sakharov – called dissidents, because the 
Soviet regime appropriated the term intelligentsia – and 
to end today with names such as Lyudmila Ulitskaya, 
Vladimir Sorokin and Alexander Sokurov.
Russia and Europe – a strained relation
On the eve of the parliamentary election in Russia on 
18 September 2016, Alexander Sokurov gave an inter-
view in the Russian newspaper Novaja Gazeta. He was 
critical of the reactionary ideological and political atmo-
sphere in Russia and declared: 
There is not any enlightenment for the Russian peo-
ple, in Russian society. Clericalization and militariza-
tion have become paramount in the consciousness of 
young people. This means that among those where 
there is a certain social energy, it is geared towards 
aggressive politicization, party-mindedness and su-
perstition.
There is a certain weight in this statement by Sokurov. 
As a film director he became internationally known with 
his movie Русский ковчег (The Russian Ark, 2002) as 
a guardian of Russia’s European cultural heritage. The 
film is a narration about the Europeanization of Russian 
society from the reforms of Peter the Great in the early 
18th century until the eve of World War I. The film is a 
single 96-minute Steadicam sequence shot through 
the halls of the Winter Palace and Hermitage in Saint 
Petersburg. Actors demonstrate episodes from Russian 
history and culture. The narrator who encounters and 
confronts the Russian culture is the Marquis de Custine, 
who is notorious as a French aristocrat who went to 
Russia in 1839 and hoped to find arguments against 
representative government but was abhorred by the 
autocracy and the acquiescence of the population, and 
by the backwardness, for which he blamed the Russian 
Orthodox Church. 
St. Petersburg, The Winter Palace and the Hermitage. 
Photo: Kristian Gerner
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Sokurov’s aim with the film was to celebrate Russia’s 
new encounter with the West after the Cold War: the 
West should repent having been equivocal and arrogant 
in the manner of Custine concerning Russia’s fate under 
Soviet rule. This film was followed up by Sokurov with 
the film Francophonia (2015). The latter movie is set in 
the Louvre, Paris, during World War II.  It tells 
the true story of the friendship between the Louvre’s 
wartime French curator and the Nazis’ head of artistic 
preservation (or, perhaps more accurately, appropria-
tion). In what may be the film’s most affecting se-
quence, Sokurov turns closer to home and compares 
the Louvre’s relatively benign wartime fate with that 
of the Hermitage Museum in besieged Leningrad.
The message of these two movies taken together is that 
Russian culture is one with Europe’s. The Hermitage is 
the Louvre’s equal.  The polemical point of Francopho-
nia shines through in scenes from Leningrad under 
the terrible German siege of 900 days in 1941-1944: 
whereas the French collaborated with the German 
occupiers during the war in order to save the treasures 
of the Louvre, “Europe” did not care a bit for the fate of 
the Hermitage or of Leningrad and the Russian people 
during the Nazi war of annihilation.
War and Warrior
On August 1, 2014 on the occasion of the centennial of 
the German attack in World War I on Russia in 1914, a 
monument to the Russian army and people was un-
veiled at Victory Park in Moscow. President Vladimir 
Putin declared at the solemn inauguration:
Russia withstood the attack and was then able to 
launch an offensive. The Brusilov offensive [1916] 
became famous throughout the whole world. But this 
victory was stolen from our country. It was stolen by 
those who called for the defeat of their homeland and 
army, who sowed division inside Russia and sought 
only power for themselves, betraying the national 
interests.
In October 2016 an equestrian statue of Ivan the Terrible 
was unveiled in the Russian city Oryol. The business 
daily Vedomosti observed in an editorial that this was 
the first monument to Ivan the Terrible in Russia’s histo-
ry and commented: ”It is a salvo in memory wars and a 
statement in a political discussion of the government’s 
right to use force domestically.“ The monument was 
backed by Russia’s culture minister, who has argued 
that Ivan the Terrible’s brutal rule is a myth – i.e.  a de-
lusion – and that Ivan’s name was tarnished by western 
travelers who slandered him in their writings. 
St. Petersburg, Palace Square August 2014 
Centennial Jubilee of World War I 
Photo: Kristian Gerner
  Russia´s first monument to Ivan the Terrible inaugurated 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/14/russias-first-monu-
ment-to-ivan-the-terrible-inaugurate
Moscow, Victory Park, August 2014 
Monument to the Russian Heroes of WW I 
Photo: Kristian Gerner
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An acquiescent middle class
It seems that the Russian people are encouraged to be 
proud of the distant past of Russia in order to accom-
modate to today’s harsh realities. Because half a year 
before the patriotic manifestation and celebration of the 
deeds of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, the 
Russian economist Tatyana Maleva observed:
People have understood that the promising future 
belongs to the past– there are no perspectives. The 
atmosphere is ”negative stability”. Discontent might 
increase in geometrical progression. Only a spark is 
needed, even an insignificant one, to trigger anything 
– for example a social explosion.
In the first quarter of 2016, according to Statistics 
Russia, 22.7 million people had an income below the 
existential minimum (as opposed to 14.4 million people 
at the end of 2015).
 
Under the intriguing heading “Unstable equilibrium 
of stability” the Opinion Research institute the Levada 
Center in August 2013 painted a rather contradictory 
and not quite assuring picture of the atmosphere. The 
Center observed that the increase of street protests 
contradicted the widespread total pessimism in society: 
“Nobody knows where a revolt may erupt.” However, 
the Center’s final conclusion from its opinion surveys 
was that the most important fact was that the depres-
sive mood in Russian society did not favor neither 
growth of the economy, nor a healthy political life and 
a striving of citizens to change the situation.  One may 
thus state that acquiescence characterizes Russian soci-
ety of today rather than the danger of immediate social 
unrest. 
According to a more recent poll by the Levada center 
in early 2016 65% percent of the Russian population 
wished that relations between Russia and the West 
should become “harmonious”. However, 65% were also 
against Russia making concessions. The chairman of the 
Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy Fedor 
Lukyanov observed, in an interview in March 2016, that 
during the Cold War the Soviet Union had nurtured 
cultural relations with the West in the guise of “popular 
diplomacy.” Today, on the contrary, the Russian leaders 
led foreign policy according to the classic slogan “If you 
want peace, prepare for war.” Lukyanov quoted Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, who in the fall 2014 had de-
clared to the members of the Russian Security council: 
”Thank God that Russia will not have any ally.” Lukyan-
ov noted that Russia did not need any allies.
A new “symphony”
The only trustworthy ally of the Russian state is the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Alexander Sokurov argued 
in the interview which has been referred to above that 
the Church and the state had become one. He did not 
use the classical word for this, symphony, but used the 
Russian verb срасти, literally “to grow together”:
Today the Church has merged ostensibly with the 
state and has become a political instrument, as all can 
see. In my opinion this is one of the most important 
and serious moments for the survival of Russia as 
such. If today in Russia religion was separated from 
the state, many current problems would not exist. It 
means that terrorism wouldn’t have the same scale. 
This is because religion has offered a political plat-
form and in our country religion has acquired priority 
over Enlightenment.
President Putin’s assertion that Russia can stand alone 
as a strong player in international relations can be 
Moscow, September 2016. ”The Burial of the Middle Class”. https://www.
novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/09/07/69769-krizis-srednego-klassa
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia 
Kirill, Moscow February 1, 2013. (Picture provided by Ria Novosti. 
REUTERS /Sergei Gunyeev)
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interpreted as an instance of katechon. This Greek term 
is used in Orthodox Christian language to describe the 
Christian Empire as the “obstacle”, i.e. the force that 
stops Anti-Christ. This katechon may in a secularized 
form be translated to mean that the Russian national 
interest is different from that of all other states, because 
Russia’s national interest is the mission to protect the 
whole world against the evil forces.
The Russian Enigma – a factoid 
A very well-known but often miss- quoted saying by 
Winston Churchill is that the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union was enigmatic. The context was the not fore-
seen and unexpected fact that the deadly enemies Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union had concluded a pact of 
non-aggression and friendship in the late summer 1939 
and then proceeded to divide Poland between them. 
Churchill’s famous phrase was a rhetorical device. It has 
very often been quoted out of context and then referred 
to as a “factual” statement.  Such a false verisimilitude 
is called a factoid. Churchill uttered it at the start of a 
live radio speech to the British people in October 1939. 
Immediately after the enigma phrase, Churchill added 
that the key to solving the riddle was to consider “Rus-
sia’s national interest”. Given our concern with the for-
eign policy of Putin’s Russia today, it is relevant to note 
that Churchill’s statement was based upon his analysis 
of the implications of the then recent German-Soviet 
non-aggression pact for the policy of the Soviet Union 
in the long run.  These are Churchill’s own words:
I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a 
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but 
perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national 
interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest of 
the safety of Russia that Germany should plant itself 
upon the shores of the Black Sea or that it should 
overrun the Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic 
peoples of south Eastern Europe.  That would be con-
trary to the historic life-interests of Russia.
 Churchill’s prediction came true – after having been 
attacked by Germany the Soviet Union would stand 
up against Germany and become an ally of the United 
Kingdom. Moreover , Churchill’s assessment of the 
rationale behind Stalin’s policy in 1939 tunes in not only 
with the official Soviet interpretation retrospectively 
of the reasons behind the pact with Germany in 1939 
but also with President Putin’s interpretation today. In 
November 2014, after the Russian annexation of the 
Crimea, President Putin declared that whereas some 
people had said it was horrendous that the Soviet 
Union had concluded the pact with Nazi Germany in 
1939 it was not horrendous at all – the Soviet Union did 
not want to wage war but to protect peace. 
Soviet patriotism acclaimed – and refuted
President Putin linked his retrospective endorsement of 
Stalin’s foreign policy in 1939 to an outright re-habili-
tation of the history of the Soviet Union as a legitimate 
part of Russia’s history of patriotism when he awarded 
the Order of Alexander Nevsky to Marshal Dmitry Yazov, 
on his birthday November 8, 2014):
…for his contribution to strengthening the nation’s 
defence capability and promoting patriotic values 
among the younger generation. Vladimir Putin 
thanked Dmitry Yazov for his efforts, noting he was 
proud to be with him on this special day. The Presi-
dent expressed hope that Marshal Yazov will continue 
his work to support the Russian armed forces and 
young servicemen.
 Marshal Yazov is notorious for being a member of the 
so-called “State Committee on the State of Emergen-
cy” which was organized in August 1991 in an attempt 
by vice president Grigorii Yanayev, Yazov and others to 
topple Presiden Mikhail Gorbachev and re-construct the 
Soviet Union as a unitary state. Putin’s declaration that 
Yazov had been a patriot thus retrospectively endorsed 
the attempted coup in 1991.
Putin’s patriotism is obviously intimately linked to mil-
itarism. It is important to note that dismissal of patrio-
tism lies at the core of Alexander Sokurov’s criticism of 
the clericalization-militarization nexus which he ob-
serves in Russia today. He argues that “patriotism” is a 
superficial sentiment:
What does it mean to be proud of the Motherland? 
To believe that it is better than other countries? Well, 
why is Canada worse than Russia? Why is the Cauca-
sus better than Italy, Switzerland or France? Or, why 
are the latter better than the Caucasus? In my opin-
ion, one can only be proud of the work of man. […] If 
patriotism is proudness, then one can be proud only 
of the work of man. One cannot be proud of nature, 
because it is only given to us.
Alexander Sokurov’s strong dismissal of “patriotism” 
must be interpreted against the background of the 
combined message of his movies The Russian Ark and 
Francophonia,i.e. that Russia is a repository of Euro-
pean high culture and its defender, although it is not 
recognized as such by the self-proclaimed guardians of 
European values in the West.
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Conclusion: Holy Russia reaffirmed
In the interview in Novaya Gazeta,  Sokurov gave an 
eloquent description of the merger of the Church with 
the militarized Russian state in the name of patriotism. 
He posed the rhetorical questions why a representative 
of the Russian Orthodox Church took part in the meet-
ing of the Marshal Staff of the armed forces but not a 
Mufti or any representatives of the other confessions in 
Russia, and why Russian fighter planes were consecrat-
ed and sprinkled with holy water by an Orthodox priest.  
He wondered whether the leaders did not trust their 
engineers or believed that the planes not made by man. 
The last comment indicates that Sokurov insinuated 
that Putin’s Russia has returned to the medieval era of 
superstition. 
Sokurov’s observation squares well with the opinion 
among some Russian intellectuals, namely the journal-
ist in Novaja Gazeta Yulia Latynina and the leader of the 
liberal Russian opposition party Yabloko (which did not 
make it into the State Duma in the September election),  
Grigorii Yavlinskii. Both argue that Putin’s regime has 
thrown Russia back to the time before the reforms of 
Peter the Great in the early 18th century, i.e. to the time 
before secularization and enlightenment.  Yavlinskii 
even wrote of the “de-modernization” of Russia.
An idea that has been nurtured by generations of Rus-
sian intellectuals is that Russia’s history has never been, 
and will not become, a smooth process of progress. It 
has been and will probably rather continue to be char-
acterized by sudden, abrupt turns. In a classic text, well 
known to scholars of Russian culture, Soviet semioti-
cians Yurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii once wrote:
Russian culture in the medieval period was dominat-
ed by a different value orientation. Duality and the 
absence of a neutral axiological sphere led to a con-
ception of the new not as a continuation, but as a total 
eschatological change. --- Under such circumstanc-
es, the dynamic process of historical change has a 
fundamentally different character: change occurs as a 
radical negation of the preceding state. The new does 
not arise out of a structurally ´unused´ reserve, but 
results from a transformation of the old, a process of 
turning it inside out. Thus, repeated transformations 
can in fact lead to the regeneration of archaic forms.
President  Putin and Marshal Yazov, November, 2014 
(http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23207)
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In the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, President 
Putin declared that the baptism of Great Prince Vladimir 
of Kiev had taken place in Khersones, an ancient Greek 
settlement in the Crimea. Putin thus demoted Kiev, the 
capital of Ukraine, as the birthplace of the Russian Or-
thodox Church in 988. As a consequence of this Musco-
vite expropriation of Ukraine’s ancient history, a statue 
to Great Prince Vladimir was inaugurated by President 
Putin and Patriarch Kirill in Moscow on Russia’s day of 
national unity, November 4, 2016. It stands to reason 
that Moscow is known in medieval sources only in 1147, 
a century and a half after the Christianization of Rus’. 
However, on November 4, 2016, a peculiar translatio 
imperii occurred: the Crimea (Khersones, Sevastopol) 
was linked to Moscow in the name of Holy Russia.
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Why is it that the Nordic countries of today are charac-
terised by rule of law, lack of corruption, a strong civil 
society based on voluntary associations and welfare 
states that provide services for all members of society? 
And at the same time are internationally competitive 
with strong economies either based on natural resourc-
es as oil and fish in Norway, or absence of them as in 
Denmark? Size is obviously of importance. Small states 
have to behave peacefully according to international 
rules, whereas great powers such as Russia are tempt-
ed to set their own rules. Yet, Moscow Russia was not 
larger than the two Nordic empires Denmark-Norway 
(the Oldenburg Monarchy) and the Swedish Baltic Em-
pire at its height between 1630 and 1721. Only Peter 1.’s 
victory at Poltava in today’s Ukraine in 1709 turned the 
tables and placed Russia as the hegemonic power in 
Northern Europe and protector of Denmark except for a 
brief episode in 1762. Before that they were of compa-
rable size and influence so it makes sense to compare 
their social and political orders, all geographical differ-
ences aside.
Apart from the two hundred years of Mongol domina-
tion the most important difference seems to be religion, 
i.e. Orthodox Christianity and Lutheran Protestantism 
respectively. Contrary to the supranational Catholic 
Church both of these versions of Christianity are organ-
ised in national churches. But apart from this organi-
sational similarity their differences abound, especially 
as regards the consequences of religion for political 
culture and state order. The most distinguishing factor 
in explaining social order in the Nordic countries is that 
they are Lutheran. Not all Lutherans live here, far from 
it. But the five Nordic nation states of today are the only 
ones in the world where Lutherans exercise hegemony 
over the state through a national church. Even though 
Sweden separated church and state in 2000 the Luther-
an-evangelical church still dominates the picture. Seen 
from a historian’s point of view the legacy from five 
hundred years of Lutheran state churches explains the 
most, even the origins of the universal welfare as sec-
ularized social democracy (Østergård 2011 and Nelson 
2016).
The Nordic countries
The five Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden – share a number of cultural and 
economic characteristics that distinguish them suffi-
ciently to speak of a “Nordic world” of its own within 
the overall international community of nations. Accord-
ing to Robert Nelson the Nordic countries are distin-
guished, among other cultural features, by higher levels 
of trust in other people than almost any other nations 
of the world. Only the Netherlands – another Northern 
European Protestant country – is comparably high in 
world values surveys (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 72). 
They differ from one another but differ still more from 
other nations according to measures such as “expend-
iture for social welfare, tax rates, large public service 
The Nordic countries
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sectors, a large public transfer sector and a more active 
labour market policy.” (Marklund and Norlund 1999, 51). 
On the whole, as the director of the Swedish Collegium 
for Advanced Study Björn Wittrock wrote in 2012
[...] in the early twenty-first century, the Nordic coun-
tries form a rather unique part of the world, character-
ized by a unique form of common belonging arguably 
stronger than that which may be found among the 
other nations of Europe. 
(Wittrock 2012, 108).
Given the high level of social security why do people 
in these countries work at all? If Nordic workers be-
haved according to the standard economic assumption 
that rational individuals pursue their self-interest, the 
economies of such Nordic countries might collapse for 
lack of a labor force.  Since this does not happen, there 
must be something distinctive happening in the Nordic 
welfare states (Iceland and Finland would likely be com-
parable in the above respect to Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden). One explanation of this apparent paradox is 
that the Scandinavian countries share some distinctive 
social and cultural attitudes and norms that could con-
tribute to the willingness to work hard for a small per-
sonal net gain economically. Rather than an economic 
motive, work in Scandinavia is more like the fulfillment 
of a religious calling. It was not only in Calvinism but 
also Lutheranism where pursuit of a calling could 
stimulate seemingly irrational levels of work effort by 
ordinary private economic standards. As one might say, 
it is seemingly part of the strong sense of “social soli-
darity” in the Nordic world that all able-bodied adults 
are morally required to work and thus to contribute to 
the economic success of the whole society, even when 
this is not in their self-interest narrowly defined. Indeed, 
failure to contribute will subject an individual to strong 
social sanctions, unlike in many other more “cynical” 
nations.
The Nordic countries of today are small, peaceful and 
egalitarian democracies, internationally oriented and 
strong supporters of law and order among the nations 
of the world. There is some truth to this convention-
al wisdom but it does not cover the whole picture as 
the countries represent surprisingly different national 
routes to modernity and welfare society. The overall 
result is that the successful cooperation among the 
Nordic states in the 20th century builds on recognition of 
every nation’s right to independence, regardless of its 
size. Many have doubted the ability of Iceland to estab-
lish a successful state in an island with little more than 
250.000 inhabitants.2 Yet, even small Iceland is a thriv-
ing and wealthy society combining traditional agricul-
ture, fisheries, hyper-modern industries and information 
technology. Its economy crashed during the financial 
crisis but the island nation has made it back again. The 
same goes for the Faroe Islands with a little more than 
50.000 inhabitants (Østergård 2008c).
In early modern times, from 1523 to 1814, the Nordic 
countries were divided between two multinational, 
conglomerate states or empires, Sweden under the 
Vasa dynasty and Denmark under the House of Olden-
burg. After defeat in the Napoleonic wars, Denmark was 
forced to cede Norway to victorious Sweden under Carl 
14. Johan, formerly the French general Jean Baptiste 
Bernadotte. Finland had become a separate state entity 
in 1809, when Russia took away the Finnish half of Swe-
den and established an arch duchy in personal union 
with the Russian empire, gaining full independence in 
1917. Sweden got Norway as a compensation for the 
loss of Finland in a shaky personal union which lasted 
until 1905, when the union was peacefully dissolved. 
Iceland broke away from Denmark in two phases, 1918 
and 1944 respectively, while connections were suspend-
ed because of the world wars, effectively preventing 
Denmark from intervening. The Faeroe Islands gained 
their autonomous status in 1948, Greenland got home 
rule in 1979 and the Sami in northern Norway and Swe-
den will probably follow suit in the future. The Aaland 
Islands were accorded status as a separate, non-mili-
tarized part of Finland in 1921 as compensation for not 
allowed to join Sweden; 1951 followed home rule, a 
status the Aaland Islands interpreted as to implying a 
separate vote on their entry into the European Union in 
1994 – and the upholding of tax free sales on the ferries 
to and from the islands although both Sweden and 
Finland are members of the EU.
All together the Nordic countries are at the size of 
the German state (Bundesland) Nordrhein-Westfalen 
with around 23 million inhabitants. From this point of 
view they are hugely overrepresented in international 
organisations such as the UN which rely on the princi-
ple of independent nation states. The Nordic countries 
also collaborate, primarily through the Nordic Council 
which is an interesting blend of cooperation among 
parliaments, civil society and states. The cooperation 
is hugely popular among average people, although 
linguistically the Nordic peoples today seem to lose the 
ability to understand the languages of the other nation-
alities. English is the preferred language of communi-
cation among the younger generations, also at univer-
sity level. This tendency is deplored among traditional 
upholders of the so-called “Nordic unity”, but nothing 
much is done about it as a common television channel 
never got off the ground in 1960s and 70s when it might 
have made a difference. Because of this lack of under-
standing and the importance attached to the European 
Union since Sweden and Finland joined in 1995, politi-
cal and administrative elites do not invest much energy 
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in Nordic cooperation, although they still pay lip service 
to “Nordic values” at festive occasions. This tendency 
seems most dominant in Denmark, but can be detected 
in different versions in all the countries. Nevertheless, 
Nordic unity and Nordic values still score highly in sur-
veys and Scandinavians still seem to prefer each other’s 
societies and values over those of the rest of Europe.
One Nordic political culture  
or several national political cultures?
“Norden” as a region, today consists of independent 
nation states with their own quite different histories 
and separate political traditions. Yet, they also share 
a long range of culture traits from the Lutheran ver-
sion of Christianity to economic flexibility, absence of 
corruption and a high degree of social equality. Entries 
in Scandinavian encyclopedia consistently represent 
Nordic identity with the following national stereotypes: 
Norway “as Norwegian and only Norwegian”, Denmark 
as “Danish in Europe”, Iceland as the “island of the 
learned”, Sweden as “Nordic in Europe, with a capacity 
for self-criticism and tolerance towards immigrants”, 
and Finland as “hard-working advocate of human 
rights, equality, international understanding and peace”. 
The Faeroe Islands and Greenland, too, have gradually 
won the right to be recognized as independent nation-
al variations of Nordic political culture. Only the Sami 
identity is represented as ethnic, though this will in all 
likelihood hold only until the Sami are recognized as 
an independent nationality with their own seat on the 
Nordic Council.
The nation states of today, then, are the configurations 
through which the common Nordic identity manifests 
itself. As they have achieved the recognition of the sur-
rounding world, they have come to appear as “natural” 
entities. Even though Danes and Swedes may have had 
difficulties in appreciating this because of their age-
old struggle for supremacy in Northern Europe. Both 
Denmark and Sweden have a long, unbroken history, 
though strictly speaking not as homogeneous nation 
states, but rather as composite states or small empires, 
exercising various kinds of hegemony over their neigh-
bors inside and outside Norden. Denmark and Sweden 
thus belong to the traditions of territorial state nations 
basically on a par with France, Britain, Spain, Poland, 
Hungary and Portugal although of course smaller, 
Norway and Iceland belong to the family of integral 
national movements who in the 19th century resurrected 
their medieval nations to independent status as did the 
catholic Irish and the Czechs whereas Finland did not 
even have a medieval pas to refer back to. The rudi-
ments of a state were established within the conglom-
erate Russian empire and subsequently gave rise to a 
bilingual political nation of Finlanders.3
Geopolitical contrasts have always been the constant in 
the history of the Nordic countries. But after 1814, com-
mon interests dominated over the conflicts to the de-
gree that the Nordic countries, with the exception of the 
occasional threat to Denmark and Finland, no longer felt 
exposed to direct threats. During the period of the Cold 
War, the Nordic countries remained in a relatively safe 
and peaceful situation because of the Iron Curtain that 
separated the Baltic Sea. At the time the Nordic peo-
ples did not realize how safe they in reality were, but 
this became obvious after the collapse of communism 
in 1989. The predictable character of world politics to a 
large degree explains popular enthusiasm in Denmark 
for the neutral Nordic alternative to NATO in the years 
between 1945 and 1989. During this period Sweden 
was able to play the neutral card, while Denmark quite 
free of charge was able to emerge on the winning side 
as member of the NATO alliance. In Denmark at least, 
NATO only became a popular issue after the need of 
the alliance had expired in 1991. The exception among 
the Nordic countries is Finland. This small state demon-
strated a determined will to fight in 1939-44 and thus es-
caped the tragic fate of the small Baltic States, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania
This era of relative peace, however, did not last and 
today appears as little more than an historical parenthe-
sis. Viewed in the long historical perspective, the Nordic 
countries differ much less from the European countries 
as Nordic ideology and the discourse of a Scandina-
vian or Nordic model would have us believe. There is, 
however, one major difference. The Nordic countries 
are Lutheran4. They did not become so immediately 
with the Reformation in the 1530s, but at some time in 
the 18th century, the pietist revivalist movements, later 
to become political and economic in nature, began to 
gain ground among the ordinary peasants and fisher-
men in all the Nordic countries. The Lutheran countries 
secularized faster and produced fewer fundamentalist 
movements than countries which embraced the Calvin-
ist brand of Protestantism, once the governments in 18th 
century moved from strict Lutheran intolerant Ortho-
doxy to enlightened perceptions of state and society.
It is reasonable to assume that the mental and organi-
zational background of the Nordic welfare state is to be 
found in the traditions and institutions of the national 
churches in these overwhelmingly homogenous Luther-
an states. In other societies as Germany and the United 
States, Lutheran communities form a constituent part. 
In other cases the Lutherans were subjects to rulers of 
a different religion as was the case in Estonia, Latvia 
and Siebenbürgen in Transsylvania, today’s Romania. 
The Lutheran state-church way of thinking originally 
was a Christian-conservative principle of caring that 
guided charitable. Early on this principle was converted 
into the state’s obligation to provide the basic needs of 
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the population on a collective and state basis. The links 
between Lutheran religious traditions and institutions 
and the rise of the universal welfare state in particular 
and the political culture in general have not yet been 
systematically studied, but from a perspective of the 
history of mentalities it seems a plausible hypothesis 
(Østergård 2010). Should the hypothesis be correct, the 
consequence would be that the political culture in the 
Nordic societies is the product of secularized Lutheran-
ism rather than democratized socialism.
The origins of the success of Lutheranism may be 
traced back to three societal features resulting from the 
peripheral nature of the Nordic societies in the Middle 
Ages and Early Modern Times. Law codes for the whole 
realm were introduced in Norway in 1274 (not Iceland) 
and in Sweden (including Finland) around 1350, while 
Denmark had three so-called landscape laws for Jut-
land, Sealand and Scania  (Skaane) from the 13th centu-
ry. The Oldenburg Monarchy acquired  a unitary law in 
the form of ‘Danske Lov’ in 1683 and ‘Norske Lov’ 1687.
This too was relatively early in a European context, yet 
the difference in time testifies to the fact that Denmark 
in many ways always has been closer to the continental 
pattern of social development than the rest of “Norden”. 
This certainly holds true for the continued political role 
of free peasants and as a consequence weak feudal 
structures and very small and insignificant towns. 
Though not yet completely understood, an interesting 
bond seems to exist between the continued domina-
tion of small, but free peasants in the clearances in the 
forests on the northern peripheries and literacy among 
ordinary people. The further to the north the more wide-
spread the literacy seems to be a Nordic rule of the 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries, a rule which also holds true for 
the poor peripheries of Iceland and the Faroe Islands.5 
It is true that that many Icelandic farmers did hand 
over their valuable Medieval manuscripts to Danish 
civil servants such as Árni Magnússon. He was a native 
Icelander who lived and worked in Copenhagen and left 
his vast collections of manuscripts to the University of 
Copenhagen in 1730, collections that only were turned 
over to Iceland in 1965 after a heated debate. The reason 
why the Icelandic owners parted with their manuscripts 
was not lack of interest or declining literacy, but on the 
contrary that they kept copying the manuscripts in the 
16th and 17th centuries, only now on the cheaper mate-
rial paper instead of parchment. This change enabled 
the owners to sell the older manuscripts to collectors 
from the continent as interest in this uniquely preserved 
literary treasure grew.
Literacy, thus seems to have been widespread, and 
more so the further to the north in the Nordic countries. 
This trend was not reversed with the introduction of 
Lutheran Protestantism. On the contrary, literacy now 
spread to the south into Denmark and northern Germa-
ny in particular. That Lutheranism also meant a narrow-
ing of cultural horizons and stronger German influence 
among the elites of society only has to be added in 
order to complete the contradictory picture of the 
specifics of “Nordic” features og social development. 
Whether Lutheranism was the cause or the result of 
previous e existing factors is not yet clear, but however 
that may be, it seems impossible to overestimate the 
importance for the Nordic countries of the Lutheran 
reformation in the 16th century and the subsequent 
developments of religious movements on the one hand 
and an enlightened bureaucracy consisting of priests 
and other theologically trained academics. This Luther-
an background goes a long way to explain what the 
Polish-Norwegian researcher Nina Witoszek has called 
the “pastoral enlightenment” of Scandinavia.
Yet, as already mentioned, the dominating tradition 
in comparative welfare state studies is to describe 
the welfare state in the Nordic countries as a result of 
particular Nordic features, the so-called “Nordic” or 
Social Democratic model”. Until the breakdown of the 
Communist block the model of the “Nordic” welfare 
state was perceived to represent a third way between 
the two dominant superpowers and their attendant 
ideologies.6 Interest in a particular Nordic model is no 
longer dominating among comparative political scien-
tists and historical sociologists who now concentrate on 
describing the specific national varieties of capitalism 
(see Campbell, Hall and Pedersen 2006 on the particular 
Danish model). 
Models develop when there is a success story to tell. 
The Scandinavian states only managed to assume 
importance in their own right in the interwar years; 
they did not become a model, though, until after World 
War Two when a social democratic developed, thanks 
to alliances with agrarian groups. This happened in 
slightly different ways in the different Nordic states, 
but everywhere the strength of the hegemony of the 
working classes reflected the weaknesses of the divided 
middle classes. Such consensus took longer to evolve 
in Denmark, Norway and Finland than in Sweden. This 
explains very the Nordic model much discussed in the 
social scientific literature of the 1960s and 70s in reality 
was a Swedish model could with an integrationist view 
of society unparalleled in other countries of Europe. 
Only in the 1960s, partly thanks to an international 
project on the smaller European democracies, was the 
Scandinavian model discovered as a unique product 
of the North. The Nordic countries certainly lacked the 
“pillarization” (verzuiling) of sub-units of society which, 
in multi-confessional societies from the Netherlands to 
Switzerland, resulted in cooperation among élites. The 
élites of the Scandinavian model cooperated, though 
some sections of them still clung to a rhetoric of class 
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struggle, and the non-élite, for whom they negotiated a 
consensus, cooperated in their own way at the grass-
roots level. The less strong the aristocracy had been in 
the history of the country concerned, the more marked-
ly they did so – with Norway as a case in point.
Indeed, one may doubt whether a “Nordic model” in 
the proper sense has ever existed. Scandinavians have 
never seen themselves as representatives of one con-
sistent and distinctive social model as national differ-
ences always have been considered more important. 
The notion of “Norden” as a conscious Social Dem-
ocratic alternative to the continental European class 
struggles between bourgeoisie, workers and peasants 
first emerged outside Scandinavia with the publication 
of the American journalist Marquis Childs’ classic work 
in 1936, bearing the telling title Sweden: The Middle 
Way. The trend culminated in the 1980s with Gösta 
Esping-Andersen’s analyses of the Nordic welfare states 
as different variations of a parallel Social Democratic 
strategy (1985). He distinguished between three ver-
sions of “welfare capitalism”: the social democratic, the 
liberal and the conservative (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
The social democratic character of the Nordic welfare 
state has come under criticism from an American com-
parative historian of the younger school (Baldwin 1990), 
while others, as already mentioned, attempt to trace 
the origins of the Nordic universal welfare state back 
to the Lutheran version of Protestantism which was 
introduced by revolutions from above in Denmark and 
Sweden in the 1530s. 
Despite the dubious character of the notion of a specif-
ically Nordic model, it is an indisputable fact that the 
Nordic countries have experienced a more harmonious 
process of modernization in the twentieth century than 
most other countries in Europe. Thanks to the com-
promises of the 1930s, Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
proved largely immune to the temptations of the total-
itarian ideologies of Nazism, fascism and communism 
(Lindström 1985). In many ways the Nordic countries 
still provide shining examples of social order and inter-
nal democracy – exemplary not only for the insiders, 
but also for surprising numbers elsewhere in the world, 
and with good reason. The Nordic countries, irrespec-
tive of the existence of a Nordic model, function more 
smoothly than the majority of societies. The problem, 
however, is that a majority in the Nordic countries has 
embraced the notion to such an extent that they believe 
in the mythical notion of Nordic unity as a contrast to 
the rest of Europe. Nordic history and culture, howev-
er, represent but one variation of common European 
patterns and themes, a variation which, due to geo-
political conditions, has resulted in small, nationally 
homogenous, socially democratic, Lutheran states. But 
a variation, nevertheless, of common European themes. 
As Klaus von Beyme noted in his illuminating contribu-
tion from the early 1990s: 
A model’s greatest success is its death. The things of 
value which it (the Nordic model, u.ø.) incorporated 
have already spread far afield in various forms – there 
is no longer a need to ideologize it. The sober and 
pragmatic approach of most Scandinavians makes 
them better equipped to realize this than the people of 
other nations who once ideologized the Scandinavian 
model. 
(Beyme 1992, 209).
The Nordic countries of today all share a Lutheran mo-
narchical heritage, even if Finland and Iceland formally 
are republics. This common heritage is demonstrated 
by the Christian cross in eight of the nine national 
flags of the Nordic countries. The peripheral position 
of the countries with regard to Europe made it possi-
ble to realize democratic potentials that less fortunate 
smaller nations such as the Czechs have experienced 
more difficulty realizing (Hroch 1996). But this fortunate 
history owes much less to homespun “Nordic” merits 
than normally assumed. The primary reason lies in the 
optimal geographical situation of the Nordic countries 
with regard to foreign policy as well as in relation to 
both economy and communications. The Nordic coun-
tries were in various ways useful as suppliers of raw 
materials to the industrial centres and have moreover 
been able to profit on a favourable relationship between 
low transportation costs and high manufacturing costs 
in the world economy. It was this stroke of cyclical 
good fortune that rendered the welfare states possible, 
despite unfavourable climatic conditions.
The Nordic countries happened to be in the right place 
at the right time. To the extent that this is no longer the 
case, it will become increasingly difficult to live on the 
The Christian cross in eight of the nine national flags 
of the Nordic countries 
norden.org
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Nordic myths and copious outpourings of yesteryear. 
Much would seem to indicate that the Baltic is about to 
regain its former position as the economic and civilizing 
pivot of Northern Europe as a region in a united Europe. 
To the extent this occurs, it will prove difficult to bridge 
the gap between the Atlantic, sea-facing Norden on 
the one hand and the land-based, Baltic Norden on the 
other. The Norwegian ethnologist, Brit Berggren, once 
stressed this important constant in the mental geogra-
phy of the Nordic peoples in a contribution to a collec-
tion of essays on Nordic identity. The historical lesson 
is that there are no objective laws binding the people 
of Norden. No common, manifest destiny. But there is 
a historical and cultural raw material of traditions and 
discourses on which such an identity may be built. Pro-
viding, of course, that this is what the Nordic peoples 
want.
Lutheranism and political culture
The following section investigates the importance of 
Lutheranism for the political culture in general and the 
welfare state in particular in Denmark. The notion of a 
close connection between Lutheran theology, Danish 
nationalism and the church has to begin by a considera-
tion of Martin Luther’s social doctrine. Sixteenth century 
Europeans did not differentiate between “church” and 
“society”; these institutions were perceived as insep-
arable as “church” and “state”. In mediaeval monocul-
ture, which still governed people’s thinking, no such 
split existed. Paradoxically, it was Martin Luther who 
laid the foundation of the split by differentiating be-
tween the secular and the spiritual arm, paradoxically 
because he did not himself distinguish between church 
and state (Lyby 1983). In this regard, Luther still lived in 
the mediaeval universalistic-theocratic way of thinking 
according to which only one body existed, one Corpus 
Christianum, encompassing the Christian countries as a 
sacred whole. This “Christian body” has, however, both 
temporal and eternal needs and therefore a need for 
two arms and two judicial systems to represent it. But 
the tasks of the secular and ecclesiastical arms are not 
independent of each other. They must be co-ordinated 
since they each in their own way strive to perform the 
same task, to guide Christians through the dangers of 
life on earth towards the hereafter (Lyby 1983, 10). 
Augustin (354-430) in De Civitate Dei (written between 
413 and 427) and many later writers have called these 
two institutions Imperium et Sacerdotium. This way of 
thinking culminated in the High Middle Ages under the 
popes Innocens 3. (1160-1216) and Bonifacius 8. (1235-
1303). But the ideal was still alive at the time of Martin 
Luther (1483-1546) and emperor Charles 5. (1500-1558) 
in the first half of the sixteenth century, even though it 
was out of step with political and social reality. Despite 
fabulous amounts of resources, the last ruler with 
an ambition of fulfilling the universal demands, the 
Habsburg Emperor Charles 5., had his plans of restor-
ing the supremacy of the empire over all of Christian 
Europe dashed by the Protestant and Catholic German 
princes working in cooperation against all attempts to 
centralize the Holy Roman Empire (Gress 1998). His 
defeat led to the compromise in Augsburg 1555 which 
established the principle of religious freedom – that 
is, religious freedom for the princes to decide which 
religion their subjects should practise, cujus regio ejus 
religio, as the principle was put in Latin. Martin Luther 
was particularly active in bringing about this defeat of 
the emperor.
Luther differentiated between two “regiments”, each of 
which should have had its own field and been respect-
ed on its own (Schwarz Lausten 1987, 19). The unity 
between them was created by God standing over both 
of them. The secular arm was supposed to be Christian 
and to govern its secular area with responsibility to 
God. In the “spiritual realm”, one was only supposed to 
preach the gospel and not to interfere with the coun-
try’s political rule. The introduction of Luther’s thinking 
Martin Luther
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took the form of a revolution from above in the Nordic 
countries. By royal decree a new, secular management 
of the churches was introduced in Denmark-Norway-Ice-
land and Sweden-Finland in the 1530s. This happened at 
the same time as a reorganization of the states after the 
final dissolution of the Kalmar Union in 1523 after the 
revolts of the nobility in Jutland and Sweden against 
Christian II (1481-1559). The new political order meant 
that the bishops were stripped of the direct political 
(and financial) influence they had secured during the 
mediaeval church-political struggles between the king 
and the church. According to the new Lutheran doctrine, 
the secular arm was under a duty to create a reasonable 
framework for the Evangelical Church but could other-
wise govern as it wished, only duty-bound to God (and 
the nobility). Things did not remain this way, however, 
in Denmark, Sweden or the other Northern European 
(German) states that introduced the Lutheran-Evan-
gelical faith. In Denmark, the new king, Christian 3. 
(1503-1559), followed Philipp Melanchton’s (1497-1560) 
version of the theory on the relationship between the 
princes and the state (Schwarz Lausten 1987, 125). As 
the Christian authority, the king was not only responsi-
ble for his subjects’ secular well-being but also for the 
salvation of their souls. He could not leave this to the 
church but had to, together with the church, take part in 
the upbringing of the population to become true Chris-
tian people. 
The background for this division of labour was that 
the church organization did not have any purpose in 
itself for Luther as it did for the Catholics, for whom 
the tradition is testimony to God’s work for people. The 
Lutheran church is, according to the church historian 
Leif Grane (1928-2000), not divine but human. How the 
organization works depends on whether it “serves and 
advances God’s commands” (Grane 1998, 8, my trans-
lation). These principles are clearly expressed in the 
Danish Church Ordinance of 1539, in which a distinction 
is made between “Our Lord Jesus Christ’s Ordinance” 
and the “King’s Ordinance”. Christ’s ordinance is God’s 
alone, and the King has no power to change it. It com-
mands that “God’s word, both the laws and the gospel 
shall be preached properly, the sacraments shall be 
properly performed, children shall be taught properly 
and vergers, schools and the poor shall have their food”. 
In contrast, the King’s Ordinance concerns all the condi-
tions that must be regulated so that Christ’s Ordinance 
can be obeyed (Grane 1998, 8). 
This does not sound like much, but turned out in prac-
tice to be extremely far-reaching. The division of labour 
meant that both Christian 3. and Gustav Vasa (1496-
1560) maintained a firm rule over the church through 
their vassals (in Danish stiftslensmænd) and bishops. 
The latter were even for a short period called ‘superin-
tendents’ to underline their role as the officials of the 
state. The king’s direct rule over the church was empha-
sized at the new crowning ceremony, in his preface to 
the Church Ordinance and many other instances. The 
new organization of the church did not correspond en-
tirely to Luther’s thoughts on the separation of the state 
and the church. But it was in accordance with the views 
on the secular authorities’ duties and rights of Philipp 
Melanchton (1497-1560), Luther’s colleague as professor 
at the University of Wittenberg (Schwarz Lausten 1999, 
39). Despite minor differences between the two theolo-
gians, the Danish reformers based their work entirely 
on the Wittenberg theology and tolerated no departures 
from the true doctrine, orthodoxy (Schwarz Lausten 
1999, 49ff.). 
In the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Times, “the 
poor” were defined much more broadly than today. 
In addition to the real poor, invalids, sick people who 
could not manage on their own, widows, orphans, 
street performers, vagabonds and those unable to 
work were also included. The lower classes in society 
thus consisted of very different groups. It is also worth 
remembering that everyone in society could risk ending 
up poor if they were out of luck. Such twists of fate 
were impossible to insure oneself against and the state 
provided no safety net. Some fanatic Protestants even 
Title page of the Danish Bible of King Christian III of 1550
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thought that helping the poor could be interpreted as a 
lack of faith in God’s providence. God must have had a 
reason for making them poor. 
The Catholic Church had developed large-scale so-
cial aid since its teachings were based on the notion 
that charity benefited the soul of the giver. Alms were 
collected on behalf of the church primarily by the large 
mendicant orders, especially Franciscans and Domin-
icans. The church justified its organized mendicancy 
by promoting the mendicant friars to a special bless-
ed state. Yet despite the church’s comprehensive poor 
relief, nearly all large cities in Europe at the beginning 
of the sixteenth century had to help the poor through 
special provisions. In Denmark, such “public” obliga-
tions can be seen in Christian II’s reform legislations 
of 1521-22. With these laws he attempted to curb the 
church’s unrestrained expansion of its landed prop-
erty and especially the bishops’ insatiable hunger for 
property. Moreover, he restricted mendicancy to four 
mendicant friar orders, introduced sharper control of 
the parish churches’ properties and incomes and set 
up a new court of appeal for ecclesiastical matters. The 
concept of “need” and the distinction between “de-
serving” and “undeserving” became the foundations 
for the care of the poor, just as he limited mendicancy. 
The king impressed on the bishops their ecclesiastical 
duties and also made a number of decisions concerning 
the improvement of teaching. However, it is important 
to emphasize that the reform programme was formu-
lated within the Catholic doctrine. What Christian II had 
originally wanted was a reformed, Danish, Catholic 
Church on which he himself would have decisive influ-
ence like the kings of France and England had over the 
Gallican and Anglican churches respectively. Christian 
held discussions with humanists during his refuge in 
the Netherlands, held hold theological discussions with 
professors of theology and reformed the university and 
cathedral schools in Denmark in a humanistic direction 
when in power (Schwarz Lausten 1999, 30-31). 
In addition to purely political motives Danish histori-
ans have emphasized the influence on the King by the 
humanist reform-Catholicism. Erasmus of Rotterdam 
(1469-1536), the “king of the humanists”, and like-mind-
ed reform thinkers took a new reading of the Bible as 
their point of departure. On this basis, aided by the 
Fathers of the Church, they formulated sharp criticism 
of the theology of the age, the pious life, monastic life, 
the political role of the church etc. and emphasized 
instead the moral life of each individual. They turned 
in disdain from the great constructs of medieval scho-
lasticism and believed in simple and practical Chris-
tianity should. Northern European humanism was a 
religious-ethical revival, critical of traditional Catholic 
theology and piety. But one thing was given, despite all 
criticism one had to remain within the common Roman 
Catholic Church. It ought to be purged and reformed 
by returning to the Bible. Among the Danish humanists 
were Christiern Pedersen (1480-1554) and Poul Hel-
gesen (1485-1535). The greatest influence on Helgesen 
was the Swedish mediaeval saint Birgitta of Vadstena 
(1303-1373); besides the Church Fathers, he quoted no 
one as often as her.
In 1528 Paul Helgesen published the treatise Om kranke, 
arme og fattige mennesker, hvorledes de skal behan-
dles (On sick, unfortunate and poor people and how to 
treat them). It was addressed to the Mayor of Copenha-
gen, Niels Stemp. In the treatise, Helgesen gave an ac-
count of the Bible’s demand that we should take care of 
the needy and formulated a concrete action plan for the 
treatment of the socially deprived in Copenhagen. He 
differentiated between the financially poor, the sick and 
the helpless and between public and private aid, wrote 
about the rules for the administration of poor relief 
and the conditions clients should meet, and put forth 
suggestions for preventive work and other initiatives 
(Schwarz Lausten 1987, 81-82). This social understanding 
was shared by many reformatory preachers, especially 
in Malmö. In a letter written in September 1536, the 
leaders of the so-called “Evangelicals” addressed the 
new Danish King Christian III, who had come to power 
after a bloody civil war in 1534-36 – incidentally, the last 
time the Hanseatic town of Lübeck tried to intervene 
The leader of the Danish reformation, Hans Tausen (1494-1561) Painting by 
Carl Bloch after Wilhelm Marstrand in 1876. University of Copenhagen
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in Danish politics through the military. The leader of 
the Danish reformation, Hans Tausen (1494-1561) by all 
accounts wrote the letter. The letter reminded the king 
that “the general reformation” had not been carried out 
under his father, Frederik I (1471-1533), who reigned 
from 1523-33. 
Hopes were pinned on Christian because he had carried 
out the reformation in his lands around Haderslev 
as duke of part of Schleswig. The authors hoped that 
he would now do the same in Denmark and Norway. 
They made a list of seven points describing the aims 
of such a reformation: God’s word should be preached 
“purely” everywhere, without force or coercion; the 
Catholic jurisdiction should be abolished; a university 
for scientific theological studies should be established; 
the school system should be expanded in all market 
towns (købstæder); every church should have a capa-
ble clergyman; every diocese should have a bishop; an 
archbishop should be appointed for the whole kingdom; 
and finally, hospitals should be renovated and the funds 
spent on social work up to that point should continue 
to be spent on it (Schwarz Lausten 1987, 107-08). Many 
of these goals were fulfilled with the recess (ordinance) 
of October 30, 1536, which marked the introduction of 
the reformation to the Kingdom of Denmark. In distant 
Iceland, however, the Catholic bishop remained in office 
for another 20 years. Sweden, as mentioned above, 
had broken free of Denmark under Gustav Vasa thir-
teen years earlier and carried out the reformation more 
gradually in the entire Kingdom of Sweden, including 
the provinces in nowadays Finland – but not Eastern 
Karelia, which belonged to Russian Novgorod. 
One of the many results of the reformation was a new 
notion of caring for the poor based on Martin Luther’s 
teachings on justification and criticism of the church. 
Luther had, as noted previously, demanded that the 
church should only preach the gospel and relinquish all 
political and economic power. He rejected the Catholic 
conception of the nature of faith, the meaning of good 
deeds, the belief in forgiveness through confession, 
purgatory, sacraments, monasticism, pilgrimages etc. 
While the state should confine itself to political and so-
cial tasks and protect the church, it should not interfere 
with its internal affairs. It should be allowed to confis-
cate large parts of church possessions, but it should to a 
great extent use them for social purposes. Luther’s the-
ology would in time have a profound effect on Nordic 
society, which became much greater because the state 
and the church became completely interwoven through 
the development of what without exaggeration might 
be termed a Lutheran royal church similar to the prince-
ly led churches in the German states and the Anglican 
Church (Schwarz Lausten 1999, 39 and 49ff.).
Fundamentalism in the Lutheran revolution from above
In many ways, Luther’s teachings laid the ground for 
the modern understanding of society, which in the very 
long run resulted in mass democracy and the welfare 
state. This was possible first and foremost because of 
the emphasis he placed on the parishioners’ role and 
the direct relationship between each individual and 
God. Clergymen did not occupy a privileged position 
as a special, holy class but were rather technical ex-
perts in the organization of church services and the 
Holy Scriptures. Their role was to be preachers, not 
intermediaries between the public and God. This gave 
parishioners much more latitude and they became the 
principal institution in the church. The strong position of 
the parishioners is illustrated by the fact that right from 
the start (in principle, at least), they were supposed to 
choose the clergyman while the church was expected to 
select candidates to be appointed as bishops (Schwarz 
Lausten 1999, 40). This was a step in the direction 
towards the pietist revivalist movements of the late 
eighteenth century and nineteenth century (Wåhlin 
1987). These movements were often in opposition to 
clergymen and the church but nonetheless remained 
within the inclusive national church. In Sweden, in con-
trast, the free churches broke away to a much greater 
extent from the official church, which partially explains 
King Ccristan III of Denmark 
Jacob Binck [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons
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why it was possible in 2000 to separate state and church 
in Sweden. 
The basis for the princely ruled churches was, howev-
er, the same: a clear authority structure coupled with 
an almost radical-democratic respect for the common 
believers: the parishioners. This democratic tradition 
became in the long term a distinguishing feature of 
Nordic society since the universal welfare schemes 
were administered locally by the rural districts, which 
were also responsible for collecting the taxes that fund-
ed the schemes. This local element in administration 
is unique in a European context and is, together with 
the universal benefits for all national citizens, the most 
characteristic element of the Nordic model of welfare 
(Knudsen 2000). Therefore, it is hardly rash to suggest 
that Lutheranism, after a series of intermediate stages, 
led to social democracy and thereby to the local admin-
istration of laws and regulations passed by the national 
government as well as centrally determined social 
benefits; in brief, the Nordic model of universal welfare 
administered by locally anchored democratic units. 
However, one should be careful not to romanticize 
Lutheranism in the light of what it eventually led to. The 
break with the Catholic hierarchy initially gave free rein 
to fanaticism, intolerance and superstition as illustrated 
by, for example, the witch trials, which were much more 
gruesome in seventeenth-century Northern Europe 
than in the more hierarchical Catholic lands to the south 
(Henningsen 1980). Witch-burning in Denmark-Nor-
way culminated under the pious fanatic Christian 4. 
(1588-1648). The rejection of Catholicism also led to a 
catastrophic drop in the level of higher education since 
the universities in Copenhagen and Uppsala were 
transformed into primitive seminaries, where students 
were indoctrinated with a literal, orthodox Lutheran-
ism. The religious fanaticism in Scandinavia and the 
close connection between the state and the church of 
the Lutheran orthodoxy are portrayed in an abundant-
ly clear way in the Swedish historian Peter Englund’s 
description of the Battle of Poltava in Ukraine on June 
27, 1709 from1988.7 His description of the significance of 
religion for the military in Sweden could apply just as 
well to the militarily less effective Danish state. At the 
same time, it applies to the rest of the society, which 
was essentially organized with war in mind in these two 
states, which were the most militarized in Europe. He 
described the day of the battle as follows: 
In the Swedish army, a very strict church discipline 
prevailed with precisely set prayers every morning 
Poltava. Paintig by Pierre-Denis Martin 
museum.ru Catherine Palace, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76504
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and evening and church services every Sunday and 
holiday. These events were of great importance and 
were called off only in emergency situations, if at all. 
Despite the extreme cold that harsh winter, resulting 
in numb limbs and frozen corpses, the soldiers had 
performed their devotions outdoors every day. King 
Charles 12. attended the Royal Guards’ service this 
Sunday. Andreas Westerrman, the 37-year-old chaplain 
of the battalion, expounded the text (...)
Westerman and his colleagues constituted an im-
portant cog in the Caroline army’s machine. They 
comforted the haggard and the dying. They strictly 
supervised the warriors’ conduct and performed all 
religious ceremonies. These people can only really 
be understood in light of the fact that everyone was 
a believer and that religion was an essential part of 
their world view; atheism was at that time unthinkable 
in practice. No one could imagine a world without a 
God. The world was dark and cold and humans were 
small and naked, surrendered to divine omnipotence 
by their own inadequacy. Religion was a very impor-
tant means of influencing and controlling the people 
regardless of whether they were peasants or soldiers. 
In the army, the idea was to try to increase soldiers’ 
willingness to fight and curb their fear by inculcating 
them with various religious patterns of thought, of 
which many were completely fatalistic. For example, 
storming a battery of hostile artillery was always a 
bloody and costly affair because of the high rate of 
fire of the guns. The soldiers were admonished not to 
try to avoid the hostile fire by seeking cover. Instead, 
they should walk straight with their heads held high, 
believing that “No bullets hit people without God’s 
will, regardless of whether one walks straight and 
tall or stoops”. After the battle, the officers were to 
remind the soldiers on behalf of the dead that noth-
ing happens without God’s Will. Army chaplains like 
Westerman played an important role in disciplining 
the warriors and building up their will to fight. They 
were the police of the spirit and the flesh. 
Church discipline, among other things in the form of 
this early service, played a role in maintaining dis-
cipline. The soldiers prayed to God to teach them to 
obey the king and to “diligently perform whatsoever 
be commanded through my officers in your name”. 
The servants of the church also had a role to play dur-
ing battle. They usually accompanied the soldiers to 
the battlefield to encourage and watch over their flock. 
There were many examples of chaplains who fell in 
battle, for example, when they tried to get retreating 
soldiers to return to the line of fire. The army’s strict 
church discipline becomes even more understandable 
when we take into account the fact that these people 
were firmly convinced that God had great influence 
on the fortunes of war. In an infantry service manual it 
was stated simply that “since all blessing come from 
the supreme God, His great and holy name should be 
faithfully worshipped”. (...)
The Swedish soldiers were thus equipped with a 
Christian armament that was not only intended to 
make them fight more willingly and with greater 
confidence but also to turn them into tough soldiers. 
Lutheran orthodoxy had forced its Old Testament 
straightjacket on Sweden and generated thoughts 
and ideas the army did not hesitate to drum into 
its soldiers. Punishment and revenge were strong 
leitmotifs in the gospel, and over the kneeling battal-
ions cracked the message that any leniency should be 
shunned if God’s word demanded retaliation. Army 
men were induced to burn and kill in the name of the 
Almighty. The Israelites’ grotesque bloodbaths in the 
Old Testament were used as an excuse for their own 
acts of depredation. The fact that the thesis about 
God’s support to the Sweden was based on a simple 
circular argument was both its greatest strength and 
weakness. The evidence was convincing in all its sim-
plicity. The fact that God was on their side was proven 
through victory on the battlefield, something that was 
considered impossible without God’s approval. The 
only question was what would happen if they lost a 
major battle one day. Then the whole thing would go 
to pieces; they would be felled by their own propa-
ganda. God would openly demonstrate that He had 
transferred His power to the enemy; a terrible thought 
indeed.”  
(Englund 1988, 15-18 my translation).
This is exactly what happened to the Swedes on that 
muggy summer day in the Ukrainian cornfields, just as 
it had happened in the seventeenth century for the Dan-
ish Lutherans confronted with professional German and 
Swedish armies. But the defeat in distant Poltava had 
even greater significance for the Baltic area. With the 
founding of Saint Petersburg in 1703 and Russia’s vic-
tory over Sweden in the Northern War in 1721, Russian 
history and Nordic history became intertwined in each 
other in a new and decisive way (Østergård 1997).
Victory of Protestantism in Denmark 
The Reformation was not just a result of internal delib-
erations, but also a response to the rejection Luther had 
met with from the heads of the Roman Catholic Church 
combined with the support he received from the urban 
middle classes in the large cities and from some of the 
princes in the European territorial states. In December 
1520, Luther received a papal bull threatening him with 
excommunication. He burned it in public and was there-
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fore shortly afterwards excommunicated as a heretic. 
This meant that the temporal authorities were obliged 
to capture and execute him. Through clever diplomacy, 
however, his protector, Friedrich 3., Elector of Saxony, 
also known as Friedrich der Weise (1463-1525), man-
aged to get Luther permission to present his case in 
person to Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles 
5. (emperor 1519-56) at the diet of Worms in southern 
Germany, April 1521. The result was that the emperor 
abided by the pope’s will and expelled Luther as a here-
tic from church and society. No one was allowed to give 
him shelter or food. He was to be handed over to the 
authorities and his books were to be burned. He evaded 
his fate by hiding in Frederick’s Wartburg Castle. A year 
later he returned safely to Wittenberg, where he lived 
unharmed until his death in 1546, engrossed in his work 
as a professor of theology and writing his ever increas-
ing body of works.
In Luther’s view, poverty was not in itself laudable in 
God’s eyes; nor was wealth. This was in stark contrast 
to the view of the Calvinists, who saw wealth as a result 
of god-fearing behaviour (Weber 1905). According to 
Luther, God looks at one’s heart and character. Prop-
erty and money should be used in the service of one’s 
neighbours, family and the community. Luther knew 
that property and wealth can be necessary in society, 
but according to Luther it is the heart’s intimacy with 
God that is essential. There can be pious as well as hea-
then poor, just as there can be infidel as well as believ-
ing heathens. But he rejected the notion that it should 
be particularly meritorious in God’s eyes to renounce 
property and money. On the contrary, people were 
supposed to work on earth; the certainty of forgive-
ness was precisely supposed to make humans ready to 
throw themselves without restraint into the demands of 
life on earth, including the duty to help those in need. 
The notion of charity thus continued to play a role, but 
the justification for it was different. On the whole, it is 
interesting to compare Lutheranism and Calvinism, the 
doctrine Max Weber, the unsurpassed master of political 
research, so incisively analysed in The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism from 1905. There is a crucial 
difference between the two protestant denominations, 
a difference that makes it practically meaningless to 
group them under one umbrella as “Protestantism” as 
Weber does.8
Historians have often claimed that the coming of the 
reformation did away with the medieval welfare sys-
tem of the Catholic Church. This is not true. The Danish 
historian Troels Dahlerup has convincingly demonstrat-
ed that the Catholic mediaeval institutions continued 
for much longer than previously assumed and unpriv-
ileged were still taken care of (Dahlerup 1983 among 
other investigations). In the towns, that is. Neither the 
Catholic system nor the new Lutheran system extended 
much further than the walls of the towns and embraced 
therefore only a minimal percentage of the population. 
But since I am primarily interested here in the origin of 
the principles, it is nonetheless relevant to analyze the 
organization of poor relief I more detail. In accordance 
with the German model, each diocese in protestant 
Denmark was supposed to set up a special fund for the 
poor, the so-called “poor box”. Both these funds and 
the hospitals were to be run by lay people, but it was 
the bishops who were obliged to supervise them. In 
addition, the bishops were expected to ensure through 
the clergymen that the population supported the social 
work. 
Peder Palladius (1503-1560), the first Protestant bishop 
of the important diocese of Zealand, dealt compre-
hensively with this aspect of poor relief in his various 
writings and visitation lectures. He described in vivid 
detail the various groups of needy and encouraged his 
flock to give alms as their Christian duty. However, he 
also emphasized the punishment motive: those who 
do not help will be punished by God. “The public” thus 
still acknowledged a responsibility towards the poor in 
society. But it is legitimate to ask whether the peasants 
understood this new and subtle theological message. 
Did the peasant class felt that it was necessary to give 
when the direct theological grounds in form of salvation 
in return for charity disappeared? This is questionable, 
as corroborated by the emphasis Palladius placed on 
punishment and reward; in fact, he revealed himself 
that there were great difficulties. The general sense of 
responsibility had deteriorated and there was greater 
distress than in Catholic times – which in Denmark, 
however, was also a consequence of the civil war that 
preceded the accession of Christian III to the throne 
(Schwarz Lausten 1987, 192). 
The Nordic princes were ardently absorbed in Luther’s 
new teachings. The Danish King Christian 3. had already 
been so when he was duke in Haderslev in Schleswig 
in the 1520s while Gustav Vasa was preparing a cor-
responding reformation in Sweden. There were many 
different motives for the princes to carry out the ref-
ormation. Nordic historical research has traditionally 
chosen to emphasize the kings’ material interests in the 
church’s property and power. This was of course im-
portant, but it is not impossible that they also believed 
in the theological content. It is for instance quite clear 
that Christian 2., who earned such a bad posthumous 
reputation in Sweden with the epithet “Tyrant”, was a 
devout believer and spent much time on theological 
disputations. He had envoys at the diet in Worms in 
1521 and was, as noted previously, strongly influenced 
by the humanist Erasmus. Nonetheless, he decided in 
1524 in favour of Luther, even though it from a political 
point of view was practically suicide. After having been 
exiled by an uprising of the nobility in the peninsula of 
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Jutland in 1523, Christian 2. was completely depend-
ent on the most prominent protector of Catholicism in 
Europe, Emperor Charles V, with whose sister Elizabeth 
he was married. Christian could only hope to reclaim 
the throne with the support of the Habsburgs, who went 
so far as to remove his children to give them a Catholic 
upbringing. Nevertheless, it was not until 1530 that he 
renounced Lutheranism and reverted to Catholicism. 
This, however, brought him into conflict with his allies 
among the urban Protestant middle classes, especially 
in Copenhagen and Malmö (Schwarz Lausten 1995 and 
1999, 31). 
Scandinavian historians have traditionally explained 
the Reformation a as result of narrow political consid-
erations by the kings who wanted to lay hands on the 
third of all real estate that belonged to the Church. But, 
as modern Church historians as Martin Schwarz Lausten 
have convincingly demonstrated, both Christian 2. 
and Christian 3. were intensely involved in theologi-
cal questions. It is a sign of narrow minded material-
ism, which tells more about nineteenth and twentieth 
century historians than about the sixteenth century, to 
deny the significance of religious conviction for polit-
ical acts. The Lutheran teachings and the Evangelical 
preachers’ formulations were important foundations 
of the new state that resulted from the reformations 
from above in Denmark-Norway-Iceland as well as in 
Sweden-Finland. Initially, the result of the confiscation 
of the wealth of the Church was a drastic deterioration 
of conditions for the poor. But this was not so much 
due to the theological programme as the result of the 
power struggle between the king and the high nobility. 
Especially in Denmark, the high nobility’s desire for the 
church’s property prevailed, with the result that most 
of it was distributed. In Sweden the result was compa-
rable, but the nobility was in a weaker position than in 
Denmark. In Sweden proper, that is, for the nobility’s 
position was extraordinarily strong in the Baltic and 
northern German empire, which the country conquered 
later on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
after the intervention in Estonia in 1561. In Denmark the 
role of the king was weaker and in fact, at times in the 
period between 1560 and 1660, it is fair to characterise 
Denmark as a republic of the nobility with an elected 
king, somewhat along the lines of the elected monarchy 
in Poland-Lithuania rather than an absolutist monarchy 
which it only became after the near total defeat by Swe-
den in 1658.9 Just as in Poland, the result was very close 
to causing the dissolution of the state after the defeat to 
the more centrally governed Sweden in 1658. This fate 
was averted at the last moment when the great power 
of that time, the Netherlands, intervened on the Danish 
side in 1659-60 against Sweden.
From multinational absolutism  
to national social democracy
Rescued from defeat and near dissolution, Denmark 
in 1660 instituted the most absolutist rule in all Eu-
rope, although modelled on the French example. After 
protracted internal development and under the influ-
ence of the Enlightenment philosophers, this regime 
carried through a sort of revolution from above in the 
form of the great reform package from 1784 to 1814, 
which laid the foundations of an independent class of 
peasant-farmers and, eventually, democracy (Horstbøll 
and Østergård 1990). However, the gradual assumption 
of power by the peasant-farmers in the second half 
of the nineteenth century initially led to a deepening 
of class distinctions, culminating in the 1880s. At no 
point in Denmark’s history was the difference between 
the farm owners and the landless agricultural labour-
ers greater than in the 1880s in the midst of the fight 
for democracy. But the farmers nonetheless created a 
democracy that they called “popular”. It was not popular 
in the sense that it embraced the entire population. The 
landless laborers and the civil servants in the towns 
were not included in the definition of “popular” by the 
peasant farmers. Nonetheless, they created the struc-
tures and a democratic political language the agricultur-
al and industrial working class could later use to create 
the twentieth century’s social democracy (Østergård 
2004a). To put it somewhat pointedly, the discourse 
triumphed over the material interests. This is especially 
true in relation to the paradoxical introduction in 1891 
of a pension for everyone, regardless of their connec-
tion to the labor market, which according to Tim Knud-
sen marks the beginning of the universal welfare state 
in Denmark (Knudsen 2000). The class interests in the 
universal pension are difficult to determine, but it was 
introduced surprisingly early, at a time when the notion 
of insurance was predominant.
There were naturally also other necessary precondi-
tions for political and social democracy, but they were 
equally religious. Of particular importance were the 
eighteenth century religious (pietist) revivals mentioned 
above, which in many ways marked the penetration of 
Christianity into the broader classes. They gradually 
became different political movements in the course of 
the nineteenth century.10 Common to both movements 
is that they found their language and concepts in a 
reading of the Bible that could be traced back to Martin 
Luther’s, Hans Tausen’s and Peder Palladius’ educational 
translations of the complicated reformatory catechism 
to simple, rhyming sentences. It is in this great histor-
ical continuity that the Nordic welfare state should be 
understood. Social democracy is important, but more 
as a continuation of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies’ evangelical-pietist movements within the setting 
of a diminished and therefore ethnically homogenous 
nation state after 1864 than as a translator of an interna-
FONDET FOR DANSK-NORSK SAMARBEID 58
UFFE ØSTERGÅRDLUTHERAN POLITICAL CULTURE VERSUS ORTHODOX POLITICAL CULTURE 
tional socialism. Regardless of whatever social demo-
cratic platforms or generations of party members have 
said, the Danish welfare state is a result of secularized 
Lutheranism in national garment rather than interna-
tional socialism. “Denmark for the people” as the Social 
Democratic platform formulated the program in 1934.
Today, the majority of the Nordic countries are Luther-
an monarchies. Even though two of the states, Finland 
and Iceland, technically are republics, they demonstrate 
their Christian-monarchical origins with crosses in 
different colours on their flags. The countries’ peripher-
al position in Europe made it possible to realize social 
democratic potentials that less fortunate small nations 
like the Czech Republic have found it more difficult 
to achieve. Yet this is to a much lesser degree due to 
“Nordic” merits often assumed. The main reason for the 
relative prosperity for large parts of the twentieth centu-
ry is that the Nordic states were in the right part of the 
world in relation to both foreign policy and the interna-
tional economy and communication (Østergård 1997). 
The countries were important, each in their own way, 
as suppliers of raw materials for the central countries 
and have moreover been able to profit from a favour-
able relationship between low transport costs and the 
high manufacturing prices in the global economy. It 
was this market-determined good fortune that made 
welfare states possible in the Nordic countries in the 
twentieth century despite unfavourable climatic condi-
tions. Whether these systems will be able to survive the 
changes in the global economy is however less certain. 
And if the material basis of the welfare states is eroded, 
the basis of the apparently so deeply rooted national 
and religious-ecclesiastical identities is also likely to 
disappear.
In this way, national identity, church and welfare 
schemes and state and nation building are closely con-
nected. Therefore, it is also important in the analysis of 
the connection to distinguish between Protestantism in 
Haugianerne. Painting by Adolph Tidemand from 1848 . 
Photo: Jaques Lathion, Nasjonalmuseet for kunst, arkitektur og design
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general and Lutheranism in particular. The fact that Prot-
estantism is not just Protestantism but several different 
churches emerges clearly, albeit indirectly, in Max We-
ber’s aforementioned classic work The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism published in 1905. Here, the 
connection between capitalism and Protestantism is 
analysed in exemplary fashion. Weber’s thesis has been 
tremendously fruitful for research and has on several 
occasions formed the basis for empirical research. It is 
nonetheless important to remember that the Protestant-
ism that Weber studied was Calvinism. That is why he 
had to devote so much space to analysing the complex 
connections between doctrine of predestination and 
the active, calculating and forward-looking merchant 
capitalism. 
In many ways, Weber’s arguments seem surprising 
to Danish or Nordic Protestants until they realize that 
because they are Lutherans, they think differently from 
Calvinists. The major difference stands out in particular 
in comparison with the US, where the Calvinism of the 
Puritan settlers set the framework for the entire politi-
cal culture (Niebuhr 1929). This Calvinist nature applies 
even when the political culture is practised by people 
belonging to other religions like Judaism or Catholi-
cism. Catholicism has become the largest single church 
denomination in the US in the past century without this 
meaning that the country has changed its fundamental 
political culture. Americans have traditionally explained 
this astonishing constancy with the influence of the 
constitution. Yet historical sociologists as Robert Bellah, 
inspired by Max Weber, have emphasized the signifi-
cance of religion, or rather, religions, for political culture 
and mentality of North America (Bellah a.o. 1985). Soon, 
we will probably witness a US where the same public 
political and economic values will be shared by Mus-
lims, Hindus or Buddhists in the same way that Jews 
and Catholics who were strongly influenced by Calvinist 
thinking on renunciation, saving up and the belief that 
God’s will was behind public success joined the ranks 
of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite, the so-called 
WASPs. 
Most recently, three Danish scholars have undertak-
en a similar investigation of the role of religion in the 
Danish national consensus (Gundelach, Iversen and 
Warburg 2008). They confirm the intimate connection 
between Lutheranism and Danishness. Jan Lindhardt 
(1938-2015), former bishop of Roskilde, has described 
the relation as follows: “Danes do not need to go to 
church because they live in their Danishness every 
day”. This apparently paradoxical statement about a 
people that is often perceived as the most secularized 
in the world strikes a theme that Danes have gradually 
become more aware of in recent years as a result of the 
integration in Europe and the subsequent collision with 
other ways of organizing the relationship between state 
and church. The Danish national church calls itself the 
“Peoples’s Church”. Organisationally its set up can best 
be described as “well-organized anarchy”, as the church 
historian and folk high school principal Hal Koch (1904-
1963), who was an ardent supporter of this system, 
once put it (Lindhardt 196811). Although it is a national 
church, it has never been regulated in accordance with 
the constitution of 1849, even though this was envis-
aged. The vague and undefined relationship between 
state and church is now beginning to raise problems, 
especially with regard to the relationship between so-
called “real” Danes and the many immigrants of other 
religions, especially Islam, which has now grown to the 
position as the second largest religion in Denmark. 
Likewise, the lack of clarification makes it virtually 
impossible for the Danish national church to enter into 
more binding ecumenical co-operation such as the Por-
voo Declaration of 1995 on the relationship between the 
Evangelical churches and the Anglican Church. Martin 
Schwarz Lausten, in a recent account of the history of 
the Danish church, claims that the proposal for closer 
co-operation between the Nordic and Baltic churches 
and the Anglican Church was rejected by the bishops. 
They drew attention to the fact that the declaration’s 
view on bishops and clergyman was contrary to the 
underlying basis of the Danish church (Schwarz Lausten 
1999, 116). For on its establishment, the Lutheran church 
broke with the so-called apostolic succession, that is, 
that there is a direct connection to the Apostle Peter, 
whom Jesus made his representative on earth by the 
imposition of hands. This continuity was broken by let-
ting Johann Bugenhagen (1485-1558), who himself was 
not anointed, anoint the first Danish bishops (Schwarz 
Lausten 1999, 43). For that reason, the bishops refused 
to sign the declaration. The same is true of the “Joint 
Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification” between 
Lutherans and Catholics (Schwarz Lausten 1999, 116-
117). The problem with this interpretation is that not 
many people in the Danish national church recognized 
the bishops’ right to speak on behalf of the church, not 
even after a hearing among the parishioners as took 
place in these cases. According to this consistent opin-
ion, no one except the individual parish has the right to 
express an opinion on anything. Yet precisely this lack 
of authority is perceived as an advantage of the Danish 
system by the most prominent. The church historian Leif 
Grane concluded one of his last lectures on the subject 
as follows:
Aside from all the nuances, it could be said that Lu-
theranism’s rejection of a divine church organization 
makes its view of the church far less comprehensible 
to outsiders than those churches that have a different 
ability to unite the outer organization with the claim 
that the visible church can speak on the behalf of God 
also outside the context of the church service. By the 
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context of the church service, I do not just mean the 
actual church service but also all situations in which 
exactly what carries the church service – and nothing 
else – is in the forefront. This, people think, is odd and 
not very forceful. “That’s not much”, as a journalist 
said to me recently. He wanted clear statements on 
important ethical questions so people had something 
to go by. 
(Grane 1998, 10 my translation).
A similar opinion is put differently by the literary critic 
Hans Hauge who, in an article about the theological 
opinions of the priest and politician Søren Krarup (b. 
1937), notes that in its consistent efforts to differentiate 
between the temporal and the religious in the gospel, 
Krarup’s movement “Tidehverv” (literally “New Era”) 
ended up “preaching the churches empty”. In his own 
words:
Krarup has been shaped by an undemocratic, theo-
logical-critical avant-garde movement, which began 
in Denmark in the 1920’s, “New Era”. The priests from 
“New Era” have never been understood, for their art 
of preaching is and was of the same type as mod-
ernist poetry. They consciously talked the churches 
empty. They believed that heaven belonged to those 
who played bingo. To call oneself a Christian, they 
said, was ‘humbug’ 
(Hauge 2002, my translation).12
All this is ultimately the result of the Lutheran doctrine 
on the direct connection between God and the indi-
vidual. Clergymen are not privileged intermediaries 
between God and people. This means that parishioners 
and parishes have been given a special role in state 
management in the five Nordic countries, where the Lu-
theran-Evangelical church, for the historical reasons ex-
plained above, has had, as the only place in the world, 
a virtual monopoly.13 Danes apparently have absolutely 
no problem with this muddled situation, while in Swe-
den it has led to a formal separation of state and church, 
laying the grounds for a situation that has long since 
been in place in other civilized European countries. 
There is apparently no need of this in Denmark, which 
may indicate that Jan Lindhardt is right in his asser-
tion of the connection between national identity and 
the church. At the same time, it probably provides an 
explanation of the Danes’ particularly reluctant relation-
ship to European integration, a co-operation the small 
states in Europe are otherwise so enthusiastic about (cf. 
Østergård 2000). Resistance to the EU’s supranational 
endeavours is normally found in large countries, or 
rather, in countries that believe they are still large. The 
majority of small countries see European co-operation 
as a way of winning influence through supranational 
regulation in the anarchist international system we 
usually call international politics. This special Danish, 
religiously based nationalism is a large degree due to 
the influence of the clergyman, poet, historian, school 
thinker and much more N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). 
His thinking is reflected in the organization of the 
church, Danish nationalism and national identity in 
general and the welfare state in particular. That this 
view today has been taken to extremes by the priest 
and politician Søren Krarup and the nationalist-populist 
Danish People’s Party is a different story that underlines 
the complex character of the influences of Lutheranism. 
The inspiration from Luther and Grundtvig can lead to 
narrow populist nationalism as well as to universal and 
humanist social democracy. I have only indicated one 
of the lines of connection and influence in this contri-
bution hoping not to have fallen into the trap of over-
determined path dependence the sociologist Lars Bo 
Kaspersen and Johannes Lindvall have warned against 
in the recent essay on the absence of religion in the 
determination of the politics of poor relief and primary 
education in Denmark and Sweden (Kaspersen and 
Lindvall 2008).
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Notes
1  The following contribution builds upon and elaborates for-
mer publications, in particular Østergård 1997, Østergård 
2011 and Østergård 2012. Furthermore, I would like to draw 
attention to a most interesting analysis by the American 
economist Robert Nelson of the importance of Lutheran-
ism for the social democratic welfare states in the Nordic 
countries, Nelson 2016. It has not yet been published but 
I have the privilege to have read it in an almost finished 
version. Among many interesting and provocative ideas it 
contains an in-depth analysis of the differences between 
Calvinism and Lutheranism.
2  In 1801 Iceland had just over 47.000 inhabitants, 307 of 
these living in the capital Reykjavik according to Agnars-
dóttor 2004, 80.
3  A Finlander is a citizen of the bilingual state Finland which 
comprises Finnish as well as Swedish speakers, although 
the latter only constitute a small minority.
4  It is important to distinguish between Calvinism and 
Lutheranism. Normally the two are lumped together as 
Protestantism, see f. ex. the influential work of Max Weber 
on the relationship between Capitalism and Protestantism 
from 1905 (cf. Nelson 2016). Both versions of Protestant-
ism broke with the supranational Catholic Church in the 
16th century and share some points of doctrine. But the 
differences are enormous, in theology as well as in the 
perception of the relationship between church and state. 
National churches are a result of Lutheranism – and of the 
eastern Orthodox version of Christianity beginning with 
the establishment of a national church in Greece in 1833.
5  The early diffusion of literacy in the Nordic countries has 
been investigated in a comparative context in a series of 
detailed studies.
6  See Stråth 1993 for a critical account of the notions of the 
Swedish “folkhem” and of a distinct Nordic model.
7  Peter Englund has written an impressive number of schol-
arly – and best-selling – books on Swedish history in the 
imperial age in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
2008-14 he served as secretary of the Swedish Academy 
which awards the Nobel Prize in literature.
8  Only in Prussia the reformed and evangelical churches 
were successfully united in one church. In the Nether-
lands the so-called Anti-Revolutionary Party and the 
Christlijk-Historische Unie collaborate in politics, but are 
separate churches. In 1975 these two protestant churches 
even joined hands with the Catholics in the party, Christen 
Demokratisch Appèl (Manow 2008, 9).
9  Among Danish historians the aristocratic system of gov-
ernance in collaboration with the elected king is usually 
referred to as ‘government by the aristoctacy’, “adelsvæl-
de” in Danish (cf. Fridericia 1894).
10  See Wåhlin 1987 and Sanders 1995. The Danish-American 
sociologist Aage Sørensen has analysed the importance 
of pietism for the development of the Nordic welfare state 
(Sørensen 1998).
11  The church historian P. G. Lindhardt is the father of the 
former bishop Jan Lindhardt.
12  An in-depth analysis of the importance of Søren Krarup 
and “New Era” for the rise of populist nationalism in Den-
mark over the last twenty to thirty years is provided in a 
doctoral thesis by Mette Zølner at the European University 
Institute in Firenze, published as Zølner 2000.
13  At least until recently. In Sweden Church and state were 
separated in 2000 and the same may happen in the other 
Nordic countries. What the consequences of this will be for 
the welfare systems and the national homogeneity in the 
countries remains to be seen.
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To say that secularization has developed differently in 
Russia and the Nordic countries would be something of 
an understatement, to say the least. While Russia has 
experienced secularization in its most radical, violent 
and coercive form, the Nordic countries have seen it as 
a peaceful, gradual and usually mild-mannered process. 
While Russia has experienced what could reasonably 
be described as a war waged by the state against the 
church, some of the Nordic countries, Denmark and 
Norway in particular, are still in a position where the 
close formal pre-secular relationship between church 
and state remains in place, more or less unchanged.
Even so, although the means of secularization have 
been different, the result may well be largely similar. Al-
though the Nordic countries have experienced nothing 
like the violence and coercion applied in Soviet times 
against religion in Russia, secularizing tendencies have 
nevertheless had a profound effect also in the Nordic 
countries. The alienation of religious perspectives, the 
marginalization - even exile - of religion from the public 
square, the loss of tradition, erosion of a shared Chris-
tian consciousness and the disregard for traditional 
values have all occurred in the Nordic countries in vary-
ing degrees, as almost everywhere in Western Europe, 
particularly since WWII. Remarkable in a comparison 
with Russia and the other former socialist countries is 
the fact that the process of secularization in the West 
has happened “by itself”. Although occasionally promot-
ed by official government policy or influential move-
ments and opinion makers, secularization as a whole 
has not been directly coercive. Rather, it has occurred in 
a general atmosphere of freedom.
The theme of this lecture, a comparative analysis of 
the prospects of post-secularization in Russia and the 
Nordic countries, is vastly complex and far beyond my 
competence. What I shall attempt here are merely a few 
scattered observations and reflections on the theme 
that I hope may be a catalyst for further thinking and 
discussion. If there is to be any hope of a better under-
standing between Russia and the Nordic countries, and 
the West in general, we need to know and analyze both 
our own traditions, assumptions and prejudices and 
those of the other party. Whether such knowledge and 
understanding suffice to do the trick, to promote mutual 
understanding, is questionable but at least it may be a 
beginning.
The observations and reflections will be presented in 
the form of a series of theses, assertions, propositions, 
suggestions, questions. In fact, you may find, that as I 
progress, I shall become increasingly uncertain, out of 
my depth.
The historical relationship between Church and State in 
Russia and the Nordic countries has theoretically been 
organized in accordance with two different, mutually 
exclusive principles.
In Orthodox Russia the relationship has been based 
on the Byzantine Symphonia principle, which defines 
the inseparable unity between Church and State and 
the harmonious collaboration between them. This is by 
definition a theocratic principle.
In the Lutheran countries of the North, the relationship 
has been based on Luther’s doctrine of the two king-
doms, the secular and the spiritual, which defines the 
fundamental distinction between them. Church and 
State may collaborate when appropriate, but they may 
also find themselves at odds with each other. This prin-
ciple implies a rejection of theocracy.
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In accordance with the symphonic principle, the rela-
tionship and the collaboration between Church and 
State in Russia cannot be too close, as long as both par-
ties respect each other and do not seek to dominate the 
other party. In a traditional symphonic perspective, both 
Church and State are engaged in the same Christian 
project. Ideally, the State aught to be a Christian state.
A critique of a close collaboration between Church and 
State in Russia (or other Orthodox countries), as often 
voiced in Western media, will not seem relevant from a 
symphonic point of view.
In accordance with the doctrine of the two kingdoms 
the relationship between Church (or churches) and State 
in the Nordic countries can easily become too close. If 
the State, for example, attempts to force a secular agen-
da on the Church or if the Church attempts to influence 
the State with specifically religious views. Whether, or 
to what extent, the State is engaged in the same Chris-
tian project as the Church is uncertain and remains 
debatable.
A critique of insufficient Church influence on public pol-
icy, perhaps even public morality, in Nordic countries is 
therefore not a priori relevant.
Against this background, current actual formal practice 
in both Russia and the Nordic countries is remarkable: 
In Russia, the Church as a private institution remains 
separated from the State, which according to its con-
stitution is a secular state with no official ideology 
or religion. In some Nordic countries, Denmark and 
Norway in particular, the Lutheran Church remains a 
state church enjoying a special position according to the 
constitutions of both countries. In Norway the consti-
tution explicitly states that the basis of national values 
remains “our Christian and humanist heritage”. In both 
countries, the secular parliament is the de-facto synod 
of the established Lutheran Church.
In both Russia and the Nordic countries there seems 
to be a contradiction between the formal principle of 
church government and actual practice. These contradic-
tions have a long history and have developed over time.
In Russia, actual practice has long been and still is less 
theocratic than the principle prescribes.
In the Nordic countries, at least in Denmark and Nor-
way, actual practice has been and perhaps still is more 
theocratic than the principle prescribes.
In both Russia and the Nordic countries, this situation is 
a product of a shared historical experience of absolut-
ism.
In Denmark and Norway (which in this respect are 
the primary representatives of the Nordic countries), 
the absolutist State Church was made possible by the 
Reformation. With no Pope and no Catholic archbishop, 
the king could take over as head of the church in accor-
dance with the Protestant practice of princely church 
government. Originally, a pragmatic solution, this 
practice was codified as a principle lasting for “all time” 
with the establishment of absolutism in the 1660s. 
With the king as sole head of both state and church, 
the two were united so closely that the Church almost 
disappeared as an independent institution. Although 
made possible by the Reformation, this amalgamation 
of State and Church was a blatant contradiction of the 
doctrine of the two kingdoms and implied an unprece-
dented elevation of the king in a manner that can only 
be described as theocratic.
In Russia absolutism as introduced by Peter the Great 
around 1700 was directly inspired by west European 
precedent, not least as practiced in the Nordic Protes-
tant countries. Here too, the abolition of the patriarchy 
deprived the Church of its own leadership in favour of 
the tsar as formal head. Although a close relationship 
between Church and State is prescribed by Orthodox 
tradition, the subjection of the Church under the State is 
clearly a contradiction of the symphonic principle.
In the Nordic countries, absolutism was a movement 
towards theocracy. Endowing the king’s person and the 
state as a whole with Divine right and a sacred purpose.
In Russia, absolutism was a movement away from the-
ocracy. A mobilization of the Church for the purposes of 
the State and thus a movement towards secularization.
For a period of about 150 years, 1700-1849 Russia and 
Denmark-Norway (Norway only until 1814) share a his-
tory of closely related organizations of State and Church 
and, to a lesser extent, society more generally. Having 
arrived from opposing sides at a similar result, both 
organizations can be described as semi-theocratic. Both 
before and after this period, the histories are starkly 
diverging and far from compatible.
Can this bit of shared historical experience be a basis 
for better mutual understanding? Can it help us in the 
Nordic countries better to understand the Russian expe-
rience and appreciate their ongoing struggle to accom-
modate the western influences introduced by Peter with 
Russian-Orthodox tradition? Can it help the Russians to 
appreciate that not everything that has come to them 
from the West has been bad for them? That some of it 
has in fact helped them to become the great nation that 
they aspire to be. 
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As theocratic, the symphonia principle by definition 
does not permit the idea or practice of secularization. 
Not only because the symphony cannot function prop-
erly with a non-Christian or merely non-Orthodox ruler, 
but also more fundamentally because secularization is 
opposed to the principal aim of the (Orthodox) Church: 
to penetrate as much of the world as possible with 
Christianity. In view of the central Orthodox doctrines of 
the deification of man (theosis) and the transfiguration 
of all creation, the secular idea of a human sphere evac-
uated by God, where God has no place or no power, 
from where he cannot be invoked, remains a meaning-
less concept. Strictly speaking, secularization can only 
be seen as a retreat and surrender of Christian ground.
Traditional Orthodoxy evinces a strong anti-modern 
tendency.
When representatives of Orthodoxy challenge “mod-
ern” phenomena like secularization, democracy and 
human rights and defend “traditional values”, they may 
in fact be expressing not merely justifications of reac-
tion and repression but sincere beliefs.
In contrast, the doctrine of the two kingdoms with its 
distinction between a secular and a spiritual sphere is 
by definition permissive of secularization. Indeed, this 
doctrine is often perceived as one of the beginnings of 
the secularization process. The idea that Christianity is a 
self-secularizing religion, prevalent not only in western 
theology but also in history and social thought, owes 
much to this fundamental doctrine, as well as to other 
aspects of Protestant theology.
Protestantism is widely seen as a precondition or even 
an essential part of modernity.
Even so, the secularizing dynamic of the two-kingdom 
doctrine obviously must have its limits. Of course, 
Protestantism can no more than Orthodoxy aim to see 
secularization taken to its extreme consequence of a to-
tal abandonment of Christianity. In practice the difficult 
question is: how to strike the balance between the secu-
lar and the spiritual, how to determine what belongs to 
the emperor and what to God.
In relation to the two-kingdom doctrine, two qualifica-
tions apply.
1. In Luther’s own definition, the doctrine clearly as-
serts that God had ordained not only the church but 
also the state (worldly authority) with the purpose 
of maintaining order in society. Even if the state 
behaves in an un-Christian manner, Luther assumes 
the situation of his own day that the state existed in 
a society generally defined by Christian concepts.
2. This also applies to day. Even if the doctrine does 
not explicitly require state representatives to be 
Christian, they must at least possess a minimum 
consciousness of Christianity in order to be aware 
of the doctrine. Even if they are not themselves 
Christian they must know and respect the doctrine 
and act in accordance with it.
Also for Luther, the idea of an entirely human sphere 
evacuated by God would be a meaningless concept. 
The power of God is everywhere, but salvation is only 
in believing the word of God; not in all sorts of worldly 
things.
Thus, the distinction between the two kingdoms is not 
wholly identical to a modern distinction between reli-
gion and politics. This distinction precisely presuppos-
es the secularized society in which religion in general 
has been privatized and only politics may legitimately 
inhabit the public square. A classical Lutheran may 
protest this kind of society no less than a traditional 
Orthodox.
The modern distinction probably prevails. It is widely 
used in western societies on themselves but also on 
other societies such as the Russian. On the basis of this 
standard principle much criticism is leveled against the 
apparent growth of collaboration between church and 
state in Russia.
What now?
Here is just one final observation on the Russian situa-
tion.
Despite closer interaction with the Russian state, real or 
perceived, the Russian Orthodox Church will probably 
not want to become a formal state Church. It is hardly in 
accordance with the symphonic principle and historical 
experience with state church status under the Petrine 
empire was not favorable to the Church. From the 
Church’s point of view it would make better sense, if the 
Russian state were to declare itself officially Orthodox.
Then a full version of the Symphony might be re-estab-
lished.
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APENDIX 
This essay in comparison is based on the proposition 
that Denmark and Russia with specific regard to the 
relationship between Church and State can each be 
considered paradigmatic of their respective versions of 
Christianity: (Lutheran) Protestantism and Orthodoxy.
In the case of Russia, it is evident. After the demise of 
the Byzantine Empire in 1453, Russia took over the posi-
tion as the principal upholder of Orthodoxy; the largest, 
and for the subsequent almost 400 years, also the only 
country in which Orthodoxy was free to develop on its 
own terms; the only country where Orthodox theocrat-
ic government could be practiced undisturbedly for a 
long period of time. Russia, therefore, can be consid-
ered paradigmatic of Orthodoxy also in a more general 
sense.
In the case of Denmark, it is not quite as evident, 
though. This country cannot be considered paradigmat-
ic of Protestantism or merely Lutheranism as a whole, 
since Protestant Christianity is present in a number of 
other countries that have managed to maintain political 
independence throughout several centuries; some of 
them are also considerably larger. However, with specif-
ic regard to the church-state relationship, the exemplary 
character of Denmark can be claimed with good reason: 
in no other country have the Protestant princely state 
and the Protestant princely church developed more con-
sistently and durably than in Denmark; a fact that can 
be demonstrated by the enduring existence of the basic 
organizational structures even in the early twenty-first 
century. An additional part of the story is the fact that, 
until 1814, the Danish state also included Norway, and 
until 1864, also the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, 
which therefore also partake to some extent in the first 
almost 300 years, almost 350 years respectively, of the 
development presented here.
Halvor Tjønn og Paavo Lipponen
The symphony  
and the two kingdoms
 
The church-state relationship in  
Denmark and Russia in the 15th–20th centuries
 By Christian Gottlieb
Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Moscow
Marmorkirken, Copenhagen
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A study of the history of these two states thus facilitates 
a comparative consideration of the development of the 
church-state relationship in two versions characteristic 
of western and eastern Christianity, respectively; two 
versions sharing another decisive presupposition: inde-
pendence of Papal influence. In both states the church-
state relationship has developed on its own terms 
within the given national, or rather territorial, frame-
work. This is not disturbed by the fact that the underly-
ing theological and political ideas do not derive from 
either Denmark or Russia themselves, perhaps even on 
the contrary. Both countries overtake and promote an 
external inheritance to which they can hardly be said to 
provide original contributions even though their respec-
tive situations provide the opportunity to take the ideas 
to radical conclusions.
The chronological perspective 
The paradigmatic character of the church-state relation-
ship has been developing for several centuries in both 
states; in Russia since the mid-15th century, in Denmark 
since the early 16th century. In both cases the develop-
ment of the relationship in modern times presuppos-
es a kind of emancipation from the original “mother 
church”: in Russia from Constantinople, in Denmark 
from Rome. In both cases this becomes decisive for the 
development of the relationship and basic to its evolv-
ing paradigmatic character.
In Russia emancipation and independence appear on 
two levels: externally and ecclesiastically as a conse-
quence of the demise of the Byzantine Empire, inter-
nally and nationally as a consequence of the collapse 
of the Mongol hegemony. However, ecclesiastical 
independence of Constantinople remains a question 
only of ecclesiastical law, i.e. of institutional authority, 
not of Orthodox doctrine, which continues in Russia 
unchanged. From Byzantium Russia also overtakes the 
Byzantine ideology of the Christian empire which can 
now no longer be realized within its original framework. 
However, the ideology proves very useful in connec-
tion with the subjection of the foreign domination of 
Russia and national integration under the princes of 
Moscow. This development begins in the second half of 
the 15th century and is manifested most visibly in the 
establishment of the tsardom in 1547 under Ivan IV and 
in 1589 in the elevation of Moscow as an independent 
patriarchy. In 1552 begins the vast imperial expansion 
of Russia.
In Denmark and Norway emancipation comes in the 
shape of the Reformation. Emancipation, thus, is pri-
marily ecclesiastical but, unlike in Russia, it is not only a 
question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction but also of eccle-
siastical doctrine. As the Reformation marks a radical 
break with Roman-Catholic doctrine, the break with the 
Roman church becomes both a religious and a political 
demarcation placing Denmark and Norway among a 
small group of reformed countries in Northern Europe 
where church and state have to be re-organized a-new 
and in a new mutual relationship. This development 
begins in the 1520s and culminates in 1536-37 with the 
introduction of the Reformation throughout the king-
dom by King Christian III. The Danish and Norwegian 
archbishoprics are abolished and the king made de-fac-
to earthly head of the church. This becomes the basis of 
the state-church establishment unfolded by subsequent 
monarchs and definitively instituted by the introduction 
of absolutism in 1660 as formalized in the Law of Roy-
alty (Kongeloven) of 1665, the Law of Denmark (Danske 
Lov) of 1683, and the Law of Norway (Norske Lov) of 
1687. This construction remains formally in power for 
most of the subsequent two centuries.
In both Russia and Denmark-Norway the result be-
comes a church organized administratively and insti-
tutionally – though not doctrinally – on purely national 
or territorial terms, closely tied to the monarch who 
more or less formally becomes its earthly head and, 
with time, achieves absolute power. In the first stages of 
these developments – in the 16th-17th centuries – they 
Rune stone, Gripsholm, Sweden, about 1050. Ingvar, the “widely travelled”, 
lead a Viking campaign through Russia to Særkland by the Caspian Sea. The 
campaign ended in definitive defeat. Ingvar’s campaign is mentioned on 30 
rune stones in the Mälar Valley
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”Om svenskarna vunnit 1709 hade  
Sverige varit stormakten i Nordeuropa 
och inte Ryssland. Kanske den ryska re-
volutionen hade genomförts i  
Stockholm”.
Uffe Østergaard
occur entirely without mutual influence, as connections 
between Russia and (Western) Europe in this period 
remain highly sporadic. However, In Russia, the next 
stage in the church-state relationship occurs very much 
under the influence of Western Europe in general and 
the Protestant countries, including Denmark, in partic-
ular. The reforms of Peter the Great in the early 1700s 
attempt to reshape Russia in the image of Western 
Europe, involving also a re-organization of the Orthodox 
Church. The patriarchy is abolished (as were the Danish 
and Norwegian archbishoprics) whereby the church is 
deprived of independent leadership, and the Russian 
church is established as a state-church according to 
a Protestant model – though retaining its Orthodox 
confession. As such it exists for the subsequent two 
centuries.
In both cases the development from the principle of 
ecclesiastical independence to that of privileged prince-
ly state church has been seen as the state’s overtaking 
of the church, which thereby becomes part of the state. 
The question remains, however, whether it could also 
be seen as the state becoming church, in as much as the 
state overtakes the fundamental purpose of the church: 
to work for the spread and upholding of the gospel, at 
least to the extent that Christianity is regarded as an 
inalienable (ideological) presupposition of the state’s 
existence. Within the framework of the system the state 
cannot abandon Christianity without giving up its own 
justification. In both cases it is clear that the relation-
ship between church and state formally and theoretical-
ly, if not always in practice, retains a highly theocratic 
character.
The theocratic establishment exerts a decisive influence 
on the development of both Russian and Danish-Nor-
wegian society, although in highly different ways. This 
becomes clear also in the latter stages of the church-
state relationship as increasing modernization and 
secularization create a demand for dismantling of the-
ocracy. The close connection between Church and State 
inevitably causes the simmering revolt against the state 
and the existing social order also to involve the church. 
As unfolded in practice the differences between the 
two countries and their churches here become highly 
visible.
In Denmark the dismantling of theocracy occurs in 
connection with the abolition of absolutism in 1848 
that paves the way for the first democratic Constitu-
tion of 1849. With this follows the substitution of the 
state church of absolutism with the “people’s church” 
(folkekirke) of democracy that, in consequence of the 
new freedom of religion, can no longer be vested with 
formal monopoly status. Even so, by virtue of the near 
total de-facto domination of the folkekirke in the popu-
Peter the Great. Portrait by Jean-Marc Nattier, 1717
Title page of the Danish Bible of King Christian III of 1550
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lation, this church still retains a privileged constitutional 
position and as such remains supported by the state. 
However, the ecclesiastical charter promised by the 
Constitution and meant to define the situation and lead-
ership of the church is never realized, despite repeat-
ed attempts. Even though the introduction in 1903 of 
popularly elected parish councils has had considerable 
practical importance for daily church life, the funda-
mental situation of the church and its relationship to the 
state still remain formally unclarified. In 2016, remains 
of the formal theocratic order still live on side by side 
with democratically determined practice.
In Russia, the dismantling of the old order occurs in 
a much different and much more violent way. In con-
sequence of the revolutions of February and October 
1917, initially the monarchy and then every remaining 
connection between church and state are abolished. 
The Orthodox Church hardly manages to find its own 
feet in its new independent situation before the state’s 
relationship to the church is turned into one of unremit-
ting hostility. In the socialist October Revolution power 
is seized by the radically anti-religious Bolshevik party, 
which right from the beginning, and since 1922 within 
the framework of the newly established Soviet state, 
launches a comprehensive and systematic campaign of 
anti-religious propaganda and persecution; something 
that remains a recurring phenomenon almost through-
out the duration of the Soviet Union. The purpose is 
the total annihilation of all religion that is seen as an ob-
stacle to the achievement of the aim of the new regime: 
the construction of a socialist society. Despite enduring 
persecution at great human and material cost, the re-
gime never succeeds in definitively obliterating religion. 
When, in an attempt at reform of Soviet society, the 
Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev decides, 
in 1987-88, on a change of course by concluding peace 
with the church, the latter is therefore still left with 
some foundation in Russian society. Since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 religion in general and the 
Russian-Orthodox Church in particular have achieved a 
remarkable renaissance and an explosive institutional 
growth that have turned this church into a significant 
player in present-day post-Soviet Russian society. 
According to the Russian Constitution of 1993, church 
and state remain separate but many indications suggest 
that the relationship is becoming increasingly close and 
mutually beneficial.
Theological and political perspectives 
As mentioned above, it is characteristic of both Russia 
and Denmark that the fundamental theological, ideo-
logical and political ideas that have shaped the devel-
opment of the church-state relationship, have been 
overtaken from outside. In Russia the introduction of 
Byzantine Christianity entails the idea of the symphony 
or harmony, formulated in 535 by the Emperor Justinian 
as the Orthodox ideal of integration of state and church, 
which as equal partners collaborate harmoniously on 
the achievement of their shared goal: the construction 
of an earthly premonition of the Kingdom of God that 
is to come. In Denmark and Norway the introduction 
of the Reformation entails the Lutheran doctrine of the 
two kingdoms, the spiritual and the secular, externally 
represented by church and state, which according to 
the principle may not interfere with each other’s af-
fairs. These two principles are thus obvious opposites. 
Whereas the doctrine of the symphony proposes the 
ideal symbiosis of church and state, thus formulating 
a theocratic norm, the doctrine of the two kingdoms is 
theoretically about the polar opposite: the proper dis-
tinction between spiritual and secular government in all 
relationships, including that between church and state. 
This is not a theocratic ideal.
Against this background it is possible to observe a 
marked contrast between theory and practice in Russia 
The Law of Royalty, Lex Regia; was the formal juridical foundation of Danish 
absolutism, dated 14 November 1665
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and Denmark(-Norway). Although the theocratic ideal 
has not been unchallenged in Russia and hardly ever 
fully realized, it is not surprising that the character of 
the church-state relationship in this country during the 
course of several centuries has been so decidedly theo-
cratic. In other words, there seems to be a wide degree 
of coincidence of theory and practice, at least until the 
reforms of Peter the Great, which to a certain extent 
challenges the terms of the symphony.
In contrast to this, it is striking to observe in the Dan-
ish-Norwegian development how far the divide is 
between the official theory of the two kingdoms and 
actual practice. Although the doctrine of the two king-
doms is mentioned explicitly in the confession of the 
Lutheran churches, the Augsburg Confession of 1530, 
by which the Law of Royalty of 1665 obliges the Dan-
ish-Norwegian kings to abide for “all time”, the principle 
is ignored in practice in favor of the more politically 
determined principle of princely church government. In-
troduced already at the Reformation, this principle was 
later confirmed in Germany at the Augsburg Settlement 
of 1555. As a result, the Lutheran princes formally took 
over the episcopal rights formerly belonging to Catholic 
bishops. Within his domain, the individual prince ac-
quired the status of a sort of supreme bishop (summus 
episcopus) with the power to decide both on ordinary 
administration of the church and on doctrinal issues. It 
was this principle, though not under this name, that was 
realized with great consistency in Denmark and Norway 
after the Reformation. With the subsequent introduction 
of absolutism, the result is the virtual disappearance 
of the church as an independent institution. Where the 
two kingdoms according to Lutheran doctrine had to be 
clearly distinguished from each other, they are in prac-
tice amalgamated into a unity that, at least on the sur-
face, makes the Protestant princely church remarkably 
similar to the Orthodox theocracy. This is confirmed by 
the fact that precisely the Protestant state church could 
become relevant as a model for Tsar Peter’s administra-
tive reform of the Orthodox Church whose government, 
therefore, became a hybrid of Protestant and Orthodox 
principles. Inspired by Protestant models, Peter’s reform 
dictates the subjection of the church under the tsar with 
whom the church thus looses its formal equality. The 
reform thus initiates a development that actually leads 
away from theocracy in its ideal Orthodox form in the 
direction of absolutism. The opposite takes place in 
Denmark and Norway where the introduction of abso-
lutism – for the same reason: the king’s subjection of 
the church – initiates a development towards theocracy, 
hardly granted by earlier tradition.
The fundamental difference between the principles of 
the two traditions, the symphony and the two king-
doms, is not therefore without significance, however; 
it just only becomes visible in connection with the 
dismantling of the theocratic establishment. As men-
tioned, this took place in very different ways in the two 
countries and even though these developments have 
many and complex explanations, the perception of the 
ideal character of the church-state relationship is likely 
to be one of them. Here the two principles evince a 
fundamental difference as to which possibilities may by 
permissible. Whereas the doctrine of the two kingdoms 
entails the possibility – and, as a point of principle, even 
the necessity – of perceiving theocracy as a theological 
misunderstanding, the doctrine of the symphony does 
not seem to allow this possibility. On the contrary, the 
symphony expresses the very principle of theocracy 
and thus assumes an absolute character. In practice, 
this means that where the doctrine of the two kingdoms 
makes it not only possible but also desirable to disman-
tle theocracy – also from a Christian perspective – and 
possibly to let this happen in a slow gradual process, 
the principle of symphony makes it neither possible nor 
desirable to dismantle or merely modify theocracy. On 
the terms of the symphony, a dismantling can therefore 
only acquire the character of total and radical abolition.
No matter how conscious of this problematic the actual 
Danish and Russian actors in the dismantling of theoc-
racy may have been, this was what actually happened: 
in Denmark a peaceful, gradual development, which 
has in practice done away with theocracy, yet has also 
permitted remains of it to exist in the close connection 
between church and state still in existence; in Russia 
an abrupt, violent, radical abolition of theocracy, which 
throughout most of the 20th century entailed a total 
break of relations between church and state and came 
close to annihilating the church altogether as an institu-
tion.
This difference is also connected with the relationship 
of the two principles to the concepts of modernity and 
secularization. Considered in this light, it seems obvi-
ous that the doctrine of the two kingdoms is in itself 
a presupposition of modernity and also has a role to 
play in the secularization process, whereas the doctrine 
of the symphony is of premodern and perhaps even 
anti-modern character. Likewise, it is equally evident 
that this difference emanates from a more fundamen-
tal theological difference in the understanding of the 
nature of the church and the aim of the Christian life, in 
the church as well as in the state. However, an unfolding 
of this theological difference between East and West will 
lead too far in this connection and can therefore only be 
suggested here.
January 2009 (rev. June 2016)
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